Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners challenged the Commission's approval of a proposal for the construction of a natural gas compressor station in the Town of Minisink, New York. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the Commission's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious, particularly given the existence of a nearby alternative site (the Wagoner Alternative) they insist is better than the Minisink locale. The court concluded that the Commission's consideration of the Wagoner Alternative falls within the bounds of its discretion and the court had no basis to upset the Commission's application of its Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717-717z, authority on this point; the court was satisfied that the Commission properly considered cumulative impacts of the Minisink Project; the court reject petitioners' argument that the Minisink Project violates the siting guidelines; and the court rejected petitioners' claims of procedural errors. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Minisink Residents for Enviro., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Two firms receiving gas storage service in the Washington Storage Field ceased taking service and "released" their storage rights to Paribas. The departing customers exercised their contract rights to buy back so-called "base gas" from the field's operator, Transco. Given the buy-back, Transco had to make new purchases to replenish its base gas so as to maintain service at the levels prevailing before the replacement. At the time of the exiting customers' departure, the historic customers who remained, and the new replacement customers, disputed whether the cost of the new base gas should be charged entirely to the replacement shippers ("incremental pricing") or should be charged to all shippers in proportion to their usage ("rolled-in pricing"). On appeal, Paribas challenged the Commission's ratemaking decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. In a decision purporting to apply the familiar "cost causation" principle, the Commission chose incremental pricing. The court concluded that the Commission failed to offer an intelligible explanation of how its decision manifested the cost causation principle; failed to explain how or why or in what sense the historic customers' continued demand did not share, pro rata, in causing the need for the new base gas, or, how or why or in what sense the historic customers did not share proportionately in the benefits provided by the new base gas; and brushed off Paribas's invocation of a seemingly parallel set of the Commission's own decisions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.View "BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from violations issued by the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration. At issue was whether the word "corporation" includes limited liability companies (LLCs) for purposes of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq. The court concluded that the terms "corporation" and "corporate operator" in the Mine Act are ambiguous. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable where, most importantly, construing section 110(c) to include agents of LLCs is consistent with the legislative history. Therefore, the court held that an LLC is a corporation for purposes of the Mine Act and that section 110(c) can be used to assess civil penalties against agents of an LLC. Because substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision to hold petitioners personally liable for the order at issue, the court affirmed on this issue. Finally, the order underlying their civil penalties was not duplicative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the ALJ's decision. View "Sumpter, et al. v. Secretary of Labor, et al." on Justia Law

The dispute between the parties in this case centered over mineral rights. Stull Ranches, LLC operated a grouse hunting business on its surface estate in rural Colorado. Entek GRB, LLC leased the right to explore and develop the minerals under much of Stull’s surface and adjoining surface estates from the federal government. This dispute arose when Entek asked permission to enter Stull’s surface estate (both to develop new oil well sites on Stull’s land and to get at one of its existing wells located on an adjacent surface estate owned by the Bureau of Land Management). Along the way, Entek pointed out that the only available road to the well on BLM’s estate crossed Stull’s land. Concerned that Entek’s presence would unsettle its grouse, Stull refused access. Entek sued to gain access. The district court held that Entek was entitled to access portions of Stull’s surface to mine certain leases lying below. But the court also held that Entek was entitled to no more than this - in particular, Entek could not cross Stull’s surface to service the well on the adjacent BLM land. Entek appealed, arguing to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred by not granting it access to BLM lands. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court in not granting Entek the relief it originally requested. The Court therefore vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Stull and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is a federal agency that, under the Federal Power Act, regulates rates charged by public utilities for transmission and sale of energy in interstate commerce, and rules pertaining to such rates, 16 U.S.C. 824d. In 2006, FERC approved a new tariff (rules governing interstate sale of electricity and electric capacity) for the PJM market, covering 13 states and the District of Columbia, as a result of an extensively negotiated settlement between power providers, utility companies, government authorities and others. The order required that load serving entities (LSEs) in the market procure a certain amount of energy capacity for access during peak load; included a rule that offers for the sale of capacity in the markets at artificially low prices would, with some exceptions, be required to be raised to a competitive level (mitigation). In 2011, FERC altered the 2006 Order: eliminating a mitigation exemption for resources built under state mandate; eliminating a provision that guaranteed that LSEs would be able to use “self-supply” to satisfy capacity obligations; and changing factors used in determining whether an offer was subject to mitigation. Objectors argued that the changes amounted to direct regulation of power facilities in violation of the FPA, and that FERC arbitrarily eliminated the mitigation exemption for state-mandated resources. Electric utilities challenged elimination of self-supply assurances for LSEs. Others challenged new rules governing calculation of a resource’s net cost of new entry (for determining whether an offer for sale of capacity will be mitigated) and FERC’s determination that a new generation resource must clear only one capacity auction to avoid further mitigation. The Third Circuit rejected all of the challenges.View "NJ Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. Fed Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, the owners and operators of a neighboring mineral lease, alleging that defendants committed "unlawful drainage" in violation of federal and Louisiana law. The district court subsequently dismissed the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that the SAC stated a claim for waste against Defendant IP, the company that allegedly perforated a hydrocarbon reservoir named the K-1 sands. The court concluded, however, that the SAC insufficiently alleged that the non-perforating defendants committed waste. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Breton Energy, L.L.C., et al. v. Mariner Energy Resources, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In 2002 oil companies filed breach of contract actions against the government, concerning sales of offshore oil and glass leases in the 1980s. The Claims Court held that the government had breached its contracts by preventing the companies from drilling for oil in the offshore areas covered by the leases. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment and restitution awards of approximately $1 billion. Nycal, which held a 4.25 percent interest in two of the leases, waived its right to restitution and pursued a claim for lost profits. The Claims Court held that it was permissible for Nycal to seek lost-profits damages even though the other owners of the leases in which Nycal held a partial share had accepted restitution, but concluded that Nycal had not proved its case for lost profits. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting the government’s evidence that Nycal could not have made a profit on its share of the leases.View "NYCAL Offshore Dev. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Black Beauty contested a citation issued by an inspector of the Mine Safety and Health Administration, but the ALJ upheld the citation. Black Beauty now petitions for review of the ALJ's order again upholding the citation on remand. The court found substantial evidence to credit the ALJ's conclusion that Black Beauty violated 30 C.F.R. 77.1605(k) by failing to maintain a berm on two tenths of a mile of a bench; there was no reason to disturb the ALJ's conclusion that Black Beauty's violation was significant and substantial; and substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that Black Beauty's failure to follow the regulation constituted more than ordinary negligence and was thus "unwarrantable." Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Black Beauty Coal Co. v. Secretary of Labor, et al." on Justia Law

Butamax owns the 188 patent, which covers a recombinant microbial host cell that uses a particular biosynthetic pathway to produce isobutanol, which is useful as a fuel or fuel additive, and the 889 patent, which issued from a divisional of the 188 patent’ application and focuses on a method of producing isobutanol from a recombinant yeast microorganism that expresses a five-step biosynthetic pathway. The patents’ specifications largely are identical. The district court rejected Butamax’s claim of literal infringement and granted Gevo summary judgment of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents of the asserted claims and of invalidity of claims 12 and 13 of the 889 patent for lack of written description, and invalidity of claims 12 and 13 of the 889 patent for lack of enablement. The Federal Circuit vacated. The district court erred in its claim construction and determination under the doctrine of equivalents and failed to recognize the existence of genuine issues of material fact. The court reversed summary judgment of invalidity for lack of enablement because that judgment appeared to have been a scrivener’s error.View "Butamax(TM) Advanced Biofuels v. Gevo, Inc." on Justia Law

CEnergy filed suit against Glenmore claiming a denial of its right under the Fourteenth Amendment to substantive due process and a violation of the town's state law obligation to deal in good faith. While CEnergy obtained a conditional use permit from Glenmore to develop a wind farm, the company failed to obtain required building permits in time to take advantage of a lucrative opportunity to sell electricity generated by wind turbines to a Wisconsin power company. The court concluded that the town board's decision to delay action on CEnergy's building permit requests could not have been arbitrary in the constitutional sense. Even if the board's treatment of the building permit applications had been arbitrary in the constitutional sense, CEnergy still would have failed to state a substantive due process claim where a plaintiff who ignores potential state law remedies cannot state a substantive due process claim based on a state-created property right. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "CEnergy-Glenmore Wind Farm #1 v. Town of Glenmore" on Justia Law