Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

A certified class of Ohio landowners alleged that a Colorado-based mining company, Antero Resources Corporation, underpaid them $10 million in natural gas royalties. The landowners claimed that Antero improperly deducted costs for processing and fractionation from their royalties. Antero counterclaimed, seeking authority to deduct additional costs related to gathering, dehydrating, compressing, and transporting the unrefined natural gas. The district court certified the class, denied Antero's motion for summary judgment, granted the landowners' motion, and entered a final judgment after the parties stipulated damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the landowners, finding that Antero improperly deducted processing and fractionation costs from the royalties. The court determined that these costs were necessary to transform the gas into marketable form and thus could not be deducted under the lease agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Antero could not deduct the costs of processing and fractionation from the landowners' royalties. The court found that the lease agreement's Market Enhancement Clause allowed deductions only for costs that enhanced the value of already marketable products, not for costs required to make the products marketable. The court concluded that the gas products first became marketable after processing and fractionation, and thus, these costs were not deductible. The court also noted that the Fourth Circuit had reached a similar conclusion in a related case involving the same defendant and lease terms. View "The Grissoms, LLC v. Antero Resources Corp." on Justia Law

The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) adopted a rule requiring current lessees of offshore drilling facilities in the Gulf of Mexico to obtain financial assurance bonds to cover potential future decommissioning liabilities. Several states and industry groups sued to vacate the rule, arguing it imposed undue financial burdens. The American Petroleum Institute (API), representing a broad range of oil and gas companies, sought to intervene in defense of the rule, claiming its members had unique interests in upholding it.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied API's motion to intervene. The court found the motion procedurally defective because API did not attach a proposed answer to its motion, as required by local rules. Substantively, the court concluded that API failed to demonstrate that BOEM would inadequately represent its interests, a necessary showing for intervention as of right. The court also denied permissive intervention, suggesting that API could present its unique perspective through an amicus brief instead.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of API's motion to intervene. It held that API did not overcome the presumption that BOEM adequately represented its interests, as API failed to show any specific adversity of interest or actions by BOEM that were contrary to API's interests. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of permissive intervention, agreeing that API could effectively present its views as an amicus curiae. Thus, the district court's order denying intervention was affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Burgum" on Justia Law

Talos ERT, L.L.C. (Talos) hired DLS, L.L.C. (DLS) to remove corroded piping from an oil-and-gas platform off the Louisiana coast. During the project, a 129-pound pipe fell and struck Walter Jackson, a DLS employee, resulting in his death. Jackson’s widow, Vantrece Jackson, and his son, Y.J., represented by his mother, Anika Warner, sued Talos for wrongful death. The suits were consolidated, and the case proceeded to trial.The jury found Talos 88% at fault for Jackson’s death and awarded significant damages to both plaintiffs. Y.J. was awarded $120,000 in special damages and $20,000,000 in general damages. Mrs. Jackson was awarded $987,930 in special damages and $6,600,000 in general damages. Talos filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and alternatively moved for a new trial or remittitur. The district court denied the JMOL and new trial motions but granted a partial remittitur, reducing Y.J.’s general damages to $4,360,708.59 and Mrs. Jackson’s to $5,104,226.22. Plaintiffs declined a new trial on damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Talos’s renewed JMOL motion, finding sufficient evidence to support both theories of liability: vicarious liability and independent negligence. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial on liability, noting the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence.Regarding damages, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the maximum recovery rule for Y.J.’s award, using a factually similar case, Rachal v. Brouillette. However, the court vacated Mrs. Jackson’s general damages award and remanded for redetermination of remittitur, as the district court’s comparison case, Zimko v. American Cyanamid, was not factually similar. The court found no plain error in the alleged prejudicial statements made by Plaintiffs’ counsel during the trial. View "Warner v. Talos ERT" on Justia Law

Kaiser-Francis Oil Company (KFOC), a Delaware corporation, and its subsidiary Aurora-KF, LLC, sold Aurora Gas, LLC, an Alaska company, to Rieck Oil, Inc., a Delaware corporation formed by Kay Rieck. The sale included an indemnity guarantee from Deutsche Oel & Gas, S.A. (DOGSA), another company owned by Rieck, to cover obligations under a pre-existing guarantee by George B. Kaiser to Cook Inlet Regional, Inc. (CIRI). When Aurora Gas went bankrupt, CIRI called on Kaiser and KFOC to fulfill the obligations, but DOGSA and Rieck Oil did not indemnify them.KFOC sued Rieck Oil, DOGSA, and Kay Rieck in the Alaska Superior Court, seeking to pierce Rieck Oil’s corporate veil to hold Rieck personally liable. The superior court applied Delaware law, reasoning that most jurisdictions apply the law of the state of incorporation for veil-piercing claims. Under Delaware law, the court found that KFOC failed to prove the necessary element of fraud or injustice to pierce the corporate veil and ruled in favor of Rieck.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case, focusing on whether Alaska or Delaware law should apply to the veil-piercing claim. The court held that Alaska law applies, as veil-piercing is not a matter of internal corporate affairs but involves the rights of third parties. The court reasoned that Alaska has a more significant interest in the matter, given the involvement of Alaska land and an Alaska Native Corporation. Consequently, the court vacated the superior court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings under Alaska law. View "Kaiser-Francis Oil Company v. Deutsche Oel & Gas, S.A." on Justia Law

Driftwood Pipeline LLC sought approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to build two new natural gas pipelines in southwestern Louisiana. FERC granted the approval, concluding that the project would serve a market need and that its benefits outweighed its adverse environmental impacts. Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club challenged this decision, arguing that FERC failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a Section 7 certificate to Driftwood Pipeline LLC, determining that the project was required by public convenience and necessity. FERC also published an environmental impact statement, concluding that the project would have some adverse environmental impacts but none that were significant. Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club requested a rehearing, which was deemed denied when FERC did not act on it. They then petitioned for review, raising challenges under NEPA and the Natural Gas Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC adequately considered the environmental effects of the project, including its impact on greenhouse gas emissions, and found that FERC's refusal to characterize the significance of these emissions was reasonable. The court also found that FERC's determination of market need was supported by substantial evidence, including precedent agreements and an independent market study. The court concluded that FERC had properly balanced the project's benefits against its adverse effects and denied the petition for review. View "Healthy Gulf v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged an amendment to the energy facility site certificate for constructing a high-voltage electrical transmission line from Boardman, Oregon, to Hemingway, Idaho. The Energy Facility Siting Council (EFSC) had previously approved the original site certificate, which was affirmed by the court in Stop B2H Coalition v. Dept. of Energy. EFSC later approved Idaho Power’s request to amend the site certificate, expanding the site boundary and making other changes. Petitioners contested the process EFSC followed and the substance of the amendment, arguing they were entitled to a contested case proceeding and that the amendment did not comply with legal protections for watersheds and wildlife habitats.The lower court, EFSC, denied petitioners’ requests for contested case proceedings and approved the amendment. Petitioners then sought judicial review, contending that the circuit court had jurisdiction over their process challenge and that EFSC’s decisions were substantively flawed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and held that it had jurisdiction to address the process challenge. The court found that EFSC did not err in denying the contested case proceedings, as the issues raised by petitioners were either untimely or did not present significant issues of fact or law. The court also rejected the substantive challenges, concluding that the bond requirements were adequately addressed in the original site certificate and that the expanded site boundary did not permit construction outside the micrositing corridors without further review.The Supreme Court affirmed EFSC’s final order approving the amended site certificate, holding that EFSC’s decisions were legally sound and supported by substantial evidence. View "Gilbert v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

Sycamore Cross Solar LLC applied for certificates of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to construct and operate a solar facility in Isle of Wight County and Surry County, Virginia. The project aimed to generate up to 240 megawatts of power and included transmission lines and associated facilities. The West Virginia & Appalachian Laborers’ District Council (WVALDC) participated in the case, arguing that the State Corporation Commission (Commission) failed to consider the benefits to specific groups as required by the Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA) and did not impose a local hiring condition.The Commission conducted an evidentiary hearing where Sycamore, WVALDC, and Commission staff presented their cases. Sycamore's witness testified about the project's economic benefits and commitment to local hiring, though no firm commitment was made. The Hearing Examiner recommended issuing the CPCNs without a local hiring condition but suggested notifying WVALDC about hiring timelines. The Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's findings but declined the notification requirement, leading WVALDC to seek reconsideration.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the VCEA only required the Commission to consider the benefits to specified groups, not make specific findings. The Commission's consideration of the evidence and its decision not to impose a hiring-related condition were within its discretion. The Court found no abuse of discretion, as the Commission reasonably concluded that the statutory requirements were met without the need for additional hiring conditions. View "WVALDC v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

In 2021, Contango Resources, LLC purchased oil and gas production and processing facilities in Fremont and Sweetwater Counties, Wyoming. In 2022, the Fremont County Assessor assessed the taxable value of the property located in Fremont County. Contango appealed the assessment to the Fremont County Board of Equalization, arguing that the County Assessor and her expert consultant failed to properly use the purchase price of the property in their valuations and used improper trending and depreciation factors. The County Board upheld the valuation.The State Board of Equalization and the district court both affirmed the County Board's decision. Contango then appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court. The main issues on appeal were whether the County Board’s decision to uphold the County Assessor’s rejection of the property’s purchase price as a starting point for valuation was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law, and whether the County Board’s decision to uphold the County Assessor’s application of trending and depreciation factors in the valuation was in accordance with law.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the County Assessor was justified in rejecting the purchase price as a starting point for valuation due to the lack of detailed information and the complexity of the Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA). The Court also found that the Assessor’s use of trending and depreciation factors outside those recommended by the Department of Revenue was permissible under the Department’s rules, as long as the sources were credible. The Court concluded that the County Board’s rulings were supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. View "Contango Resources, LLC v. Fremont County" on Justia Law

In January 2017, Bruce Higgins, Rebekka Higgins, the Estate of Judy Devney, and John L. Devney sought a judgment to quiet title to mineral interests in Williams County and recover oil and gas proceeds. The defendants, Maynard Lund, Kjersti Eide, Don Eide, and Jennifer Eide, denied the allegations and counterclaimed for quiet title. XTO Energy, Inc., Continental Resources, Inc., and Whiting Petroleum, Corp. requested dismissal of the complaint.The District Court of Williams County held a bench trial in April 2018 to interpret a 1964 warranty deed. The court found that the deed reserved Milton Higgins' entire interest in the top parcel and quieted title accordingly, resulting in a 50/50 split of the partnership mineral acres between the successors of Milton Higgins and Howard Lund. The court awarded the plaintiffs $237,000 in royalty damages plus fees and costs. In 2021, the court granted summary judgment motions by the plaintiffs, determining that the 1952 royalty deed conveyed a floating royalty rather than a fixed royalty. Final judgment was entered in January 2024.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the 1964 warranty deed was ambiguous, allowing for extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent, and concluded that the reservation applied to both the top and bottom parcels. The court also found no valid stipulation regarding the interpretation of the 1952 royalty deed and determined that the deed conveyed a floating royalty. The court affirmed the district court's interpretation of the deeds and the division of the suspended oil and gas proceeds. View "Higgins v. Lund" on Justia Law

In 1957, Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Act (PAA) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, providing indemnity for contractors and others involved in nuclear activities. The PAA mandated that the government indemnify contractors and other "persons indemnified" for public liability arising from nuclear incidents. In 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) entered into an indemnity agreement with Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, which processed uranium for the government. Cotter Corporation later purchased radioactive materials from Mallinckrodt and was sued in 2012 by plaintiffs alleging harm from these materials.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed Cotter's claim for indemnification under the PAA and the indemnity agreement, ruling that Cotter was not entitled to indemnification because its activities did not arise out of or in connection with the contractual activities of Mallinckrodt. The court also dismissed Cotter's contract claim, concluding that Cotter lacked standing as a third-party beneficiary and failed to state a claim for breach of contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the Claims Court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that Cotter's liability for the nuclear incident plausibly arose out of or in connection with the contractual activities of Mallinckrodt, as the materials causing the incident were produced under the contract. The court also found that Cotter sufficiently alleged it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement and that the government breached the contract by not indemnifying Cotter. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COTTER CORP., N.S.L. v. US " on Justia Law