Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The case centers on the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), which transports crude oil from Alaska’s North Slope, with oil from different shippers being commingled in the pipeline. To address variations in oil quality, a “Quality Bank” compensates shippers who inject higher-quality oil and charges those with lower-quality oil. The valuation of one particular oil component, Resid—the heaviest and least valuable cut—has been disputed for decades. Petro Star, a shipper whose refineries lack specialized units to further process Resid, argued that Resid was undervalued, while ConocoPhillips contended it was overvalued. The TAPS owners, who administer the Quality Bank, also challenged a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) finding that the Bank’s administrator violated tariff provisions.Following a 2013 FERC investigation into the Resid valuation formula, both Petro Star and ConocoPhillips intervened, seeking changes. After initial FERC findings were remanded for further explanation by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FERC held additional hearings. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded the formula was just and reasonable, and FERC largely affirmed this result, also finding a tariff violation by the Quality Bank administrator for failing to update formula yields based on monthly Resid testing.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s formula for valuing Resid remains just and reasonable, as neither Petro Star nor ConocoPhillips demonstrated the formula to be unjust or unreasonable. The court also upheld FERC’s finding that the Quality Bank administrator violated the tariff by not updating formula yields with each test, but found FERC’s prospective remedy—requiring monthly testing and annual yield updates—was appropriate. The court denied all three petitions. View "Petro Star Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

A businessman from Kazakhstan alleged that he was wrongfully detained and psychologically coerced by the country’s National Security Committee into signing unfavorable business agreements, including waivers of legal claims and a forced transfer of valuable company shares. The business at issue, CAPEC, operated in Kazakhstan’s energy sector and held significant assets, some of which were allegedly misappropriated by fellow shareholders and transferred through U.S. financial institutions. The plaintiff claimed these actions harmed him economically, including the loss of potential U.S.-based legal claims.Following unsuccessful litigation in Kazakhstan, the plaintiff initiated suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to invalidate the coerced agreements and recover damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Alien Tort Statute, and other state and federal laws. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff, as a permanent resident alien, could not establish diversity jurisdiction against foreign defendants, that the alleged torts occurred outside the U.S., and that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury required for civil RICO claims. The court denied leave to amend, determining that any amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the matter de novo, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Second Circuit held that claims against the National Security Committee were barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as its conduct was sovereign rather than commercial. For the individual defendants, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege a domestic injury under RICO, as the harm and racketeering activity occurred primarily in Kazakhstan. The court further concluded that amendment of the complaint would have been futile. The judgment was affirmed. View "Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich" on Justia Law

PJM Interconnection LLC manages an extensive electrical grid across thirteen states and the District of Columbia. To ensure competitive market conditions and compliance with regulatory standards, PJM employs Market Monitoring Analytics LLP as its independent market monitor (IMM). For several years, IMM attended meetings between PJM’s Board of Managers and the Liaison Committee, a nonvoting body designed to facilitate communication between PJM Members and the Board. However, PJM began enforcing the Liaison Committee’s charter provision, restricting attendance to end-use customers and regulated utilities, thereby excluding IMM from future meetings.After this exclusion, IMM filed a complaint with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), arguing that PJM’s action violated Section IV.G of its tariff, which IMM interpreted as granting it the right to participate in such stakeholder processes. FERC reviewed the complaint and dismissed it. The Commission determined that Section IV.G only applied to decision-making bodies within PJM that handle proposed revisions to tariffs or market rules, not to the Liaison Committee, which functions solely as a communication forum and does not engage in decision-making or voting.IMM subsequently petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of FERC’s decision. The Court, before addressing the merits, examined whether IMM had standing to challenge its exclusion. The Court held that IMM failed to demonstrate a concrete or particularized injury resulting from its inability to attend the Liaison Committee meetings, as IMM retained access to all market data required for its monitoring functions and had alternative avenues for communication with the Board. The Court further found that IMM had not shown any expenditure of resources to counteract the alleged harm. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to IMM’s lack of standing. View "Independent Market Monitor for PJM v. FERC" on Justia Law

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Two companies, Gulf Coast Investments, LLC and Trigger Energy Holdings, LLC, sold their membership interests in Blueprint Energy Partners, LLC to TCU Holdings, LLC. Blueprint, formed in 2017 for shale oil operations in Wyoming, originally had three equal members: Gulf Coast, Trigger, and TCU, with Aladdin Capital, Inc. as the manager and primary creditor. After financial struggles and interpersonal conflicts, the parties negotiated the buyout in 2019. TCU’s principal, Kent Stevens, threatened to leave and take staff and clients unless Gulf Coast and Trigger agreed to a set price, known as the “dynamite option.” Despite these threats, the plaintiffs were represented by counsel who advised them of alternatives, and negotiations spanned several months, culminating in a signed purchase agreement.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, reviewed the plaintiffs’ post-sale lawsuit alleging economic duress, breach of operating agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, shareholder oppression, unjust enrichment, and sought accounting and injunctive relief. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all counts, reasoning that the plaintiffs voluntarily entered the agreement, had legal alternatives, and that the contract itself contained a waiver of further claims. The court also addressed each substantive claim on its merits, finding no legal basis for recovery.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that, under either the three-part or two-part test for economic duress, the plaintiffs failed to show involuntary acceptance or lack of reasonable alternatives. The court also found no breach of the operating agreement or fiduciary duties, no tortious interference or shareholder oppression, and no basis for unjust enrichment or usurpation. The holding confirms the validity and enforceability of the purchase agreement and disposes of all claims against the defendants. View "Trigger Energy Holdings v. Stevens" on Justia Law

This case concerns a contractual dispute between two companies engaged in the purchase and sale of natural gas. In 2010, the parties entered into a base contract using a standard industry form that governed their future transactions, with specific delivery obligations detailed in transaction confirmations executed in October 2020. Under these confirmations, one party was required to deliver fixed and variable amounts of gas to the other at agreed prices. During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, significant disruptions in natural gas supply occurred, and the seller delivered far less gas than contracted over a six-day period. The seller invoked the contract’s force majeure provision, citing weather-related supply loss and declarations by its affiliates. The buyer, however, disputed the sufficiency and applicability of this claim, asserting the seller could have obtained gas from other sources.After the seller initiated a declaratory judgment action in Texas state court, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the seller, holding that force majeure excused its nonperformance, and found the contract did not require the purchase of replacement gas. The question of how to allocate delivered gas between the two contracts (with differing prices) went to a jury, which found for the buyer, concluding that available gas should be allocated first to the fixed-price contract.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on force majeure, finding factual disputes about the seller’s gas supply and its reasonable efforts to avoid nonperformance. The court affirmed the jury’s verdict regarding allocation, holding that trade usage could supplement the contract and sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding. The case was remanded for further proceedings on force majeure. View "MIECO v. Targa Gas Marketing" on Justia Law

A company engaged in oil and gas production in Wyoming purchased electricity to operate equipment—primarily electronic submersible pumps and pumpjacks—that lifted fluids from underground, moved them to surface facilities for separation, and ultimately delivered the separated crude oil to custody transfer units (LACTs). The company sought a refund of sales tax paid on a portion of this electricity, arguing that the power was used for “transportation” and therefore exempt from sales tax under a statutory provision for those “engaged in the transportation business.” Utility studies commissioned by the company attempted to quantify what percentage of electricity was used for surface movement of fluids.A prior audit by the Wyoming Department of Revenue covering different years led to a similar refund dispute, but the Department conceded that the company was “engaged in the transportation business,” and the Wyoming State Board of Equalization ruled in the company’s favor. However, for the tax years at issue here, the Department denied the refund, asserting the company was not engaged in the transportation business as required by statute. The Board, after a contested hearing, again ruled for the company, finding it met the exemption, but the Department appealed, and the District Court certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wyoming.The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that collateral estoppel did not bar the Department’s appeal because the issue of whether the company was engaged in the transportation business was not actually litigated in the prior proceeding, but stipulated. On the merits, the Court reversed the Board’s decision. It found that the company’s activities—moving crude oil from the wellhead to the LACT and separating water—were part of the production process, not transportation. The company was not engaged in the transportation business as contemplated by the statute and the electricity was used for production, not actual transportation purposes. Thus, the company was not entitled to a sales tax exemption or refund. View "Department of Revenue v. PacifiCorp" on Justia Law

PacifiCorp, a utility company operating a natural gas power plant in Chehalis, Washington, supplies electricity to customers in Idaho. Washington enacted the Climate Commitment Act (CCA), requiring greenhouse gas emitters to purchase emissions allowances. PacifiCorp sought to recover $2.3 million from Idaho customers, representing their share of the costs for these allowances needed to operate the Chehalis plant. The CCA provides “no-cost” allowances exclusively to Washington customers, shielding them from these costs, while PacifiCorp’s Idaho customers would bear the expense for electricity exported from Washington.The Idaho Public Utilities Commission reviewed PacifiCorp’s application under the Energy Cost Adjustment Mechanism (ECAM). The Commission approved recovery of over $60 million in other costs but denied the $2.3 million in CCA allowance costs. It reasoned that, under the 2020 PacifiCorp Inter-Jurisdictional Allocation Protocol, state-specific energy and climate policy costs should be borne by the state enacting them. The Commission also found that passing CCA costs to Idaho customers would violate Idaho Code section 61-502, which requires rates to be just, reasonable, and sufficient, and would create discriminatory customer classes. PacifiCorp’s petition for reconsideration was denied, with the Commission reaffirming its decision on both Protocol and statutory grounds.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho considered whether the Commission’s orders violated PacifiCorp’s constitutional rights, were unsupported by evidence, or were outside the regular pursuit of its authority. The Court held that the Commission acted within its statutory powers and that its decision to disallow recovery of CCA allowance costs from Idaho customers was supported by the record and consistent with its mandate under Idaho Code section 61-502. The Court affirmed the Commission’s orders. View "Pacificorp v. IPUC" on Justia Law

This case involves a class action dispute over late payments of oil proceeds to royalty and working interest owners in Oklahoma. The plaintiff, an Oklahoma landowner with royalty interests in three oil wells, alleged that Sunoco, Inc. and Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals, L.P. failed to pay statutory interest on late payments as required by Oklahoma’s Production Revenue Standards Act (PRSA). The PRSA mandates that first purchasers of oil must pay proceeds within strict timeframes and include 12 percent interest on any late payments. The class was defined to include all owners who received late payments from Sunoco without the required interest.After Sunoco removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, the court certified the class in 2019, finding common questions predominated, including whether Sunoco owed interest on untimely payments and whether a demand was required. The district court granted partial summary judgment on liability for the PRSA claim, and after a bench trial, awarded the class over $103 million in actual damages (including prejudgment interest) and $75 million in punitive damages. Sunoco appealed, challenging class certification, standing for certain class members, the calculation of prejudgment interest, and the punitive damages award. The Tenth Circuit previously remanded for clarification on damages allocation for unidentified owners, which the district court addressed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings on class certification, ascertainability, standing, and the award of actual damages including prejudgment interest. The court held that the PRSA requires automatic payment of statutory interest on late payments, and that prejudgment interest should be compounded until paid. However, the Tenth Circuit vacated the punitive damages award, holding that punitive damages are not available for breach of contract claims under Oklahoma law when the only claim proven was a PRSA violation. The case was remanded for amendment of the judgment consistent with this opinion. View "Cline v. Sunoco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, C&M Resources, LLC and Winter Oil, LLC, acting on behalf of a putative class of royalty owners, alleged that Extraction Oil and Gas, Inc. underpaid royalties owed under oil and natural gas production agreements. This case is the third attempt by the plaintiffs to pursue these claims, all arising from the same set of facts. In the two prior lawsuits filed in Colorado state court, the trial courts dismissed the complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, as required by statute. The plaintiffs did not appeal those dismissals.In the present case, originally filed in state court in 2019, proceedings were stayed pending the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Antero Resources Corp. v. Airport Land Partners, Ltd. After the stay was lifted in 2023 and discovery commenced, Extraction determined that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million and removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act. The plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely and that Extraction had waived its right to remove by participating in state court litigation. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the remand motion, finding that the removal was timely based on information obtained during discovery and that the bankruptcy proof of claim and other documents from prior cases did not trigger the removal clock.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court properly denied remand and correctly applied collateral estoppel, precluding the plaintiffs from relitigating the exhaustion requirement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Extraction, finding no error in the lower court’s rulings. View "C&M Resources v. Extraction Oil and Gas" on Justia Law