Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Mississippi Power Company filed documents asserting confidentiality with the Mississippi Public Service Commission related to a certificate-of-public-convenience-and-necessity proceeding in January 2009. In July 2012, Bigger Pie Forum (BPF) requested three of those documents from the Commission, and Mississippi Power sought a protective order. Following a hearing, the Chancery Court ordered that the documents be produced. Mississippi Power appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court to the extent that it ordered disclosure of the January 2009 gas price forecasts and CO2 cost assumptions that were similar in kind to those already published (by news media). However, the Court remanded this case to the Chancery Court to should consider the documents under seal and order that information pertaining to natural gas price forecasts and CO2 costs assumptions be produced by Mississippi Power. View "Mississippi Power Company v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

Applicant Ecos Energy, LLC appealed the Public Service Board's decision that its proposed solar power project did not qualify for a standard-offer power purchase contract under Vermont's Sustainably Priced Energy Enterprise Development (SPEED) program because it exceeded the statutory limit on generation capacity. In 2009, the Board issued an order in which it prescribed various procedures and requirements for the standard-offer program. The standard-offer program was administered by the SPEED facilitator, VEPP, Inc. One of the participants in the implementation process, Central Vermont Public Service, commented that separate projects would need to enter into separate interconnection agreements with the utility, enter into separate standard contracts, and obtain separate certificates of public good. Another participant, Renewable Energy Vermont, commented that the statute was clear that "separate plants that share common infrastructure and interconnection should be considered as one plant." In April 2013, VEPP issued a request for proposals (RFP) for projects. Applicant proposed three 2.0 MW solar projects (the Bennington Solar project, the Apple Hill Solar project, and the Sudbury Solar project). Applicant's three projects were the lowest-priced projects. In submitting the RFP results to the Board, VEPP noted that the Bennington project and the Apple Hill project would be located on the same parcel of property and the generation components of the project were "physically contiguous." It requested that the Board make a determination as to whether or not the two projects constituted a single plant. The Board accepted the Bennington project and disqualified the Apple Hill project, which had a higher price. The Board authorized VEPP to enter into standard-offer contracts with applicant for the Bennington and Sudbury projects. Applicant subsequently petitioned the Board to reconsider and modify its order. When it refused, applicant appealed the decision. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the Board's conclusion that the Bennington and Apple Hill projects constituted a single plant was contrary to the plain language of the applicable statute: the Bennington and Apple Hill projects would qualify as "independent technical facilities." As such the Court reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "In re Programmatic Changes to the Standard-Offer Program and Investigation into the Establishment of Standard-Offer Prices under the Sustainably Priced Energy Enterprise Development" on Justia Law

Wayne Morrow filed a permissive appeal to the Circuit Court's order denying his request for a judgment declaring that the $100,000 cap on damages in section 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied to Morrow, a municipal employee who was sued in his individual capacity. In 2009, Alice Yu sought to have Alabama Power Company restore electrical service in her name at a commercial building she was leasing. The premises had been without power for approximately eight months. The City of Montgomery sent Morrow to perform an electrical inspection of the premises and clear the premises for service before electrical service was restored. Keandarick Russell, a minor, was staying with his great-grandmother, who lived next door to the premises. Russell was playing on the concrete pad on which the air-conditioning system was located and was electrocuted when he came in contact with a chain-link fence adjacent to the premises. When the incident occurred, wires from an uncovered junction box at the electrical source had come in contact with a portion of the fence, and, as a result, the fence had become electrified. Russell was electrocuted when he touched the fence. Shameka Caldwell, as Russell's mother and next friend, filed a wrongful-death action against multiple defendants, including Morrow and Yu for two fictitiously named defendants. In the amended complaint, Caldwell alleged that Morrow had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly inspected the premises and had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly allowed electrical service to be restored to the premises. In his answer, Morrow asserted that he was entitled to State immunity, to State-agent immunity, and to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the plain language of 11-47-190 did not limit the recovery on a claim against a municipal employee in his or her individual capacity, the $100,000 statutory cap on recovery would not apply to Caldwell's claims against Morrow. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Morrow's request for a judgment declaring that it would. View "Morrow v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

Shirley Adams and other landowners challenged a petition of the U.S. Oil and Gas Association that proposed amendments to Statewide Rule 681 which authorized the surface and subsurface landspreading of NORM as additional methods of disposal. The Mississippi Oil and Gas Board approved the proposed amendments to Rule 68, and its decision was upheld by the Chancery Court. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found that the landowners failed to prove that the Board's adoption of amended Rule 68 was arbitrary and capricious or against the weight of the evidence. In addition, the Board's decision did not violate federal law or the landowners' constitutional rights; however, the Board violated state law when it exceeded its statutory authority under Section 53-1-17 by amending Rule 68 without gaining the approval of the Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality. Accordingly, the Chancery Court's decision was reversed and the case remanded for review by the Commission.View "Adams v. Mississippi State Oil & Gas Board" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the assessed value of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System for property tax purposes. The parties disputed the method used to assess the pipeline's value as well as the specific deductions made for functional and economic obsolescence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's valuation. View "BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Denali Citizens Council challenged the Department of Natural Resources' (DNR) finding that issuing a license to Usibelli Coal Mine for gas exploration in the Healy Basin was in the best interests of the state on two grounds: (1) DNR failed to take a "hard look" at the economic feasibility of excluding certain residential areas and wildlife habitat from the license; and (2) DNR's treatment of environmental mitigation measures in the best interest finding was arbitrary and capricious. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's order upholding DNR's decision to issue the gas exploration license to Usibelli because the Court concluded that DNR did not act arbitrarily in developing and publishing its best interest finding. View "Denali Citizens Council v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Issues of constitutional import stemming from cross-appeals taken from the Commonwealth Court's ruling on expedited challenges to Act 13 of 2012 were before the Supreme Court in this case. Act 13 contained sweeping legislation affecting Pennsylvania’s environment particularly the exploitation and recovery of natural gas in Marcellus Shale. The litigation was accelerated in part because the legislation itself was designed to take effect quickly and imposed obligations which required the challengers to formulate their legal positions swiftly; and in part in recognition of the economic importance of the legislation to the Commonwealth and its citizens. Following careful deliberation, the Supreme Court's decision found several challenged provisions of Act 13 were unconstitutional. Madame Justice Todd, and Mr. Justice McCaffery, found that several core provisions of Act 13 violated the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the Environmental Rights Amendment; other challenges lacked merit; and several issues required further Commonwealth Court proceedings. Mr. Justice Baer, concurred in the mandate, and joined the majority in all but Parts III and VI(C); Justice Baer would have found the "core constitutional infirmity" sounded in substantive due process. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson Township, et al v. Pa. Public Utility Commission and Attorney General -" on Justia Law

The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) approved a contract for the purchase of substitute natural gas and directed the procedure for resolving future related disputes. The court of appeals reversed the IURC's approval of the contract because a definition term in the contract deviated from the required statutory definition. The parties to the contract subsequently amended the contract to delete the language that the court of appeals found improper. The Supreme Court vacated the reversal of the IURC's order, held that the amended contract that corrected the definitional error rendered the definitional issue moot, and summarily affirmed the court of appeals as to all other claims.View "Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. Ind. Fin. Auth." on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a final water court order which voided a rule promulgated by the Office of the State Engineer regarding nontributary ground water extracted in the course of coalbed methane (CBM) production and other oil and gas development. The final rules were challenged by owners of vested water rights and citizen groups whose members owned vested water rights. After extensive briefing by the parties, the water court upheld the Final Rules in their entirety except for the "Fruitland Rule," which it invalidated. The water court held that although H.B. 1303 granted authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the Fruitland Rule, the Tribal Rule essentially divested the State Engineer of that authority. The water court also found that the State Engineer had issued an improper "advisory" rule, and thus could not promulgate the Fruitland Rule unless he first obtained a judicial determination of his authority over nontributary ground water underlying the Reservation. The State Engineer, the Tribe, and several Intervenors appealed the water court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule based on the Tribal Rule. The Court concluded the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of this authority: it stated on its face that the Final Rules themselves do not form the basis of or "establish" the State Engineer's authority to administer the nontributary ground water within Reservation boundaries. Because the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of his authority, the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule on that ground. Furthermore, the water court also erred in labeling the Fruitland Rule an "advisory" rule and in requiring the State Engineer to obtain a judicial determination that he had authority to administer nontributary ground water within the boundaries of the Reservation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s invalidation of the Fruitland Rule and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dick Wolfe v. Pawnee Well Users, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned Merit Energy Company's 2006 natural gas severance and ad valorem tax liability for wells located in several counties. Merit was a take-in-kind interest owner, which is a party who elects to take a portion of the mineral produced rather than receive monetary remuneration for its share of the production. The State Board of Equalization (SBOE) determined that Merit failed to timely appeal several final Wyoming Department of Revenue (DOR) decisions regarding the amount of taxable gas it had received and dismissed Merit's appeal. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in affirming the SBOE's dismissal as untimely; and (2) even if the Court permitted Merit to appeal the notice of valuation change sent by the DOR, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded Merit from doing so.View "Merit Energy Co. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law