Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Energy, Oil & Gas Law
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The Alaska LNG Project sought authorization from the Department of Energy to export up to twenty million metric tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) per year for thirty years. The Department initially authorized the Project to export LNG to free-trade countries in 2014 and later to non-free trade countries in 2015, subject to environmental review. In 2023, the Department issued a final order approving the Project’s export application, concluding that the approval was consistent with the public interest despite uncertainties regarding environmental impacts.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had previously authorized the construction and operation of the Project’s facilities, including an 800-mile pipeline and associated infrastructure, after preparing an extensive environmental impact statement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld FERC’s compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC. The Department of Energy adopted FERC’s impact statement and issued its own supplemental environmental impact statement in response to Executive Order 13990.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Department of Energy’s final order. The court found that the Department had properly adopted FERC’s environmental impact statement and complied with NEPA. The court also upheld the Department’s finding of substantial uncertainty regarding the magnitude of environmental impacts, particularly greenhouse gas emissions and climate impacts, associated with the Project’s exports. The court concluded that the impacts of downstream emissions in foreign countries were not reasonably foreseeable and that the Department’s analysis was supported by substantial evidence.The court denied the petitions for review, affirming the Department of Energy’s authorization for the Alaska LNG Project to export LNG. View "Sierra Club v. DOE" on Justia Law

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Entergy companies petitioned for review of three orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC had rejected tariff changes proposed by Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO), arguing that the new tariff would grant Entergy excessive market power. Entergy contended that FERC’s decisions were arbitrary and capricious.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Entergy’s opening brief did not address the issue of standing, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite. This omission violated Circuit Rule 28(a)(7), which requires petitioners to set forth the basis for their claim of standing in their opening brief. As a result, Entergy forfeited any arguments in support of standing.The D.C. Circuit Court dismissed the petitions for review, stating that Entergy lacked standing. The court emphasized that Entergy’s failure to discuss standing in its opening brief constituted a forfeiture of the argument. Even if the court were to consider the standing arguments Entergy later advanced, the company did not demonstrate the necessary concrete, imminent, and redressable injury. The court concluded that dismissal was the appropriate consequence for Entergy’s failure to establish standing. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

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EOG Resources, Inc. holds drilling rights to oil and gas beneath property owned by Lucky Land Management, LLC in Ohio. The dispute arose over whether EOG's drilling rights included the right to drill horizontally from Lucky Land's surface to adjacent properties. EOG sought a preliminary injunction to access the land, cut down trees, and start constructing drills. The district court granted the injunction, finding that EOG would likely succeed on the merits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted EOG's request for a preliminary injunction, allowing EOG to access the land and begin drilling operations. The court found that EOG was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction. Lucky Land Management appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's findings. The appellate court held that Lucky Land had the better interpretation of oil-and-gas law, which generally does not allow a lessee to use the surface of one property to drill into neighboring lands without explicit permission. The court also found that EOG would not suffer irreparable harm if it had to wait for the litigation to proceed, as any potential losses could be compensated with monetary damages. The court emphasized that preliminary injunctions are meant to prevent irreparable injuries and preserve the court's ability to issue meaningful final relief, not to serve as shortcuts to the merits. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction. View "EOG Resources, Inc. v. Lucky Land Management, LLC" on Justia Law

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Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP) proposed constructing a 32-mile natural gas pipeline across several Tennessee counties, which would involve crossing numerous waterbodies. TGP applied for a § 404 permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), a § 401 water quality certification from the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), and a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Corps issued the § 404 permit, allowing TGP to discharge materials into waterbodies during construction.The Corps issued public notices and received comments on TGP’s application. TGP responded to these comments, explaining its assessment of alternative routes and crossing methods. FERC issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement, concluding that the Pipeline would not result in significant environmental impacts. TDEC issued a § 401 water quality certification, and FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The Corps then issued the § 404 permit with special conditions, including requirements for TGP to use the least impactful trenching techniques and obtain approval before using blasting methods.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Corps' decision. The court held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the § 404 permit. The Corps properly assessed practicable alternatives to open-cut trenching, determined that TGP’s proposed rock-removal methods were the least environmentally damaging practicable alternatives, and correctly relied on TDEC’s § 401 water quality certification. The court also found that the Corps provided sufficient support for its conclusions regarding suspended particulates and turbidity and adequately assessed the cumulative effects of the Pipeline’s construction. The court denied the petition for review. View "Appalachian Voices v. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

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A certified class of Ohio landowners alleged that a Colorado-based mining company, Antero Resources Corporation, underpaid them $10 million in natural gas royalties. The landowners claimed that Antero improperly deducted costs for processing and fractionation from their royalties. Antero counterclaimed, seeking authority to deduct additional costs related to gathering, dehydrating, compressing, and transporting the unrefined natural gas. The district court certified the class, denied Antero's motion for summary judgment, granted the landowners' motion, and entered a final judgment after the parties stipulated damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the landowners, finding that Antero improperly deducted processing and fractionation costs from the royalties. The court determined that these costs were necessary to transform the gas into marketable form and thus could not be deducted under the lease agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Antero could not deduct the costs of processing and fractionation from the landowners' royalties. The court found that the lease agreement's Market Enhancement Clause allowed deductions only for costs that enhanced the value of already marketable products, not for costs required to make the products marketable. The court concluded that the gas products first became marketable after processing and fractionation, and thus, these costs were not deductible. The court also noted that the Fourth Circuit had reached a similar conclusion in a related case involving the same defendant and lease terms. View "The Grissoms, LLC v. Antero Resources Corp." on Justia Law

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The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) adopted a rule requiring current lessees of offshore drilling facilities in the Gulf of Mexico to obtain financial assurance bonds to cover potential future decommissioning liabilities. Several states and industry groups sued to vacate the rule, arguing it imposed undue financial burdens. The American Petroleum Institute (API), representing a broad range of oil and gas companies, sought to intervene in defense of the rule, claiming its members had unique interests in upholding it.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied API's motion to intervene. The court found the motion procedurally defective because API did not attach a proposed answer to its motion, as required by local rules. Substantively, the court concluded that API failed to demonstrate that BOEM would inadequately represent its interests, a necessary showing for intervention as of right. The court also denied permissive intervention, suggesting that API could present its unique perspective through an amicus brief instead.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of API's motion to intervene. It held that API did not overcome the presumption that BOEM adequately represented its interests, as API failed to show any specific adversity of interest or actions by BOEM that were contrary to API's interests. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of permissive intervention, agreeing that API could effectively present its views as an amicus curiae. Thus, the district court's order denying intervention was affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Burgum" on Justia Law

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Talos ERT, L.L.C. (Talos) hired DLS, L.L.C. (DLS) to remove corroded piping from an oil-and-gas platform off the Louisiana coast. During the project, a 129-pound pipe fell and struck Walter Jackson, a DLS employee, resulting in his death. Jackson’s widow, Vantrece Jackson, and his son, Y.J., represented by his mother, Anika Warner, sued Talos for wrongful death. The suits were consolidated, and the case proceeded to trial.The jury found Talos 88% at fault for Jackson’s death and awarded significant damages to both plaintiffs. Y.J. was awarded $120,000 in special damages and $20,000,000 in general damages. Mrs. Jackson was awarded $987,930 in special damages and $6,600,000 in general damages. Talos filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and alternatively moved for a new trial or remittitur. The district court denied the JMOL and new trial motions but granted a partial remittitur, reducing Y.J.’s general damages to $4,360,708.59 and Mrs. Jackson’s to $5,104,226.22. Plaintiffs declined a new trial on damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Talos’s renewed JMOL motion, finding sufficient evidence to support both theories of liability: vicarious liability and independent negligence. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial on liability, noting the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence.Regarding damages, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the maximum recovery rule for Y.J.’s award, using a factually similar case, Rachal v. Brouillette. However, the court vacated Mrs. Jackson’s general damages award and remanded for redetermination of remittitur, as the district court’s comparison case, Zimko v. American Cyanamid, was not factually similar. The court found no plain error in the alleged prejudicial statements made by Plaintiffs’ counsel during the trial. View "Warner v. Talos ERT" on Justia Law

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Kaiser-Francis Oil Company (KFOC), a Delaware corporation, and its subsidiary Aurora-KF, LLC, sold Aurora Gas, LLC, an Alaska company, to Rieck Oil, Inc., a Delaware corporation formed by Kay Rieck. The sale included an indemnity guarantee from Deutsche Oel & Gas, S.A. (DOGSA), another company owned by Rieck, to cover obligations under a pre-existing guarantee by George B. Kaiser to Cook Inlet Regional, Inc. (CIRI). When Aurora Gas went bankrupt, CIRI called on Kaiser and KFOC to fulfill the obligations, but DOGSA and Rieck Oil did not indemnify them.KFOC sued Rieck Oil, DOGSA, and Kay Rieck in the Alaska Superior Court, seeking to pierce Rieck Oil’s corporate veil to hold Rieck personally liable. The superior court applied Delaware law, reasoning that most jurisdictions apply the law of the state of incorporation for veil-piercing claims. Under Delaware law, the court found that KFOC failed to prove the necessary element of fraud or injustice to pierce the corporate veil and ruled in favor of Rieck.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case, focusing on whether Alaska or Delaware law should apply to the veil-piercing claim. The court held that Alaska law applies, as veil-piercing is not a matter of internal corporate affairs but involves the rights of third parties. The court reasoned that Alaska has a more significant interest in the matter, given the involvement of Alaska land and an Alaska Native Corporation. Consequently, the court vacated the superior court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings under Alaska law. View "Kaiser-Francis Oil Company v. Deutsche Oel & Gas, S.A." on Justia Law

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Driftwood Pipeline LLC sought approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to build two new natural gas pipelines in southwestern Louisiana. FERC granted the approval, concluding that the project would serve a market need and that its benefits outweighed its adverse environmental impacts. Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club challenged this decision, arguing that FERC failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a Section 7 certificate to Driftwood Pipeline LLC, determining that the project was required by public convenience and necessity. FERC also published an environmental impact statement, concluding that the project would have some adverse environmental impacts but none that were significant. Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club requested a rehearing, which was deemed denied when FERC did not act on it. They then petitioned for review, raising challenges under NEPA and the Natural Gas Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC adequately considered the environmental effects of the project, including its impact on greenhouse gas emissions, and found that FERC's refusal to characterize the significance of these emissions was reasonable. The court also found that FERC's determination of market need was supported by substantial evidence, including precedent agreements and an independent market study. The court concluded that FERC had properly balanced the project's benefits against its adverse effects and denied the petition for review. View "Healthy Gulf v. FERC" on Justia Law

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Petitioners challenged an amendment to the energy facility site certificate for constructing a high-voltage electrical transmission line from Boardman, Oregon, to Hemingway, Idaho. The Energy Facility Siting Council (EFSC) had previously approved the original site certificate, which was affirmed by the court in Stop B2H Coalition v. Dept. of Energy. EFSC later approved Idaho Power’s request to amend the site certificate, expanding the site boundary and making other changes. Petitioners contested the process EFSC followed and the substance of the amendment, arguing they were entitled to a contested case proceeding and that the amendment did not comply with legal protections for watersheds and wildlife habitats.The lower court, EFSC, denied petitioners’ requests for contested case proceedings and approved the amendment. Petitioners then sought judicial review, contending that the circuit court had jurisdiction over their process challenge and that EFSC’s decisions were substantively flawed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and held that it had jurisdiction to address the process challenge. The court found that EFSC did not err in denying the contested case proceedings, as the issues raised by petitioners were either untimely or did not present significant issues of fact or law. The court also rejected the substantive challenges, concluding that the bond requirements were adequately addressed in the original site certificate and that the expanded site boundary did not permit construction outside the micrositing corridors without further review.The Supreme Court affirmed EFSC’s final order approving the amended site certificate, holding that EFSC’s decisions were legally sound and supported by substantial evidence. View "Gilbert v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law