Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Three main issues were raised on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case: (1) whether a school district is liable for oil and gas severance taxes on its royalty interests derived from oil and gas production on sixteenth-section land (the chancellor ruled that it is not); (2) whether the statute of limitations restricts the time period in which a school district can seek a refund of severance taxes that it had paid erroneously (the chancellor ruled that a three-year statute of limitations applied to any refund claims); and (3) whether a school district is liable for administrative expense taxes on its royalty interests derived from oil and gas production on sixteenth-section land (the chancellor ruled that it is). Upon review of the applicable code and in consideration of the arguments of the parties to this case, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor's judgment should be affirmed in part and reversed in part: (1) school districts are not liable for oil and gas severance taxes on sixteenth-section royalty interests: school districts, as political subdivisions of the state, are not included within the definition of "persons" made subject to these taxes; (2) pursuant to the Mississippi Constitution, statutes of limitation in civil causes do not run against the state or its subdivisions; and (3) school districts are liable for administrative expense taxes on sixteenth-section royalty interests: "[t]hese assessments are 'fees,' not 'taxes'; the Legislature has expressly made the state and its subdivisions subject to these fees; and no constitutional provision or other law is violated by requiring school districts to pay them."View "Jones County School District v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection approved an application of Saddleback Ridge Wind, LLC for a permit to construct the Saddleback Ridge Wind Project, a wind energy development. The Board of Environmental Protection affirmed. Friends of Maine's Mountains, Friends of Saddleback Mountain, and several individuals appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Board abused its discretion when determining which nighttime sound level limit to apply to the applications. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's order related to nighttime sound requirements and remanded, holding that the Board failed to meet its statutory obligation to protect the health and welfare of the Project's neighbors and thus abused its discretion in approving Saddleback's permit applications.View "Friends of Maine's Mountains. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs the State and the Vermilion Parish School Board filed a "Petition for Damages to School Lands" in 2004 seeking damages and remediation of a sixteenth section of property in Vermilion Parish owned by the State and managed by the School Board. The property was allegedly polluted by oil and gas exploration and production performed pursuant to an oil, gas and mineral lease originally granted on the property in 1935 and a surface lease entered into in 1994. The plaintiffs claimed damage to the land’s soil, surface waters and ground waters. Plaintiffs raised various causes of action including negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract and violations of both the Mineral Code and the Civil Code. Several defendants were named in the original petition and in supplemental and amending petitions as companies which conducted, directed, controlled or participated in various oil and gas exploration and production activities as operators and/or working interest owners, and/or joint venturers in the mineral interest. At the time of this appeal, the remaining defendants were Union Oil Company of California; Union Exploration Partners; Carrollton Resources, L.L.C.; Chevron USA Inc.; and Chevron Midcontinent, L.P. In a motion for summary judgment, Chevron USA Inc. sought dismissal from suit, which was denied. Upon review of Chevron's argument that it should have been dismissed from the suit, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal’s conclusion that there seemed to be a genuine issue of material fact as to Chevron USA Inc.’s successor status to Union Oil Company of California, and as such, should not have been dismissed from the case. Consequently, the Court affirmed the court of appeal’s opinion in this regard. View "Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company" on Justia Law

After a portion of an oil and gas lease's interest was assigned to Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, the Ohio Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (Division) issued a permit to Chesapeake to drill an oil and gas well on the lease property. Summitcrest, Inc., who originally entered into the lease with the assignor, appealed to the Oil and Gas Commission (Commission). The Division filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the issuance of permits to drill oil and gas wells did not constitute an appealable order. Chesapeake joined in the Division's motion to dismiss. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss. Chesapeake filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Commission from exercising further jurisdiction in the appeal and to vacate the Commission's actions in the appeal. The Commission subsequently heard the appeal and affirmed the issuance of the drilling permit. Thereafter, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the prohibition case based on mootness, which the Supreme Court denied. The Supreme Court then granted the writ, holding that the Commission patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the appeal from the Division's issuance of the permit.View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Oil & Gas Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 1961, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a right-of-way grant to the Alaska Department of Public Works conveying a "road building material site" along the Denali Highway with no expiration date and no rental fee. After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was enacted in 1971, the United States conveyed the surface and subsurface estates encompassing the State's material site to Ahtna, Inc., an Alaska Regional Native Corporation. The conveyance was "subject to" the "[r]ights-of-way for Federal Aid material sites." ANCSA allowed the federal government to waive administration of the rights-of-way, which BLM did in 1984. The BLM waiver stated that the State was the grantee of the right-of-way at issue, and instead of providing an expiration date the waiver described the term of duration of the right-of-way as "[p]erpetual." The waiver entitled Ahtna to "any and all interests previously held by the United States as grantor," but the waiver explicitly stated there were no rental or other revenues associated with the right-of-way. The State removed material from the site until 1988, but the State did not use material from the site for the next 20 years. The State began using the site again in 2008. Ahtna demanded compensation for the removal of gravel from the material site and directed the State to cease and desist further entry onto Ahtna lands. The State responded that its right to remove the gravel pre-existed Ahtna's title interest. The State filed suit against Ahtna, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that the State had a valid interest in the material site right-of-way under the Federal-Aid Highway Act, and that Ahtna could not cancel the right-of-way for nonuse or abandonment so long as the State operated and maintained the Denali Highway. Ahtna appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the assumption that BLM's waiver transferred administrative authority to Ahtna, that authority did not include the right to cancel the State's interest in the material site for nonuse or abandonment without consent from the State. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State.View "Ahtna, Inc. v. Alaska Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities" on Justia Law