Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, the Army Corps of Engineers issued two nationwide general permits that authorized surface and underground coalmining operations to discharge dredged and fill material into waters of the United States. The Corps conducted a public notice-and-comment period and completed a cumulative-impacts analysis that projected the permits’ respective environmental impacts before determining that compensatory mitigation would reduce adverse impacts to a minimal level. The Corps disclosed its analyses and findings in each permit’s Environmental Assessment in lieu of an environmental impact statement. Riverkeeper sued, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(e), the National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706, during the Corps’ issuance of two nationwide coal-mining waste-discharge permits in 2007. The district court granted summary judgment to the Corps. During Riverkeeper’s appeal, the permits at issue expired. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the case remains in controversy and reversed in part. Although the Corps repeatedly objected to the feasibility of Riverkeeper’s demands, in taking the “easier path” of preparing an environmental assessment instead of an environmental impact statement the Corps failed to follow CWA and NEPA regulations by documenting its assessment of environmental impacts and examining past impacts. View "KY Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rowlette" on Justia Law

These cases arose out of the energy crisis of 2000-2002. Plaintiffs, retail buyers of natural gas, alleged that defendants, natural gas traders, manipulated the price of natural gas by reporting false information to price indices published by trade publications and engaging in wash sales. The court held that the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717 et seq., did not preempt plaintiffs' state antitrust claims, and reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. The 2003 enactment of FERC's Code of Conduct did not affect the court's conclusion that the NGA did not grant FERC jurisdiction over claims arising out of false price reporting and other anticompetitive behavior associated with nonjurisdictional sales. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Heartland Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend to add a treble damages state law claim and therefore affirmed the district court's order denying that motion. The court reversed the district court's order dismissing the AEP Defendants from the Wisconsin Arandell case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the plain text of Wisconsin Statutes 133.14 allowed recovery only by plaintiffs who were direct purchasers under the voided contract, the court affirmed the district court's order granting partial summary judgment to DETM. View "In re: Western States Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Washington Gas' request to expand a natural gas substation (County Zoning Plans). On appeal, Washington Gas challenged the district court's order dismissing Washington Gas' mandatory referral claim and the district court's subsequent order granting summary judgment on Washington Gas' federal preemption claims. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the mandatory referral claim pursuant to Burford v. Sun Oil; the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act (PSA), 49 U.S.C. 60102, 60104, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because the PSA only preempted safety regulations and the County Zoning Plans were not safety regulations; and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because Washington Gas was a local distributor of natural gas and, therefore, was not subject to the NGA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Washington Gas Light Co. v. Prince George's County Council" on Justia Law

FERC fined petitioner $30 million for manipulating natural gas futures contracts. Petitioner, an employee of the hedge fund Amaranth, claimed that FERC lacked authority to fine him because the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over all transactions involving commodity futures contracts. The court granted the petition for review because manipulation of natural gas futures contracts fell within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction and because nothing in the Energy Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. 717c-1, clearly and manifestly repealed the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. View "Hunter v. FERC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), as amended by the Reform Act of 1987, required the Secretary of the Interior to issue leases for parcels of land to the highest bidding energy company within sixty days of payment to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Appellants (collectively, "Energy Companies") sued to compel the Secretary to issue pending leases on which they were the high bidders and more than sixty days had passed since they had paid the BLM in full. The district court construed the MLA to impose a mandate on the Secretary to decide whether to issue the leases, and ordered BLM to make such decisions regarding the still pending leases of Energy Companies within thirty days. Energy Companies appealed the district court's order and asserted that the MLA required the Secretary to issue the pending leases within sixty days rather than merely make a decision on whether the leases will be issued. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s order was not a "final decision," and as such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Energy Companies' appeal. View "Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar" on Justia Law

The Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Massachusetts submitted an environmental impact statement (EIS) with its relicensing application in 2006. Before relicensing occurred, an earthquake and tsunami occurred off the coast of Japan, which hit the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Less than three months later, Massachusetts moved to admit a contention and to reopen the Pilgrim record, arguing that Fukushima revealed new and significant information that the environmental impact analysis needed to address. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied Massachusetts's motion. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) denied the Commonwealth's petition for review, rejecting the Commonwealth's claims that the EIS was inadequate in light of the damage to Fukushima. The Commonwealth also petitioned for review from the NRC's vote to renew the license of the Pilgrim station. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition for review, holding that the NRC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by (1) failing to require supplementation of the EIS in light of Fukushima; and (2) declining to hear Massachusetts' rulemaking petition and to complete all the post-Fukushima review before granting the license. View "Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the interaction between the NRC's regular decommissioning process of a licensed nuclear facility and a statutory provision (section 2021 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2021) authorizing the NRC to transfer regulatory authority over classes of nuclear materials located within a state to the government of that state. In regards to the basic standards for decommissioning, the court's inability to understand the key regulatory materials purportedly guiding the agency exercise of control over decommissioning required a remand. The court found no legal error in the remainder of the Commission's Order. View "Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., et al" on Justia Law

In this case, FERC reviewed rates resulting from an auction process and concluded that though the rates were not contract rates, they warranted the Mobile-Sierra doctrine presumption anyway. The NEPGA and State Petitioners petitioned for review. Because the NEPGA lacked standing, the court dismissed its petition for review. The court rejected the merits of the State Petitioners' arguments where FERC did not exceed the bounds of its considerable discretion by adopting the public interest standard for deciding whether a given Forward Capacity Auction rate was just and reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the State Petitioners' petition for review. View "New England Power Generators Assoc., Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners, HPBA and NPGA, sought review of two recently promulgated rules that they believed expanded the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C. 6201 et seq., to include decorative fireplaces. The court agreed with the HPBA that the DOE's interpretation of decorative fireplaces as "Direct heating equipment," a specifically enumerated class of covered products under the Act, contravened the EPCA's statutory scheme and, in turn, clear congressional intent. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Assoc. v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Congress's amendment of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), to establish a renewable fuel standard (RFS) program. API objected to the EPA's 2012 projection for cellulosic biofuel and to its refusal to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. The court rejected API's argument that the EPA failed to justify its determination not to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. However, because the EPA's methodology for making its cellulosic biofuel projection did not take neutral aim at accuracy, the court held that it was an unreasonable exercise of agency discretion. Accordingly, the court vacated the 2012 RFS rule and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law