Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

An interlocutory appeal came before the Supreme Court, involving an issue of the “stream-of-commerce” doctrine of personal jurisdiction. Defendant Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc. (TPRI) challenged a superior court decision denying its motion to dismiss, for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff State of Vermont’s complaint. The State alleged that TPRI, along with twenty-eight other defendants, contaminated the waters of the state by introducing into those waters a gas additive called methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Atlantic Richfield Company" on Justia Law

Through Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act, ("Act 2"), the General Assembly created a scheme for establishing “cleanup standards” applicable to voluntary efforts to remediate environmental contamination for which a person or entity may bear legal responsibility. Appellant EQT Production Company (“EPC”), owned and operated natural gas wells in the Commonwealth. In May 2012, the company notified Appellee, the Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department” or “DEP”), that it had discovered leaks in one of its subsurface impoundments containing water that had been contaminated during hydraulic fracturing operations. Subsequently, EPC cleared the site of impaired water and sludge and commenced a formal cleanup process pursuant to Act 2. In May 2014, the agency tendered to EPC a proposed “Consent Assessment of Civil Penalty,” seeking to settle the penalty question via a payment demand of $1,270,871, subsuming approximately $900,000 attending asserted ongoing violations. EPC disputed the Department’s assessment, maintaining that: penalties could not exceed those accruing during the time period in which contaminants actually were discharged from the company’s impoundment; all such actual discharges ended in June 2012; and the Act 2 regime controlled the extent of the essential remediation efforts. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether ECT had the right to immediately seek a judicial declaration that the DEP's interpretation of the Act was erroneous. The Court held that the impact of the Department’s threat of multi-million dollar assessments against EPC was sufficiently direct, immediate, and substantial to create a case or controversy justifying pre-enforcement judicial review via a declaratory judgment proceeding, and that exhaustion of administrative remedies relative to the issues of statutory interpretation that the company has presented was unnecessary. View "EQT Production Co. v. DEP" on Justia Law

After discovering hazardous contaminants at Sanford and Orlando coal gasification plants in the 1990s, the EPA concluded that Florida Power and previous owners were liable for costs of removal and remediation. In 1998 and 2003, Florida Power entered into “Administrative Order by Consent for Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Studies” (AOCs) with the EPA for the sites, under which Power agreed to conduct studies to determine the public safety threat and evaluate options for remedial action. Power agreed to pay the EPA about $534,000 for past response costs at the sites. After the investigation and study at the Sanford site, the EPA entered Records of Decision. In 2009, the court approved a consent decree for actual performance of the Sanford remediation. Regarding the Orlando site, Power submitted a draft Remedial Investigation Report, Risk Assessment, and Remedial Alternative Technical Memorandum that was under EPA review when, in 2011, Power filed this cost recovery and contribution action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601) against a successor to a former owner-operator of the sites. The court dismissed, finding that the 1998 and 2003 AOCs were “settlement agreements” and triggered CERCLA’s three-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the AOCs did not constitute “administrative settlements.” View "Fla. Power Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs allege that, beginning in 2008, they have had a persistent film of dust over their properties, coming from Cane Run power plant, which is owned and operated by LGE. Louisville’s Air Pollution Control District, the agency charged with enforcing environmental regulations in Jefferson County, investigated and issued several Notices of Violation concerning particulate emissions and odors, finding finding that LGE allowed fly ash particulate emissions to enter the air and be carried beyond its property line. The NOVs were resolved by an administrative proceeding before Louisville’s Air Pollution Control Board, which resulted in an Agreed Board Order, requiring LGE to implement and comply, with a “Plant-Wide Odor, Fugitive Dust, and Maintenance Emissions Control Plan.” Plaintiffs provided a Notice of Intent to Sue, alleging violations of the Clean Air Act and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and state-law claims of nuisance, trespass, negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. The district court dismissed all federal law claims except the claim that Cane Run was operating without a valid Clean Air Act permit and rejected defendants’ argument that the Clean Air Act preempted plaintiffs’ state common law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, View "Little v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) required that owners of underground storage tanks demonstrate their ability to pay cleanup costs and compensate third parties for bodily injury and property damage arising out of releases of petroleum products from their tanks. New Hampshire’s Oil Discharge and Disposal Cleanup Fund (ODD Fund) was an EPA-approved program that complied with the federal requirement. In 2003, the State sued several gasoline suppliers, refiners, and chemical manufacturers seeking damages for groundwater contamination allegedly caused by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). In 2012, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment and equitable relief against the State. Each petitioner was a “distributor” of oil under RSA chapter 146-D and paid fees into the ODD Fund. They alleged that “[t]o date, the costs of MTBE remediation in the State of New Hampshire has been paid for primarily through” the ODD Fund, and that that fund was financed, in part, through fees that they paid. Petitioners sought a declaration that those fees “are unconstitutional as the [State] has recovered and/or will recover funds from the MTBE Lawsuit for the cost of MTBE remediation,” and that those fees should be reimbursed to them from: (1) “the settlement proceeds the [State] has received and will receive through the MTBE Litigation”; (2) “any future recovery the [State] receives through the MTBE Litigation”; and (3) “[a]dditionally, or in the alternative, . . . from the funds recovered, and/or to be recovered in the future in the MTBE Litigation, . . . under principles of equitable subrogation and/or unjust enrichment.” On appeal, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred in ruling that they lacked standing to seek reimbursement of their fees from the settlement funds. They also argued that the trial court erred in ruling that their equitable claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Find View "Aranosian Oil Co., Inc. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Valley Authority, a federal agency, operates power plants that provide electricity to nine million Americans in the Southeastern United States, 16 U.S.C. 831n-4(h). Like private power companies, TVA must comply with the Clean Air Act. In 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency told TVA that it needed to reduce emissions from some of the coal-fired units at its plants, including the Drakesboro, Kentucky, Paradise Fossil Plant. TVA considered several options, including maintaining coal-fired generation by retrofitting the Paradise units with new pollution controls and switching the fuel source from coal to natural gas. After more than a year of environmental study, TVA decided to switch from coal to natural-gas generation and concluded that the conversion would be better for the environment. TVA issued a “finding of no significant impact” on the environment stemming from the newly configured project. The district court denied opponents a preliminary injunction, and granted TVA judgment on the administrative record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that TVA acted arbitrarily in failing to follow the particulars of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act for making such decisions, and in failing to consider the project’s environmental effects in an impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act. View "Ky. Coal Ass'n, Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth." on Justia Law

Trona is a sodium carbonate compound that is processed into soda ash or baking soda. Because oil and gas development posed a risk to the extraction of trona and trona worker safety, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the leasing of federal public land for mineral development, indefinitely suspended all oil and gas leases in the mechanically mineable trona area (MMTA) of Wyoming. The area includes 26 pre-existing oil and gas leases owned by Barlow. Barlow filed suit, alleging that the BLM’s suspension of oil and gas leases constituted a taking of Barlow’s interests without just compensation and constituted a breach of both the express provisions of the leases and their implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of the contract claims on the merits and of the takings claim as unripe. BLM has not repudiated the contracts and Barlow did not establish that seeking a permit to drill would be futile. View "Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Phillips owns an underground petroleum pipeline, built in 1930. A 1963 report stated that 100 barrels of leaded gasoline had leaked beneath West Alton, Missouri, and not been recovered. The leak was repaired. In 2002 a West Alton resident noticed a petroleum odor in his home. He contacted Phillips, which investigated. West Alton has no municipal water. Testing on the owner’s well disclosed benzene, a gasoline additive and carcinogen, at three times allowable limits. Phillips purchased the property, and two nearby homes and, with the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR), established a remediation plan. In 2006 Phillips demolished the homes, removed 4000 cubic yards of soil, and set up wells to monitor for chemicals of concern (COCs). Phillips volunteered to provide precautionary bottled water to 50 residents near the site. Sampling of other wells had not shown COCs above allowable limits. MDNR requested that Phillips test the wells of each family receiving bottled water before ending its water supply program. Phillips chose instead to continue distributing bottled water. Most of the recipients are within 0.25 miles of the contamination site. In 2011 nearby landowners sued, alleging nuisance, on the theory that possible pockets of contamination still exist. The Eighth Circuit reversed class certification, noting the absence of evidence showing class members were commonly affected by contamination, View "Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co." on Justia Law

After inspectors found 130,000 barrels of oil floating atop uncovered equalization tanks, CITGO was convicted of multiple violations of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7413 and 40 C.F.R. 60.690 et seq. (Subpart QQQ), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. 703. On appeal, CITGO challenged the district court's CAA convictions, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erroneously instructed the jury about the scope of a regulation concerning "oil-water separators." The court concluded that Subpart QQQ’s text, the overall regulatory scheme, and its promulgation history point to the inescapable conclusion that an equalization tank is not an “oil-water separator.” Because the district court misstated the scope of the regulation, its jury instruction was erroneous and this omission affected the outcome. Therefore, CITGO’s CAA convictions must be reversed. The court also concluded that CITGO's MBTA convictions must be reversed because the court agreed with the Eighth and Ninth circuits that a “taking” is limited to deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory birds. The court's conclusion is based on the statute’s text, its common law origin, a comparison with other relevant statutes, and rejection of the argument that strict liability can change the nature of the necessary illegal act. View "United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Columbia Gas conditionally authorizing the company to extend a natural gas pipeline in Maryland. The court concluded that petitioners satisfied the requirements of Article III standing; the court has jurisdiction over the present controversy and the case is not moot; but petitioners' interest in protecting its members property from eminent domain in the face of alleged non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), does not fall within the zone of interest protected by the NEPA, the CWA, and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 71. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review for want of a legislatively conferred cause of action. View "Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC" on Justia Law