Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Environmental Law
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WRB owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery in Madison County. Following major renovations, WRB applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency under the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-25) to have 28 of the refinery’s systems, methods, devices, and facilities certified as “pollution control facilities” for preferential tax assessment. IEPA recommended approval of two of the requests by the Pollution Control Board (PCB), which accepted the IEPA’s recommendations. The Board of Education sought to intervene in the proceedings where certification had been granted, arguing that it had a legally cognizable interest because the certifications would ultimately deprive it of tax revenue. PCB denied the petitions as moot. While requests to reconsider were pending, the IEPA recommended that the PCB approve WRB’s applications to certify the remaining 26 systems. Before PCB took action on those cases, the Board of Education sought to intervene. PCB denied the motion and granted certification in each case. The appellate court dismissed the Board of Education’s consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction under section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, under which the Board of Education sought review The court noted the specific provision for appeals in proceedings involving PCB’s “issuance, refusal to issue, denial, revocation, modification or restriction of a pollution control certificate,” contained in the Property Tax Code,35 ILCS 200/11-60. That provision requires that proceedings originate in the circuit court, rather than by direct administrative review in the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.View "Bd of Educ. of Roxana Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist/ No. 1 v. Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law

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WRB owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery in Madison County. Following major renovations, WRB applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency under the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-25) to have 28 of the refinery’s systems, methods, devices, and facilities certified as “pollution control facilities” for preferential tax assessment. IEPA recommended approval of two of the requests by the Pollution Control Board (PCB), which accepted the IEPA’s recommendations. The Board of Education sought to intervene in the proceedings where certification had been granted, arguing that it had a legally cognizable interest because the certifications would ultimately deprive it of tax revenue. PCB denied the petitions as moot. While requests to reconsider were pending, the IEPA recommended that the PCB approve WRB’s applications to certify the remaining 26 systems. Before PCB took action on those cases, the Board of Education sought to intervene. PCB denied the motion and granted certification in each case. The appellate court dismissed the Board of Education’s consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction under section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, under which the Board of Education sought review The court noted the specific provision for appeals in proceedings involving PCB’s “issuance, refusal to issue, denial, revocation, modification or restriction of a pollution control certificate,” contained in the Property Tax Code,35 ILCS 200/11-60. That provision requires that proceedings originate in the circuit court, rather than by direct administrative review in the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.View "Bd. of Educ. of Roxana Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law

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BP and Andarko appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the the government on the question of their liability for civil penalties under 33 U.S.C. 1321(b)(7)(A). Section 1321(b)(7)(A) imposes mandatory penalties upon the owners of facilities "from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged." The court found no genuine dispute as to defendants' liability for civil penalties where the well's cement failed, resulting in the loss of controlled confinement of oil such that the oil ultimately entered navigable waters. Therefore, the well is a facility "from which oil or a hazardous substance was discharged""into or upon the navigable waters of the United States." Andarko and BP "shall be subject to a civil penalty" calculated in accordance with statutory and regulatory guidelines and this liability is unaffected by the path traversed by the discharged oil. Nor is liability precluded by any culpability on the part of the vessel's owner or operator. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

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The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to fund alternative energy projects called “biorefinery demonstration projects,” 42 U.S.C. 16232(d), to develop ways to convert trees, crops and agricultural waste into energy. Frontier sought a grant to construct a plant in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula that would use about 770 tons of wood chips per day to produce 20 million gallons of ethanol per year. As required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), DOE prepared a draft environmental assessment. After receiving input, DOE issued a final environmental assessment that proposed changes, including use of a biomass boiler instead of natural gas boilers to generate power for the plant. DOE issued a finding of “no significant impact” and awarded $100 million toward construction of the plant, about 34% of its total cost. Opponents sued, alleging violation of the NEPA. The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims also failed on the merits. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to standing, holding that the opponents did show injury subject to redress, but affirmed on the merits, stating that DOE completed a thorough environmental assessment and reasonably described the environmental impacts identified as not significant. View "Klein v. U.S. Dep't of Energy" on Justia Law

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Following the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, each of the Oil Companies entered into contracts with the government to provide high-octane aviation gas (avgas) to fuel military aircraft. The production of avgas resulted in waste products such as spent alkylation acid and “acid sludge.” The Oil Companies contracted to have McColl, a former Shell engineer, dump the waste at property in Fullerton, California. More than 50 years later, California and the federal government obtained compensation from the Oil Companies under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, for the cost of cleaning up the McColl site. The Oil Companies sued, arguing the avgas contracts require the government to indemnify them for the CERCLA costs. The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit reversed with respect to breach of contract liability and remanded. As a concession to the Oil Companies, the avgas contracts required the government to reimburse the Oil Companies for their “charges.” The court particularly noted the immense regulatory power the government had over natural resources during the war and the low profit margin on the avgas contracts. View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

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This appeal was taken from a district court order in a quiet title action. While the appeal was pending, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) declared twenty-seven unpatented mining claims asserted by Appellant forfeit and void by operation of law because Appellant failed to comply with the statutory mining claim maintenance requirement. Consequently, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appeal was rendered moot when the BLM declared Appellant's asserted claims forfeit and void. The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the appeal was moot because the controversy that existed at the beginning of this litigation concerning superior title was no longer at issue, and Appellant's claims did not exist as a matter of law.View "Majuba Mining, Ltd. v. Pumpkin Copper, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission approved Cimarex Energy Company's plan to reinject waste carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide into a producing natural gas formation in southwest Wyoming over the objection of Exxon Mobil Corporation. Exxon appealed. The district court affirmed the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the Commission properly denied Exxon's petition for a rehearing; but (2) the Commission failed to provide sufficient findings of fact as to whether Cimarex's plan to reinject carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide would result in waste of natural gas and improperly interfere with Exxon's correlative rights. Remanded to the Commission to make appropriate findings of both basic and ultimate facts.View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n" on Justia Law

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The Department of Environmental Protection approved an application of Saddleback Ridge Wind, LLC for a permit to construct the Saddleback Ridge Wind Project, a wind energy development. The Board of Environmental Protection affirmed. Friends of Maine's Mountains, Friends of Saddleback Mountain, and several individuals appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Board abused its discretion when determining which nighttime sound level limit to apply to the applications. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's order related to nighttime sound requirements and remanded, holding that the Board failed to meet its statutory obligation to protect the health and welfare of the Project's neighbors and thus abused its discretion in approving Saddleback's permit applications.View "Friends of Maine's Mountains. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

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The Clean Air Act requires permits for stationary sources, such as factories and powerplants. The Act’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) provisions make it unlawful to construct or modify a “major emitting facility” in “any area to which [PSD program] applies” without a permit, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C). A “major emitting facility” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” (or 100 tons per year for certain sources). Facilities seeking a PSD permit must comply with emissions limitations that reflect the “best available control technology” (BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act and it is unlawful to operate any “major source,” wherever located, without a permit. A “major source” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant,” under Title V of the Act. In response to the Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission standards for new vehicles, and made stationary sources subject to the PSD program and Title V, based on potential GHG emissions. Recognizing that requiring permits for all sources with GHG emissions above statutory thresholds would render the programs unmanageable, EPA purported to “tailor” the programs to accommodate GHGs by providing that sources would not become newly subject to PSD or Title V permitting on the basis of their potential to emit GHGs in amounts less than 100,000 tons per year. The D.C. Circuit dismissed some challenges to the tailoring rule for lack of jurisdiction and denied the rest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the Act does not permit an interpretation requiring a source to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of potential GHG emissions. The Massachusetts decision held that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes GHGs, but with respect to PSD and Title V permitting provisions, EPA has employed a narrower, context-appropriate meaning. Massachusetts did not invalidate the long-standing constructions. “The Act-wide definition is not a command to regulate, but a description of the universe of substances EPA may consider regulating.” The presumption of consistent usage yields to context and distinct statutory objects call for different implementation strategies. EPA has repeatedly acknowledged that applying PSD and Title V permitting requirements to GHGs would be inconsistent with the Act’s structure and design, which concern “a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.” EPA lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s unambiguous numerical thresholds to accommodate its GHG-inclusive interpretation. EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require sources that would need permits based on emission of conventional pollutants to comply with BACT for GHGs. BACT, which has traditionally been about end-of-stack controls, may be fundamentally unsuited to GHG regulation, but applying BACT to GHGs is not "disastrously unworkable," and need not result in a dramatic expansion of agency authority. View "Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

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This case concerned three rivers which flow through Montana and then beyond its borders. At issue was whether discrete, identifiable segments of these rivers in Montana were nonnavigable, as federal law defined that concept for purposes of determining whether the State acquired title to the riverbeds underlying those segments, when the State entered the Union in 1989. Montana contended that the rivers must be found navigable at the disputed locations. The Court held that the Montana Supreme Court's ruling that Montana owned and could charge for use of the riverbeds at issue was based on an infirm legal understanding of the Court's rules of navigability for title under the equal-footing doctrine. The Montana Supreme Court erred in its treatment of the question of river segments and portage and erred as a matter of law in relying on evidence of present-day primarily recreational use of the Madison River. Because this analysis was sufficient to require reversal, the Court declined to decide whether the State Supreme Court also erred as to the burden of proof regarding navigability. Montana's suggestion that denying the State title to the disputed riverbeds would undermine the public trust doctrine underscored its misapprehension of the equal-footing and public trust doctrines. Finally, the reliance by petitioner and its predecessors in title on the State's long failure to assert title to the riverbeds was some evidence supporting the conclusion that the river segments over those beds were nonnavigable for purposes of the equal-footing doctrine. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed. View "PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana" on Justia Law