Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Cascade County's request for attorney fees and costs, interest, and unjust enrichment damages, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the provisions of Mont. Code Ann. 75-11-307(2) precluded the County's request for attorney fees, costs, interests, and unjust enrichment damages.This appeal involved a long-running dispute between the County and the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board for remediation costs associated with petroleum contamination. The County held that four petroleum releases did not qualify for reimbursement from the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Fund. The district court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed in part. In district court on remand, the County filed a motion to the Board to pay "eligible costs." The district court denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County's claims for attorney fees, costs, interest, and unjust enrichment damages were statutorily prohibited. View "Cascade Co. v. Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Bd." on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit found the EPA’s own written decision indicated the EPA concluded that the statutory and regulatory definitions of “small refinery” did not provide specific “guidance []or limits” on how the terms “refinery” and “average aggregate daily crude oil throughput” should have been “evaluated.” Accordingly, the EPA proceeded as though it “ha[d] discretion to choose what factors and information it w[ould] consider in this evaluation.” The EPA’s decisions to deny an extension of a temporary exemption to “small refineries” from complying with the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard Program were reversed and remanded. "That does not mean that the EPA could not again arrive at the same conclusion. But, to do so, the EPA would need to (a) either consider and apply its own regulatory definition of “facility” to the circumstances presented here or explain why that regulatory definition is inapplicable, (b) provide clear guidance on its integration analysis, to the extent it continues to rely on that factor, and (c) omit any consideration of Suncor’s management structure or public statements unless it can demonstrate that those factors are somehow consistent with, and have a reasonable connection to, the statutory and regulatory definitions of the term “refinery.” View "Suncor Energy v. EPA" on Justia Law

Signal Peak Energy, LLC, an intervenor-appellee, sought to expand its mining operations. The expansion is expected to result in the emission of 190 million tons of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Interior published an Environmental Assessment (EA) in which it explained that the amount of GHGs emitted over the 11.5 years the Mine is expected to operate would amount to 0.44 percent of the total GHGs emitted globally each year. The U.S. Department of the Interior (“Interior”) found that the project’s GHG emissions would have no significant impact on the environment.   The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Interior on all but Plaintiffs’ claim that Interior failed to consider the risk of coal train derailments. The district court vacated the 2018 EA, but not Interior’s approval of the Mine Expansion, and remanded the matter to Interior to consider the risk of train derailment. Interior subsequently published a fourth EA that incorporated the 2018 EA and considered train derailment risks for the first time.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending the opinion denying the petition for panel rehearing, and denied the petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Interior on all but one claim. The panel held that Interior violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to provide a convincing statement of reasons why the project’s impacts were insignificant. The panel was not persuaded that Interior was required to use the Social Cost of Carbon metric to quantify the environmental harms stemming from the project’s GHG emissions. View "350 MONTANA, ET AL V. DEBRA HAALAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Leonard Schleder and declaring him the owner of the mineral rights at issue in this case, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) correctly interpreted the warranty deed language to reserve to Schleder all his mineral interests in the property; (2) properly considered the chain of title in interpreting the language of the unambiguous warranty deed; and (3) did not err in determining that estoppel by deed did not apply to prevent Schleder from asserting title to the mineral interests. View "Dellit v. Schleder" on Justia Law

Warren tenders gasoline products to Colonial (a common carrier) for shipment on Colonial’s pipeline from Texas to New Jersey, where Warren has a gasoline-blending operation. The rates and conditions for the transportation services are specified in tariffs approved by the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC). The tariff recognizes that the gasoline batches Colonial transports for Warren are fungible and allows Colonial to comingle gasoline from many shippers during transport. Colonial must deliver gasoline of the same volume and grade as the gasoline that was entrusted to it, with the same characteristics that influence the gasoline’s combustion performance (octane rating and distillation value), and its environmental impact, such as volatility. The tariff does not state whether “on specification” gasoline includes any “blend margin.” In 2016, FERC determined that the regulation of in-pipeline blending was outside its jurisdiction. Colonial continued giving Warren gasoline that complies with the relevant tariff but Warren claims that Colonial’s in-line blending of the gasoline with butane diminishes Warren’s ability to blend cheaper blendstocks into the gasoline. Warren regularly blends cheaper gasoline with more expensive gasoline to increase the amount of on-specification gasoline that it can sell,Warren sued for loss of profits (Carmack Amendment 49 U.S.C. 1590), conversion, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference. The Third Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claims. Warren’s request seeks an enlargement of its rights under the FERC-approved tariff and violates the filed-rate doctrine’s nondiscrimination principle. View "George E. Warren LLC v. Colonial Pipeline Co" on Justia Law

The Delaware River Basin Commission banned high-volume hydraulic fracturing (fracking) within the Delaware River Basin, reflecting its determination that fracking “poses significant, immediate and long-term risks to the development, conservation, utilization, management, and preservation of the [Basin’s] water resources.” The ban codified a “de facto moratorium” on natural gas extraction in the Basin since 2010. Two Pennsylvania state senators, the Pennsylvania Senate Republican Caucus, and several Pennsylvania municipalities challenged the ban, alleging that the Commission exceeded its authority under the Delaware River Basin Compact, violated the Takings Clause, illegally exercised the power of eminent domain, and violated the Constitution’s guarantee of a republican form of government.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of standing. No plaintiff alleged the kinds of injuries that Article III demands. Legislative injuries claimed by the state senators and the Republican Caucus affect the state legislature as a whole; under Supreme Court precedent, “individual members lack standing to assert the institutional interests of a legislature.” The municipalities alleged economic injuries that are “conjectural” and “hypothetical” rather than “actual and imminent.” None of the plaintiffs have standing as trustees of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the Pennsylvania Constitution's Environmental Rights Amendment because the fracking ban has not cognizably harmed the trust. View "Yaw v. Delaware River Basin Commission" on Justia Law

Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., a generation and transmission cooperative, admitted Mieco, Inc., a natural gas supplier, as a member. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) concluded that owing to the admission of Mieco (1) Tri-State was subject to its jurisdiction and (2) the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the exit charge levied by Tri-State upon a member that leaves the cooperative. United Power, Inc., (United) a utility and member of Tri-State, opposed the admission of Mieco and wants United’s exit charge adjudicated in a state forum. United challenged the FERC’s conclusions as ultra vires and arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petitions for review insofar as they raise objections that have not properly been exhausted before the agency, and denied the petitions in all other respects. The court first explained that it was reasonable for the FERC to conclude that providing such clarity was a prudent and efficient use of a declaratory order. Further, the FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over an exit charge. A state proceeding adjudicating whether an exit charge is just and reasonable is therefore preempted because it is “unmistakably and unambiguously directed” at something that is in “the FERC’s exclusive domain.” View "United Power, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Sabine–Neches Waterway is vitally important to the local, state, and federal economies. Despite its importance, sixty years have gone by without much effort to maintain or otherwise improve it. The Sabine–Neches Navigation District (District) set out to change that. Congress covered most of the cost with the District left to cover the rest. The District planned to cover its share through port fees. But the same federal law that led to congressional funding also sets limits on how costs can be passed onto consumers by local entities. Two energy companies sued the District, claiming that the port fees exceeded those limits. The district court concluded that they failed to state plausible claims and dismissed the case.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the statute, properly construed, allows the District to finance its share of the project once a usable increment of the project is completed. Because Anchorage Basin No. 1 has been completed, subsection (a)(1) permitted the District to pass the Ordinance containing the User Fee. Further, Plaintiffs’ argument hinges on a strict reading of “necessary.” But context is needed to determine whether “necessary” means “absolute physical necessity” or merely “conducive to the end sought.” Under these circumstances, it is the latter. Thus, the District can cover more than 25% of the cost with the User Fee proceeds. View "BG Gulf Coast LNG v. Sabine-Neches" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Valley Authority sells its power to the BVU Authority in Virginia, one of its many customers. The BVU Authority in turn sells its power to local consumers who need electricity. Among those local consumers is Plaintiff, who believes that the TVA has a statutory duty to use the fruits of its sales to large industrial buyers to subsidize consumers’ electricity consumption. Plaintiff believes that a string of TVA rate changes, shifting costs from industry to consumers, were illegal. So he sued BVU Authority and TVA under three theories, which all more or less amount to claims that the TVA failed to live up to its statutory duties under Section 11. The district court dismissed all three claims because TVA’s rate-making authority is committed to agency discretion and thus unreviewable.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all three of Plaintiff’s claims. The court explained that Section 11 of the TVA Act lays out broad policies and goals that operate more like aspirations than commands. It does not support any of the claims that Plaintiff offers against TVA or BVU Authority. TVA rate-making is a presumptively unreviewable category of agency action under 701(a)(2), and the policy-laden language of Section 11 does not provide any guidelines or limits to overcome that presumption. Because the TVA-BVU contract simply repeats the vague statutory language, Plaintiff’s contract claim is really a statutory claim in disguise, and Section 11 of the TVA Act does not provide a private cause of action. View "David Holbrook v. Tennessee Valley Authority" on Justia Law

Loggerhead Holdings, Inc., a holding company that owned a scuba diving cruise business, was one of many plaintiffs who brought suit against an oil company because of the explosion of an offshore drilling rig and the resulting discharge of a massive quantity of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. Loggerhead’s claims were dismissed on summary judgment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that Loggerhead had been able to continue operations for several years despite its fraught financial condition, and indeed despite reporting net losses on its taxes for the three years preceding the disastrous events of April 2010 in the Gulf. Whether it could have continued to survive, if not thrive, had the April events not occurred presents a fact question. Thus, the court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find the requisite causal link between the Deepwater Horizon disaster and Loggerhead’s demise. Summary judgment should not have been granted.   However, because Loggerhead was not able to offer more than Dixon’s allegations and an unsupported estimate — evidence “so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant” — the district court properly granted BP’s motion for summary judgment on the Section 2702(b)(2)(B) claim. View "Loggerhead Holdings v. BP" on Justia Law