Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Seeking to construct a natural gas compressor station in Maryland, Dominion applied for and received a certificate of public convenience and necessity from FERC. The Department subsequently twice refused to process Dominion's application for an air quality permit and Dominion sought expedited review from the court. The court granted Dominion's petition and remanded for further action because the Department's failure to act to grant, condition, or deny Dominion's air quality permit was inconsistent with federal law. View "Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, et al." on Justia Law

A severe rainstorm in 2006 caused two wastewater storage tanks at CITGO's Lake Charles Louisiana refinery to fail and over two million gallons of oil flooded into the surrounding waterways. The United States filed suit against CITGO under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1321, seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief. The district court imposed a $6 million penalty against CITGO and ordered injunctive relief. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the motion to dismiss was properly denied where there was no diligent prosecution by the State and no jurisdictional issue to resolve; the district court needed to have made a finding on the amount of economic benefit and that such a finding was central to the ability of the district court to assess the statutory factors and for an appellate court to review that assessment; the court vacated the civil penalty award and remanded for re-evaluation; at that time, the district court should reconsider its findings with respect to CITGO's conduct, giving special attention to what CITGO knew prior to the oil spill and its delays in addressing recognized deficiencies; and the court rejected the government's argument that the district court erred with respect to its findings on the amount of oil spilled. View "United States, et al. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

Portland Generating Station is a 427-megawatt, coal-fired, electricity generating plant in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, directly across the Delaware River within 500 feet of Warren County, New Jersey. The EPA found that Portland emits sulfur dioxide in amounts that significantly interfere with control of air pollution across state borders. In response to a petition under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7408, 7409)), the EPA imposed direct limits on Portland‘s emissions and restrictions to reduce its contribution to air pollution within three years. The Third Circuit upheld the EPA actions. It was reasonable for the EPA to interpret Section 126(b) as an independent mechanism for enforcing interstate pollution control, giving it authority to promulgate the Portland Rule. The contents of the Portland Rule are not arbitrary, capricious, or abusive of the EPA‘s discretion. View "GenOn REMA LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Between 1994 and 1999 Commonwealth Edison modified five Illinois coal-fired power plants that had been operating on August 7, 1977, and were, therefore, grandfathered against a permitting requirement applicable to any “major emitting facility” built or substantially modified after that date in parts of the country subject to the rules about prevention of significant deterioration, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a), until the modification. The permit requires installation of “the best available control technology for each pollutant subject to regulation.” Commonwealth Edison did not obtain permits. There was no challenge until 2009, a decade after completion of the modifications. The district court dismissed a challenge as untimely. After finishing the modifications, Commonwealth Edison sold the plants to Midwest. The federal government and Illinois (plaintiffs) argued that the district court allowed corporate restructuring to wipe out liability for ongoing pollution. Midwest and its corporate parent (Edison Mission) filed bankruptcy petitions after the appeal was argued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Midwest cannot be liable because its predecessor would not have been liable had it owned the plants continuously. Commonwealth Edison needed permits before undertaking the modifications. The court rejected arguments of continuing-violation and continuing-injury. View "United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC" on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in two underlying lawsuits (the Briley Lawsuit and the McSpadden Lawsuit). These underlying lawsuits sought damages arising out of Doe Run's operation of a five-hundred-acre waste pile (Leadwood Pile). The court concluded that the pollution exclusions in the CGL policies precluded a duty to defend Doe Run in the Briley Lawsuit. The court concluded, however, that the McSpadden Lawsuit included allegations and claims that were not unambiguously barred from coverage by the pollution exclusions in the policies. The McSpadden Lawsuit alleged that the distribution of toxic materials harmed plaintiffs, without specifying how that harm occurred. The McSpadden complaint also alleged that Doe Run caused bodily injury or property damage when it left the Leadwood Pile open and available for use by the public without posting warning signs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in an underlying lawsuit. The underlying lawsuit alleged environmental property damage resulting from Doe Run's mine and mill operations. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Lexington had no duty to defend because the policies' absolute pollution exclusions unambiguously barred coverage of all claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's revised emissions standards for secondary lead smelting facilities. In 2012, acting pursuant to sections 112(d)(6) and 112(f)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(d)(6), (f)(2), EPA revised the 1995 emissions standards for secondary lead smelting facilities, reducing allowable emissions by 90% and requiring smelters to totally enclose certain "fugitive" emission sources. Industry petitioners first argued that the Secondary Lead Rule impermissibly regulated elemental lead as hazardous air pollutants (HAP). The court concluded, inter alia, that industry petitioners' first contention was time-barred and the second contention also failed because the Rule set HAP emissions standards at levels designed to attain the primary lead national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), not the converse. In regards to environmental petitioners' challenges, the court concluded that environmental petitioners have shown that their members would have standing under Article III to sue in their own right. However, environmental petitioners' challenge failed on the merits. Their primary argument that, when EPA revised emissions standards under section 112(d)(6), it must recalculate the maximum achievable control technology in accordance with sections 112(d)(2) and (d)(3), was barred by NRDC v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part the petitions for review. View "Assoc. of Battery Recyclers v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

As the tanker Athos neared Paulsboro, New Jersey, an abandoned anchor in the Delaware River punctured its hull and caused 263,000 gallons of crude oil to spill. The owner of the tanker, Frescati, paid $180 million in cleanup costs and ship damages, but was reimbursed for nearly $88 million by the U.S. government under the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 2701. Frescati made claims against CARCO, which ordered the oil and owned the terminal where the Athos was to unload, claiming breach of the safe port/safe berth warranty made to an intermediary responsible for chartering the Athos and negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The government, as a statutory subrogee for the $88 million reimbursement reached a limited settlement agreement. The district court held that CARCO was not liable for the accident, but made no findings of fact and conclusions of law, required by FRCP 52(a)(1). The Third Circuit remanded for findings, but stated that the Athos and Frescati were implied beneficiaries of CARCO‘s safe berth warranty; that the warranty is an express assurance of safety; and that the named port exception to that warranty does not apply to hazards that are unknown and not reasonably foreseeable. The court noted that it is not clear that the warranty was actually breached, absent findings as to the Athos‘s actual draft or the clearance provided. The court further stated that CARCO could be liable in negligence for hazards outside the approach to CARCO‘s terminal. View "United States v. Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from actions taken by the Commission approving an application by Southern for combined licenses to construct and operate new Units 3 and 4 of the Vogtle Nuclear Plant and an application by Westinghouse for an amendment to its already-approved reactor design on which the Vogtle application relied. After the close of the combined-license hearing record, petitioners sought to reopen the hearing to litigate contentions relating to the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi complex in Japan. The court held that the Commission acted reasonably in denying petitioners' contentions where the Task Force Report, studying the implications of the Fukushima accident for the United States, alone was not a "new and significant" circumstance requiring a supplemental environmental impact statement and petitioners' contentions lacked specific links between the Fukushima Accident and the Vogtle Site. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Blue Ridge Env. Defense League, et al v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, et al" on Justia Law

Mingo Logan applied to the Corps for a permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1344, to discharge dredged or fill material from a mountain-top coal mine in West Virginia into three streams and their tributaries. The Corps issued the permit to Mingo Logan, approving the requested disposal sites for the discharged materials. Four years later, the EPA invoked its subsection 404(c) authority to "withdraw" the specifications of two of the streams as disposal sites, thereby prohibiting Mingo Logan from discharging them. Mingo Logan then filed this action challenging the EPA's withdrawal of the specified sites. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Mingo Logan and concluded that the EPA had post-permit withdrawal authority. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA" on Justia Law