Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) Title III court allowing certain expenses incurred by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) under a contract entered into with LUMA Energy, LLC and LUMA Energy ServCo, LLC (collectively, LUMA) as entitled to administrative expense priority pursuant to section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, holding that there was no error.In 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (FOMB) filed for bankruptcy on behalf of PREPA. In 2020, PREPA entered into a contract with LUMA, a private consortium, to transfer the operations and management of PREPA to LUMA. At issue was whether the Title III court erred in allowing expenses incurred by PREPA under the contract as entitled to administrative expense priority. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) section 503(b)(1)(A) applies in Title III cases; (2) the Title III court did not abuse its discretion in applying the requirements of section 503(b)(1)(A); and (3) the Title III court correctly held that 48 U.S.C. 2126(e) prevents it from reviewing challenges to FOMB's certification decision. View "Union de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y Riego v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the PROMESA Title III court granting the motion of the Financial Oversight and Management Board to assume certain long-term power supply contracts on behalf of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) under 11 U.S.C. 365 and 48 U.S.C. 2161, holding that there was no clear error.On appeal, Appellants - PREPA's primary labor union, an energy company that had other contracts with PREPA, and multiple environmental groups - argued that the Board abused the assumption procedure set forth in section 365 to avoid the competitive bidding process ordinarily required for long-term power supply contracts under Commonwealth law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Board's motion to assume was ripe for resolution by the Title III court and remained so on appeal; and (2) the Title III court properly granted the Board's motion to assume the renegotiated contracts under the customary standards of section 365(a). View "Campamento Contra Las Cenizas v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority" on Justia Law

Allco Renewable Energy Limited & PLH LLC (collectively Allco), appealed the Vermont Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) September 2020 decision awarding two provider-block contracts to Green Mountain Power (GMP). Allco argued the PUC erred in determining the proposals submitted by GMP on behalf of an undisclosed independent developer were proper provider-block projects under 30 V.S.A. 8005a(c)(1)(B). The Vermont Supreme Court deferred to the PUC’s conclusion that the GMP proposals qualified as provider-block projects because Allco did not demonstrate the PUC’s interpretation of section 8005a(c)(1)(B) was either unreasonable or has compelling indications of error. View "In re Investigation to Review the Avoided Costs that Serve as Prices for the Standard-Offer Program in 2020 (Allco Renewable Energy Limited & PLH LLC)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) upholding county appraisers' application of the Kansas Oil and Gas Appraisal Guide developed by the Kansas Department of Revenue's Property Valuation Division for valuations given for the 2016 tax year to the working interest of River Rock Energy Co. in 203 gas wells and related equipment, holding that the BOTA did not err.In its dispute, River Rock argued that the Guide produced inflated values for its working gas leases by capping operating expense allowances to arrived at a "working interest minimum lease value." The BOTA upheld the county appraisers' application of the Guide. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Guide overvalued River Rock's wells. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the county appraisers correctly applied the Guide; and (2) the court of appeals correctly decided that it had jurisdiction to entertain River Rock's challenge to BOTA's order refusing to abate filing fees. View "In re Tax Appeal of River Rock Energy Co." on Justia Law

A 2015 auction for electrical capacity (commitments by power plants to provide electricity to utilities in the future) in Illinois produced a striking result. Capacity in neighboring regions uniformly sold for less than $3.50 per megawatt-day; in a region covering much of Illinois, the auction resulted in capacity prices of $150 per megawatt-day, a nearly ninefold increase from the prior year’s price of $16.75. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission identified numerous problems with the existing auction rules and ordered that the rules be changed prospectively. FERC also launched an investigation into potential market manipulation in the 2015 Auction but later ruled that the identified flaws in the auction rules and the high price range those rules established, plus the allegations of market manipulation, did not call into question the 2015 Auction or the price it produced.The D.C. Circuit granted a petition for review in part. Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791, FERC need not approve every auction price before it goes into effect. That is not what the market-based rate scheme requires. However, FERC’s analysis of the 2015 Auction, was arbitrary and capricious; it failed to adequately explain why the problems it identified in the existing auction rules affecting pricing— problems it ordered fixed going forward—did not also affect the fairness of the 2015 Auction. View "Public Citizen, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The crux of this interlocutory appeal was whether Plaintiffs, complaining of personal injury and property damage as a result of the alleged improper use of an oil-disposal well, had to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board (MSOGB) prior to proceeding on their common-law claims in the circuit court. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the MSOGB could provide no adequate remedy for the Baucums’ personal-injury and property-damage claims, the Baucums were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding in the circuit court. View "Petro Harvester Oil & Gas Co., LLC, et al. v. Baucum" on Justia Law

Daniel and Debra Bearce appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Yellowstone Energy Development, LLC. In June 2006, representatives of a business entity that would eventually become Yellowstone went to the home of Daniel and Debra Bearce seeking to purchase 170 acres of land owned by the Bearces. Yellowstone successfully secured an exclusive option to purchase the land. In 2008, Yellowstone exercised its option to purchase the land, and the parties entered into a contract for deed. In 2009, Yellowstone and the Bearces modified the contract for deed to alter some of the payment terms. Both the original contract for deed and the 2009 modified contract for deed included the following term providing for the payment of a portion of the purchase price with “shares” of a contemplated ethanol plant. Yellowstone subsequently abandoned its plan to build an ethanol plant on the Bearces’ land. Yellowstone then negotiated a long-term lease with a third party to build an oil train loading facility on the Bearces’ land. In July 2010, Yellowstone sent a letter to the Bearces advising them $100,000 in “value” would be issued despite Yellowstone’s abandonment of the plan to build an ethanol plant. In December 2011, the Yellowstone Board of Directors approved a multiplier of three units per $1 invested for individuals who had provided initial cash investment in Yellowstone. The Bearces’ interest in Yellowstone was not given the 3:1 multiplier. Units representing ownership interest in Yellowstone were allocated and placed on a ledger sometime after December 4, 2012. After receiving a “unit ledger” indicating their interest in Yellowstone would not receive the 3:1 multiplier, the Bearces objected. Despite the objection, Yellowstone refused to apply the 3:1 multiplier to the Bearces’ interest in Yellowstone. The Bearces sued Yellowstone, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent inducement, and breach of contract. On appeal, the Bearces argued the district court erred in concluding Yellowstone did not owe them a fiduciary duty and that, if a duty was owed, the Yellowstone Board of Directors did not breach its fiduciary duty. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Bearce v. Yellowstone Energy Development" on Justia Law

In 1942-1943, the government contracted with the Oil Companies to rapidly expand aviation gas (avgas) production facilities and sell vast quantities of avgas to the government with an artificially low profit margin. The government assumed certain risks, agreeing to reimburse “any new or additional taxes, fees, or charges” which the Companies “may be required by any municipal, state, or federal law ... to collect or pay by reason of the production, manufacture, sale or delivery of the [avgas].” The increased production led to increased amounts of acid waste that overwhelmed existing reprocessing facilities. The Companies contracted to dispose of the acid waste at the McColl site in Fullerton, California.In 1991, the United States and California sued under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, seeking to require the Companies to pay cleanup costs. The Ninth Circuit held that the government was 100% liable for the cost of cleaning up the benzol waste (about 5.5% of the waste) at the McColl site. The Companies have borne nearly all of the clean-up costs incurred since 1994; they submitted a contract termination claim, seeking reimbursement. The Claims Court ultimately found the government liable for all cleanup costs at the McColl site and awarded the Companies $99,509,847.32 for costs incurred through November 2015. The government paid. Remediation at McColl remains ongoing. The Companies sought damages incurred after November 2015. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the government is liable for those costs plus interest, rejecting arguments that res judicata bars the claims and that the Claims Court did not have jurisdiction under the Contract Settlement Act of 1944. View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission authorized the construction and operation of three liquified natural gas (LNG) export terminals on the shores of the Brownsville Shipping Channel in Cameron County, Texas, and the construction and operation of two 135-mile pipelines that will carry LNG to one of those terminals. Objectors filed challenges under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C); the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717b(a).The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition concerning the Annova Terminal as moot, and granted the petitions with respect to the Rio Grande and Texas Terminals, without vacatur. The Commission’s analyses of the projects’ impacts on climate change and environmental justice communities were deficient under NEPA and the APA, and the Commission failed to justify its determinations of public interest and convenience under Sections 3 and 7 of the NGA. On remand, the Commission must explain whether 40 C.F.R. 1502.21(c) requires it to apply the social cost of carbon protocol or some other analytical framework, as “generally accepted in the scientific community” within the meaning of the regulation, and if not, why not. View "Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or abused its discretion, in denying the Association's motion to intervene in post-licensing deadline extension proceedings pertaining to the Eagle Mountain Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Project in California. The panel concluded that the Commission's interpretation of its Rule 214 deserves deference, and thus it may properly limit intervention in post-licensing proceedings. The panel further concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the Association's motion to intervene, where the only change sought by the licensee was an extension of time to commence construction.The panel also concluded that the Commission did not violate the Federal Power Act (FPA) in failing to provide public notice. In this case, based on longstanding interpretative precedent, the Commission determined that Eagle Crest's request was not a significant alteration of the License because the requested extensions were not inconsistent with the Project's plan of development or terms of the License. The panel concluded that the Commission's interpretation of Section 6 of the FPA is sufficiently persuasive as applied to deadline extension requests. Accordingly, the panel denied the petition for review. View "National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law