Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Joe Waldock appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to 25 percent of the mineral interests under a tract of land in Mountrail County in the successors in interest of the Estate of William C. Edwardson. Waldock argued the district court erred in deciding a 1954 administrator's deed from Edwardson's Estate to Waldock's predecessor in interest, Clark Van Horn, was equivalent to a quitclaim deed and in deciding the rule for interpreting mineral conveyances from "Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Co.," (144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940)), was not applicable to the administrator's deed. ThUpon review, the Supreme Court concluded the legal effect of the plain language of the administrator's deed conveyed 25 percent of the mineral interests to Waldock's predecessor in interest and reserved 25 percent of the mineral interests to Edwardson's Estate. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corporation" on Justia Law

The successors to the interests of eight siblings of John Q. Nichols ("Goughnour defendants") appealed the grant of summary judgment in a quiet title action by the successors to the interests of John Q. Nichols ("Nichols plaintiffs") to determine ownership of 1/2 of the mineral interests in a parcel of land in Mountrail County. The Goughnour defendants claimed they collectively owned 1/4 of the mineral interests in the land and the Nichols plaintiffs owned 1/4 of the mineral interests. The district court decided the Goughnour defendants collectively owned 1/9 of the mineral interests in the land and the Nichols plaintiffs owned 7/18 of the mineral interests. After review of the district court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nichols v. Goughnor" on Justia Law

Respondents-Appellants Darlene Hankison, Michael Flick, Steven Flick, David Flick, landowners in Wells County, and Weckerly F.L.P., a landowner in Sheridan County, appealed a Wells County district court judgment and a Sheridan County district court order that denied their motions to dismiss and granted Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.'s petitions to enter their property to conduct testing and surveys. The Wells County district court held that for purposes of a petition to enter land for surveying and testing, Minnkota only needed to show it was in charge of a public use or it was in the category of persons entitled to seek eminent domain. The court determined Minnkota was in charge of a public use and also was entitled to seek eminent domain. The Sheridan County court held, under N.D.C.C. § 10-15-52, a foreign cooperative is entitled to all rights, exemptions, and privileges of a cooperative organized for the same purposes under the laws of this state when it is issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state. Minnkota was issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state, and it is organized to provide power to its members. Because North Dakota electric cooperatives have authority to use eminent domain, the court determined Minnkota also has the power to use eminent domain. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district courts did not err in concluding that Minnkota was entitled to seek the power of eminent domain under North Dakota law. View "Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Come Big or Stay Home, LLC (CBSH) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of EOG Resources, Inc. dismissing its claims for refusing to provide it with oil and gas well information unless CBSH agreed to not disclose the information to third parties without EOG's consent. EOG owned and developed oil and gas interests in North Dakota and has drilled and operated numerous oil and gas wells in the state. CBSH owned mineral or leasehold interests in the state, including interests in spacing units where wells have been drilled and operated by EOG. In late 2008, EOG sent CBSH an invitation to participate in drilling a horizontal oil and gas well in Mountrail County, ending with a joint operating agreement (JOA) for that well. CBSH refused to execute subsequent JOAs for several additional wells. After each refusal by CBSH to execute a JOA, EOG sent letters to CBSH explaining it was willing to provide well information to CBSH if it would agree to the nondisclosure provision contained in the JOA. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law that CBSH's theories of recovery were not viable under the circumstances. View "Come Big or Stay Home, LLC v. EOG Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Angeline Maki and other relatives of Richard Arndt (collectively "Maki defendants") appealed a judgment that declared that Appellee Richard Arndt and others (collectively "Arndt plaintiffs") were the owners of mineral interests underlying the Arndt family farm, and the Arndt plaintiffs cross-appealed part of the judgment that denied their claim against the Maki defendants for attorney fees and costs for slandering title to the minerals. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the Maki defendants' counterclaim for reformation of a 1973 contract for deed and a 1984 personal representative's deed and correctly quieted title to the minerals in the Arndt plaintiffs. The Court further concluded, however, that genuine issues of material fact existed on the claim for attorney fees and costs for slandering title to the minerals. View "Arndt v. Maki" on Justia Law

The Industrial Commission and Slawson Exploration Company appealed a district court judgment that reversed the Commission's assessment of a risk penalty against Gadeco, LLC. The issue in this case arose from a challenge to the validity of an invitation to participate in the cost of drilling a well which resulted in the Commission's assessment of a 200 percent risk penalty. Because the Supreme Court was unable to discern the basis for the Commission's decision, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the Commission for the preparation of findings that explain the reasons for its decision. View "Gadeco v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

JB Mineral Services, LLC (JB), appealed the grant of summary judgment declaring an oil and gas lease terminated and awarding statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees to Dahn P. Beaudoin and J. Willard Beaudoin, as trustees of the William Beaudoin Irrevocable Mineral Trust (Beaudoins). JB sought to lease the Beaudoins' oil and gas interests, and sent a lease, a supplemental agreement and a document it alleged was a "120-say sight draft" for $165,000. Later, JB sent a revised lease and a 25-day sight draft to Beaudoins, reflecting JB's claim that Beaudoins owned 3.68 fewer mineral acres than covered in the original lease. The revised lease would also have extended the term of the lease approximately six months longer than a July 2009 lease. Beaudoins never executed or agreed to the revised lease and did not present the second sight draft for payment. Beaudoins claim that the "termination date" under the supplemental agreement was January 12, 2010, which was 120 business days after they signed the lease and supplemental agreement in July, 2009. JB's position was that it had until January 20, 2010, to pay a supplemental bonus payment by funding the July 2009 sight draft. Beaudoins' counsel responded by faxed letter dated January 20, 2010, reiterating that the lease had already terminated and was invalid. JB never authorized payment of the July 2009 sight draft, but recorded the original July 2009 lease on January 20, 2010. Beaudoins sued JB to have the lease declared invalid and for statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Beaudoins, finding the district court did not err in concluding JB failed to timely pay or tender the sum required to continue the 2009 lease and that the lease automatically terminated by its express terms. View "Beaudoin v. JB Mineral Services" on Justia Law

Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. ("Brigham"), appealed a partial judgment that dismissed its action against Lario Oil & Gas Company ("Lario") and Murex Petroleum Corporation ("Murex") which sought oil and gas production payments based on a claimed leasehold interest in certain mineral acres in Mountrail County. The Triple T, Inc. ("Triple"), and Christine Thompson, as sole trustee of the Navarro 2009 Living Trust Agreement, appealed an order denying their motions to intervene and to vacate the judgment. The land that contained the oil and mineral rights at issue in this case were probated in 2008 and became a part of the Navarro Trust. Late that year, the Trust executed an agreement which purported to resolve an issue over ownership of the mineral rights. In 2009, Brigham commenced this action against Lario and Murex alleging that it was entitled to a percentage of the production from the oil and mineral interests from the 2008 agreement. Brigham argued the district court erred in determining that Lario had the controlling interest in the 2008 agreement and that Brigham had no interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate in the subject property. Upon review of the lengthy trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment and order. View "Brigham Oil v. Lario Oil" on Justia Law

In 1953, Standard Oil Company owned a refinery in Mandan, and the Northern Pacific Railway Company owned land between the refinery and the Heart River. Northern Pacific executed a written permit granting Standard Oil permission to construct a pipeline along Northern Pacificâs right-of-way from the refinery to the river. The permit provided that Standard Oil could not transfer or assign the permit without Northern Pacificâs permission. In 1998, Northern Pacificâs successor-in-interest sold the portion of land that contained Standard Oilâs pipeline. In 2001, Standard Oilâs successor-in-interest, sold the refinery. In 2004, Tesoro, the new owner of the refinery, filed a âNotice of Permitâ along with the 1953 permit, with the Recorderâs Office. Later that year, the property was sold to Riverwood Commercial Park. Disputes arose between Riverwood and Tesoro over Riverwoodâs planned development of the property. The dispute bounced between the district and Supreme Court for various theories of recovery. Riverwoodâs theories centered on the characterization of the 1953 âpermitâ: all of Riverwoodâs claims would fail as a matter of law if the 1953 permit was not a license but an easement. After thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the 1953 permit was indeed an easement, and affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Tesoro and Standard Oil.