Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Pattison Sand Company operated a sandstone mine in Iowa. After part of the mine roof collapsed near where a miner was working, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) issued an order under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act prohibiting any activity in much of the mine. Pattison challenged the order before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. An ALJ determined that the order was valid and that the Commission lacked authority to modify it. Pattison moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing MSHA from enforcing parts of the order. The federal district court denied relief. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted in part and denied in part Pattison's petition for review and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that the roof fall was an accident within the meaning of the Act; (2) the ALJ's determination that he lacked the authority to modify the order was in error; and (3) the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the company's request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was not in error. View "Pattison Sand Co., LLC v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Two environmental groups (Petitioners) petitioned for review of a final rulemaking by the EPA that approved a revision to a California state plan to implement national ambient air quality standards for air pollutants. The revision required the South Coast Air Quality Management District to transfer credits to a soon-to-be-completed power plant named Sentinel. Petitioners alleged that the EPA committed procedural errors during the rulemaking process and that the substance of the revised state plan violated the Clean Air Act. Petitioners and the EPA agreed this case should be remanded because the EPA's final rule was invalid, so the only dispute was whether vacatur was appropriate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded without vacatur so the construction of the power plant could proceed without delay, as the power supply would otherwise be interrupted and the plant's operation was not authorized to commence without a new and valid EPA rule in place. View "Ca. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 2010, the EPA promulgated a final rule adopting a new, one-hour primary national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for nitrogen dioxide (NO2). The American Petroleum Institute, the Utility Air Regulatory Group, and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (collectively the API) petitioned for review of that rule, claiming the EPA, in adopting the NAAQS, was arbitrary and capricious and violated the Clean Air Act. The API also challenged a statement in the preamble to the final rule regarding the EPA's intended implementation of the NAAQS. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (1) denied the petitions insofar as they challenged the EPA's adoption of the NAAQS, holding that the EPA's adoption of the NAAQS for NO2 was neither arbitrary or capricious nor in violation of the Clean Air Act; and (2) dismissed the portions of the petitions challenging the EPA's non-final statement regarding permitting in the preamble to the Final Rule, holding that it did not have jurisdiction to consider those portions of the petitions. View "Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Grand Valley Citizens' Alliance filed a complaint alleging that it was entitled to a hearing on an application for permit to drill pursuant to section 34-60-108(7), C.R.S. (2011), of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that under subsection 108(7), Grand Valley Citizens were entitled to a hearing because it had a filed a petition on a matter within the jurisdiction of the Commission. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals judgment, holding that section 34-60-108(7) requires a hearing only for rules, regulations, and orders. Permits are governed by section 34-60-106(1)(f), which grants the Oil and Gas Commission broad authority to promulgate rules governing the permitting process, including the authority to determine who may request a hearing. View "Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

With the approval of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), in 2005 the Public Service Company of Colorado (Xcel) began constructing a coal-fired electric power unit known as "Comanche 3." When Xcel sought to recover a portion of its construction costs nearly four years later in a rate proceeding, Petitioner Leslie Glustrom intervened. Petitioner sought to introduce testimony that Xcel acted improperly and, consequently, should not recover its costs. The PUC excluded most of her testimony, a ruling that Petitioner challenged. Petitioner separately challenged the depreciation rate and the possibility that Comanche 3 might not be "used and useful" at the time rates went into effect. The PUC denied her challenges, and the district court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PUC did not abuse its discretion when it struck substantial portions of Petitioner's testimony pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Further, the depreciation rate approved by the PUC was established pursuant to law and in accordance with the evidence. Lastly, the PUC was free to exercise its discretion in departing from a strict application of the "used and useful" principle. Petitioner failed to meet her burden in showing why such a departure here would result in a rate that is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. View "Glustrom v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit concerned a challenge to an exploratory drilling plan under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OSCLA). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) approved the Shell Exploration Plan S-7444 (Shell EP) to conduct drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. The Plan covered ten exploratory wells on offshore Alabama leases in the central Gulf. This case was a consolidated appeal in which Petitioners the Defenders of Wildlife, the Gulf Restoration Network and others filed comments on the Shell EP, participated in the ancillary administrative proceedings, and then filed a petition with the Court for review. The only issues for the Court's review were whether the Shell EP violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). After review of the parties' briefs and the record below, the Court denied the petition for review, finding the BOEM's decision to approve the Shell EP was not arbitrary or capricious and instead, "reflected the agency's balance of environmental concerns with the expeditious and orderly exploration of resources in the Gulf of Mexico." View "Defenders of Wildlife, et al v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Managem, et al" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation's (MBOGC) issuance of twenty-three gas well permits to Fidelity Exploration and Production Company in the area known as the Cedar Creek Anticline (CCA). The Montana Wildlife Federation and National Wildlife Federation (collectively, Federations) challenged the issuance of the permits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, MBOGC, Fidelity, and Montana Petroleum Association, holding that the Federations failed to rebut the presumption of validity in the MBOGC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) conducting its review under Mont. Code Ann. 82-11-144 and in considering evidence outside the administrative record; (2) determining that the environmental assessments prepared by MBOGC for gas development in the CCA were adequate under the Montana Environmental Policy Act; and (3) ruling that MBOGC did not have to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement for oil and gas development in the CCA. View "Mont. Wildlife Fed'n v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned the court for review of the Commission's rulemaking regarding temporary storage of permanent disposal of nuclear waste. The court held that the rulemaking issue constituted a major federal action necessitating either an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant environmental impact. The court further held that the Commission's evaluation of the risks of spent nuclear fuel was deficient in two specified ways. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review, vacated the Commission's orders, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State of New York v. NRC" on Justia Law

API petitioned for review of a 2008 EPA regulation deregulating many "hazardous secondary materials" under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. After the parties completed briefing, the EPA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that, if made final, would significantly amend the EPA's 2008 decision. As a result, the court deemed this controversy unripe as a prudential matter and ordered the case held in abeyance, subject to regular reports on the status of the proposed rulemaking. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 1957 the Commonwealth constructed the Quehanna Wild Area Nuclear Site. Part of the site was donated to Pennsylvania State University. Until 1967 Penn State leased to a Lockheed predecessor, conducting work under Atomic Energy Commission contracts, involving Strontium-90, a radioactive isotope. The predecessor partially decontaminated. According to Lockheed, the Commonwealth was aware that Strontium-90 remained and could not be removed without dismantling the facility. In the 1990s, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, and the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources to decommission the facility. This cost more than $20 million. PADEP sued Lockheed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a). Lockheed defended that the Commonwealth should recover less than its demand based on its own conduct and liability and the doctrines of unclean hands, estoppel, waiver, and laches. Lockheed also alleged that PADEP was liable under CERCLA as an owner-operator and as having arranged for or transported hazardous substances. The district court dismissed Lockheed’s third-party complaint, concluding that the Commonwealth and DCNR retained Eleventh Amendment immunity when PADEP filed a federal suit. The Third Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss the third party complaint as moot, based on the sufficiency of Lockheed’s affirmative defenses. View "Commonwealth of PA Dep' of Envtl. Prot. v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law