Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Two companies, Gulf Coast Investments, LLC and Trigger Energy Holdings, LLC, sold their membership interests in Blueprint Energy Partners, LLC to TCU Holdings, LLC. Blueprint, formed in 2017 for shale oil operations in Wyoming, originally had three equal members: Gulf Coast, Trigger, and TCU, with Aladdin Capital, Inc. as the manager and primary creditor. After financial struggles and interpersonal conflicts, the parties negotiated the buyout in 2019. TCU’s principal, Kent Stevens, threatened to leave and take staff and clients unless Gulf Coast and Trigger agreed to a set price, known as the “dynamite option.” Despite these threats, the plaintiffs were represented by counsel who advised them of alternatives, and negotiations spanned several months, culminating in a signed purchase agreement.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, reviewed the plaintiffs’ post-sale lawsuit alleging economic duress, breach of operating agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, shareholder oppression, unjust enrichment, and sought accounting and injunctive relief. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all counts, reasoning that the plaintiffs voluntarily entered the agreement, had legal alternatives, and that the contract itself contained a waiver of further claims. The court also addressed each substantive claim on its merits, finding no legal basis for recovery.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that, under either the three-part or two-part test for economic duress, the plaintiffs failed to show involuntary acceptance or lack of reasonable alternatives. The court also found no breach of the operating agreement or fiduciary duties, no tortious interference or shareholder oppression, and no basis for unjust enrichment or usurpation. The holding confirms the validity and enforceability of the purchase agreement and disposes of all claims against the defendants. View "Trigger Energy Holdings v. Stevens" on Justia Law

This case concerns a contractual dispute between two companies engaged in the purchase and sale of natural gas. In 2010, the parties entered into a base contract using a standard industry form that governed their future transactions, with specific delivery obligations detailed in transaction confirmations executed in October 2020. Under these confirmations, one party was required to deliver fixed and variable amounts of gas to the other at agreed prices. During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, significant disruptions in natural gas supply occurred, and the seller delivered far less gas than contracted over a six-day period. The seller invoked the contract’s force majeure provision, citing weather-related supply loss and declarations by its affiliates. The buyer, however, disputed the sufficiency and applicability of this claim, asserting the seller could have obtained gas from other sources.After the seller initiated a declaratory judgment action in Texas state court, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the seller, holding that force majeure excused its nonperformance, and found the contract did not require the purchase of replacement gas. The question of how to allocate delivered gas between the two contracts (with differing prices) went to a jury, which found for the buyer, concluding that available gas should be allocated first to the fixed-price contract.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on force majeure, finding factual disputes about the seller’s gas supply and its reasonable efforts to avoid nonperformance. The court affirmed the jury’s verdict regarding allocation, holding that trade usage could supplement the contract and sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding. The case was remanded for further proceedings on force majeure. View "MIECO v. Targa Gas Marketing" on Justia Law

A company engaged in oil and gas production in Wyoming purchased electricity to operate equipment—primarily electronic submersible pumps and pumpjacks—that lifted fluids from underground, moved them to surface facilities for separation, and ultimately delivered the separated crude oil to custody transfer units (LACTs). The company sought a refund of sales tax paid on a portion of this electricity, arguing that the power was used for “transportation” and therefore exempt from sales tax under a statutory provision for those “engaged in the transportation business.” Utility studies commissioned by the company attempted to quantify what percentage of electricity was used for surface movement of fluids.A prior audit by the Wyoming Department of Revenue covering different years led to a similar refund dispute, but the Department conceded that the company was “engaged in the transportation business,” and the Wyoming State Board of Equalization ruled in the company’s favor. However, for the tax years at issue here, the Department denied the refund, asserting the company was not engaged in the transportation business as required by statute. The Board, after a contested hearing, again ruled for the company, finding it met the exemption, but the Department appealed, and the District Court certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wyoming.The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that collateral estoppel did not bar the Department’s appeal because the issue of whether the company was engaged in the transportation business was not actually litigated in the prior proceeding, but stipulated. On the merits, the Court reversed the Board’s decision. It found that the company’s activities—moving crude oil from the wellhead to the LACT and separating water—were part of the production process, not transportation. The company was not engaged in the transportation business as contemplated by the statute and the electricity was used for production, not actual transportation purposes. Thus, the company was not entitled to a sales tax exemption or refund. View "Department of Revenue v. PacifiCorp" on Justia Law

PacifiCorp, a utility company operating a natural gas power plant in Chehalis, Washington, supplies electricity to customers in Idaho. Washington enacted the Climate Commitment Act (CCA), requiring greenhouse gas emitters to purchase emissions allowances. PacifiCorp sought to recover $2.3 million from Idaho customers, representing their share of the costs for these allowances needed to operate the Chehalis plant. The CCA provides “no-cost” allowances exclusively to Washington customers, shielding them from these costs, while PacifiCorp’s Idaho customers would bear the expense for electricity exported from Washington.The Idaho Public Utilities Commission reviewed PacifiCorp’s application under the Energy Cost Adjustment Mechanism (ECAM). The Commission approved recovery of over $60 million in other costs but denied the $2.3 million in CCA allowance costs. It reasoned that, under the 2020 PacifiCorp Inter-Jurisdictional Allocation Protocol, state-specific energy and climate policy costs should be borne by the state enacting them. The Commission also found that passing CCA costs to Idaho customers would violate Idaho Code section 61-502, which requires rates to be just, reasonable, and sufficient, and would create discriminatory customer classes. PacifiCorp’s petition for reconsideration was denied, with the Commission reaffirming its decision on both Protocol and statutory grounds.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho considered whether the Commission’s orders violated PacifiCorp’s constitutional rights, were unsupported by evidence, or were outside the regular pursuit of its authority. The Court held that the Commission acted within its statutory powers and that its decision to disallow recovery of CCA allowance costs from Idaho customers was supported by the record and consistent with its mandate under Idaho Code section 61-502. The Court affirmed the Commission’s orders. View "Pacificorp v. IPUC" on Justia Law

This case involves a class action dispute over late payments of oil proceeds to royalty and working interest owners in Oklahoma. The plaintiff, an Oklahoma landowner with royalty interests in three oil wells, alleged that Sunoco, Inc. and Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals, L.P. failed to pay statutory interest on late payments as required by Oklahoma’s Production Revenue Standards Act (PRSA). The PRSA mandates that first purchasers of oil must pay proceeds within strict timeframes and include 12 percent interest on any late payments. The class was defined to include all owners who received late payments from Sunoco without the required interest.After Sunoco removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, the court certified the class in 2019, finding common questions predominated, including whether Sunoco owed interest on untimely payments and whether a demand was required. The district court granted partial summary judgment on liability for the PRSA claim, and after a bench trial, awarded the class over $103 million in actual damages (including prejudgment interest) and $75 million in punitive damages. Sunoco appealed, challenging class certification, standing for certain class members, the calculation of prejudgment interest, and the punitive damages award. The Tenth Circuit previously remanded for clarification on damages allocation for unidentified owners, which the district court addressed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on class certification, ascertainability, standing, and the award of actual damages including prejudgment interest. The court held that the PRSA requires automatic payment of statutory interest on late payments, and that prejudgment interest should be compounded until paid. However, the Tenth Circuit vacated the punitive damages award, holding that punitive damages are not available for breach of contract claims under Oklahoma law when the only claim proven was a PRSA violation. The case was remanded for amendment of the judgment consistent with this opinion. View "Cline v. Sunoco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, C&M Resources, LLC and Winter Oil, LLC, acting on behalf of a putative class of royalty owners, alleged that Extraction Oil and Gas, Inc. underpaid royalties owed under oil and natural gas production agreements. This case is the third attempt by the plaintiffs to pursue these claims, all arising from the same set of facts. In the two prior lawsuits filed in Colorado state court, the trial courts dismissed the complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, as required by statute. The plaintiffs did not appeal those dismissals.In the present case, originally filed in state court in 2019, proceedings were stayed pending the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Antero Resources Corp. v. Airport Land Partners, Ltd. After the stay was lifted in 2023 and discovery commenced, Extraction determined that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million and removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act. The plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely and that Extraction had waived its right to remove by participating in state court litigation. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the remand motion, finding that the removal was timely based on information obtained during discovery and that the bankruptcy proof of claim and other documents from prior cases did not trigger the removal clock.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court properly denied remand and correctly applied collateral estoppel, precluding the plaintiffs from relitigating the exhaustion requirement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Extraction, finding no error in the lower court’s rulings. View "C&M Resources v. Extraction Oil and Gas" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge to amended energy efficiency standards issued by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for consumer furnaces (specifically, residential non-weatherized gas furnaces and mobile home gas furnaces) and certain commercial water heaters under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). Petitioners, including trade associations, manufacturers, and energy providers, argued that the new standards would effectively eliminate non-condensing appliances from the market, claiming these products offer unique features and performance characteristics not available in condensing models. They also contended that DOE failed to provide adequate economic justification for the new standards and did not comply with procedural requirements during rulemaking.Previously, DOE had issued a series of proposed rules and interpretive rules regarding whether non-condensing technology constituted a protected performance characteristic under EPCA. After public comment and a period of shifting interpretations, DOE ultimately concluded in its 2021 Interpretive Rule that non-condensing technology does not provide a unique performance-related feature compared to condensing appliances. DOE then promulgated final rules in 2023 amending the efficiency standards for both consumer furnaces and commercial water heaters. Petitioners sought review of these actions in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that DOE’s interpretation—that non-condensing appliances do not offer performance characteristics or features substantially different from condensing appliances—was reasonable and supported by the record. The court also found that DOE’s economic justification for the amended standards was robust and supported by substantial evidence (and, for commercial water heaters, by clear and convincing evidence). Additionally, the court determined that DOE provided an adequate opportunity for public comment. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review, upholding DOE’s rules. View "American Gas Association v. DOE" on Justia Law

A natural gas pipeline company replaced three aging compressor units along its pipeline, which transports gas from Canada to the Pacific Northwest. The replacements used newer, higher-capacity compressors, but the company initially installed controls to limit their output to match the old units. After completing the replacements, the company sought federal approval to expand pipeline capacity by removing those restrictions and making other upgrades, securing long-term contracts for the added capacity with new customers. The company excluded the cost of the earlier compressor replacements from the expansion’s cost estimate, assuming those costs would remain allocated to existing customers.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the compressor replacements under its automatic authorization regulation, finding no further environmental review was needed. Later, FERC issued a certificate for the expansion project under the Natural Gas Act, after preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS) as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). FERC declined to treat the compressor replacements as part of the expansion for environmental or rate-setting purposes and denied the company’s request for a “predetermination” that expansion costs could be rolled into existing rates in future proceedings. Multiple parties, including two states and environmental groups, sought rehearing and then judicial review, challenging FERC’s decisions on environmental review, rate allocation, and public need.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the consolidated petitions. The court held that the pipeline company had standing and its claims were ripe. On the merits, the court found FERC’s decisions were not arbitrary or capricious. FERC reasonably excluded the compressor replacements from the expansion’s environmental and rate analysis, applied its established policies for rate-setting and public need, and provided sufficient environmental review under NEPA. The court denied all petitions for review. View "Gas Transmission Northwest v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Venezuelan government expropriated assets belonging to a Venezuelan subsidiary of a U.S.-based energy company. The subsidiary had provided drilling services to a state-owned Venezuelan energy company, but after a breakdown in their business relationship and significant unpaid invoices, Venezuelan authorities blockaded the subsidiary’s operations, issued public statements about nationalization, and ultimately transferred the subsidiary’s assets to the state-owned company, which began operating them. The U.S. parent company claimed that this expropriation rendered its ownership interest in the subsidiary worthless and deprived it of its rights to control the subsidiary’s assets.The U.S. parent company and its Venezuelan subsidiary filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Venezuela and its state-owned energy company, alleging unlawful expropriation. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit initially affirmed. However, the Supreme Court vacated that decision, clarifying the standard for the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation exception. On remand, the D.C. Circuit found that only the U.S. parent company had a valid claim under international law, as the domestic-takings rule barred the subsidiary’s claim. The district court later dismissed Venezuela as a defendant, leaving the state-owned company as the sole defendant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the state-owned company’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the FSIA’s expropriation exception applied because Venezuela indirectly expropriated the U.S. company’s property, the state-owned company owns and operates the expropriated assets, and it engages in commercial activity in the United States. The court also held that personal jurisdiction was proper and that the act-of-state doctrine, as limited by the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, did not bar the claim. View "Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. v. Petroleos De Venezuela, S.A." on Justia Law

The case concerns the approval of a 32-mile natural gas pipeline intended to supply fuel to a new natural-gas turbine that will replace one of two coal-fired units at the Cumberland Fossil Plant in Tennessee. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal agency, decided to retire the coal units and replace one with a gas turbine, which is expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the pipeline after preparing a detailed environmental impact statement. The Sierra Club and Appalachian Voices challenged this approval, arguing that FERC’s decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act.Previously, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the pipeline, finding that market need was established by TVA’s long-term agreement to purchase all pipeline capacity and that the project’s benefits outweighed its harms. FERC also credited the pipeline with enabling a net reduction in emissions due to the coal-to-gas transition. After the Sierra Club requested rehearing, FERC clarified that only one coal unit would be replaced but maintained its approval. The Sierra Club then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petitions. The court held that FERC’s approval complied with NEPA and the Natural Gas Act. It found that FERC reasonably analyzed downstream emissions, properly considered the no-action alternative, and was not required to analyze the pipeline and power plant as connected actions because FERC lacked regulatory authority over power generation. The court also held that FERC’s reliance on TVA’s precedent agreement established market need and that FERC’s public interest balancing was reasonable. The court emphasized that, following recent Supreme Court precedent, judicial review of NEPA compliance is highly deferential. View "Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law