Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs assert that they developed cancer after being exposed to excessive radiation emissions from the Nuclear Material and Equipment Company’s Apollo, Pennsylvania facility. The district court held that their common-law claims against were preempted by the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act and rejected their Price-Anderson “public liability” claims on summary judgment. The Third Circuit affirmed. Although the Act preempted common-law negligence claims, the public liability claims require Plaintiffs to prove versions of the traditional negligence elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. With respect to duty, the court noted the restrictions on access to the facility; Plaintiffs did not establish the existence of excessive radiation outside the restricted area. The facility’s license did not establish a tort duty. Even with state-of-the-art data, it is impossible to determine with certainty that radiation is the cause of a given incidence of cancer. Plaintiffs failed to offer evidence from which a jury could find that each plaintiff was exposed to radiation from Defendants’ uranium effluent sufficiently frequently, regularly, and proximately to substantially cause their illnesses. View "McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Consolidation Coal Company appealed after the Department of Labor (“DOL”) awarded survivor’s benefits to Judy Noyes under the Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”). The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that Mrs. Noyes was entitled to a statutory presumption that the death of her husband, James Noyes, resulted from his exposure to coal dust in underground coal mines. The ALJ further concluded that Consolidation failed to rebut that presumption by showing either that Mr. Noyes did not suffer from pneumoconiosis or that pneumoconiosis did not cause his death. Consolidation argued on appeal the ALJ erred in retroactively applying the rebuttal standard from DOL’s revised regulations to Mrs. Noyes’ claim for benefits, and that the ALJ’s determination that Consolidation failed to meet its burden of rebuttal was not supported by substantial evidence. After review, the Tenth Circuit held the ALJ permissibly applied the rebuttal standard from the revised regulations to Mrs. Noyes’ claim, and that standard could further be applied retrospectively to claims, like Mrs. Noyes’, that were filed prior to the effective date of the revised regulations. However, the Court agreed with Consolidation that the ALJ incorrectly stated the revised rebuttal standard in analyzing Mrs. Noyes’ claim. View "Consolidation Coal Company v. OWCP" on Justia Law

Respondent was a party to an oil and gas lease that restricted its use of the surface estate and required it to drill from off-site locations when feasible. Briscoe Ranch, Inc. owed an adjacent surface estate and agreed that Respondent could use horizontal drilling to drill from the surface of the Ranch in order to produce minerals from Respondent’s lease. The lessee of the minerals underlying the Ranch (Petitioner) was not a party to the agreement and sought to enjoin Respondent from drilling on the Ranch and asserted claims for both trespass and tortious interference with a contract. Petitioner claimed that its consent was necessary before Respondent could drill through the Ranch’s subsurface covered by its mineral lease. The district court dismissed the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the loss of minerals Petitioner will suffer by a well being drilled through its mineral estate is not a sufficient injury to support a claim for trespass; and (2) Respondent’s drilling plans did not tortiously interfere with Petitioner’s contractual lease rights. View "Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Colorado had jurisdiction to award benefits for out-of-state work-related injuries and to impose a statutorily penalty on an employer under 8-41-204, C.R.S. (2016), when the employer was not a citizen of Colorado, and had no offices or operations in Colorado, only that the employer hired a Colorado citizen within the state. The Supreme Court held that on the facts presented here, Colorado lacked personal jurisdiction over the employer. View "Youngquist v. Miner" on Justia Law

Wayne Morrow filed a permissive appeal to the Circuit Court's order denying his request for a judgment declaring that the $100,000 cap on damages in section 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, applied to Morrow, a municipal employee who was sued in his individual capacity. In 2009, Alice Yu sought to have Alabama Power Company restore electrical service in her name at a commercial building she was leasing. The premises had been without power for approximately eight months. The City of Montgomery sent Morrow to perform an electrical inspection of the premises and clear the premises for service before electrical service was restored. Keandarick Russell, a minor, was staying with his great-grandmother, who lived next door to the premises. Russell was playing on the concrete pad on which the air-conditioning system was located and was electrocuted when he came in contact with a chain-link fence adjacent to the premises. When the incident occurred, wires from an uncovered junction box at the electrical source had come in contact with a portion of the fence, and, as a result, the fence had become electrified. Russell was electrocuted when he touched the fence. Shameka Caldwell, as Russell's mother and next friend, filed a wrongful-death action against multiple defendants, including Morrow and Yu for two fictitiously named defendants. In the amended complaint, Caldwell alleged that Morrow had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly inspected the premises and had negligently, recklessly, and/or wantonly allowed electrical service to be restored to the premises. In his answer, Morrow asserted that he was entitled to State immunity, to State-agent immunity, and to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the plain language of 11-47-190 did not limit the recovery on a claim against a municipal employee in his or her individual capacity, the $100,000 statutory cap on recovery would not apply to Caldwell's claims against Morrow. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Morrow's request for a judgment declaring that it would. View "Morrow v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

A 2007 stockholders’ derivative suit alleged that Massey’s officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to make sure that Massey employees were complying with environmental and mine worker safety laws and regulations. A 2008 settlement released the claims in exchange for certain reforms to be made a part of corporate governance policies relating to company oversight and conduct regarding environmental and mine worker safety standards. The reforms were incorporated into Massey’s written Corporate Governance Agreement and were to remain in effect for five years. On April 5, 2010, an explosion occurred at Massey’s Upper Big Branch Mine at Montcoal, West Virginia, killing 29 miners. According to a contempt petition, investigations subsequent to the disaster found systematic mine safety compliance failures leading up to the explosion. The trial court dismissed the civil contempt petition. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. The petitioners lacked standing to pursue contempt proceedings because they no longer own any Massey stock; Massey has been purchased by Alpha Natural Resources; and the respondents were removed by Alpha as corporate directors and officers. View "Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Fund v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

A fire destroyed a hydroponic tomato facility belonging to a new business, Sunnyland Farms, Inc. The day before the fire, Sunnyland's electricity had been shut off by its local utility, the Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative (CNMEC), for nonpayment. Sunnyland's water pumps were powered by electricity, and without power, Sunnyland's facility had no water. Sunnyland sued CNMEC, alleging both that CNMEC had wrongfully suspended service, and if its electrical service had been in place, firefighters and Sunnyland employees would have been able to stop the fire from consuming the facility. After a bench trial, the court found CNMEC liable for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages, including lost profits, of over $21 million in contract and tort, but reduced the tort damages by 80% for Sunnyland's comparative fault. It also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the contract judgment, vacated the punitive damages, held that the lost profit damages were not supported by sufficient evidence, affirmed the trial court's offset of damages based on CNMEC's purchase of a subrogation lien, and affirmed the trial court's rulings on pre- and post-judgment interest. Sunnyland appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding the contract judgment, punitive damages, and interest, and reversed on the lost profit damages and the offset. The Court also took the opportunity of this case to re-examine the standard for consequential contract damages in New Mexico. View "Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Mobile Gas Service Corporation, pipeline operators and several other companies over the release of an odorant containing mercaptan. Mobile Gas, stated that, in fall 2011, Mobile Gas started receiving complaints about natural-gas leaks in the Eight Mile area; that the complaints centered around the facilities of Gulf South and Mobile Gas. plaintiffs, who resided in the Eight Mile area, filed their complaint, alleging nuisance, aggravated nuisance, negligence, and wantonness against the defendants arising from the release of mercaptan. A dispute arose over the issuance of a subpoena to the engineering firm that did the initial survey of the leak for Mobile Gas in response to an investigation by State Department of Environmental Management (ADEM). Mobile Gas objected to plaintiffs' attempt to subpoena the engineer; Mobile asserted that the engineer's report was privileged and therefore protected by the work-product privilege. The trial court denied Mobile Gas' objection. Mobile then filed its mandamus petition with the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Mobile Gas has established that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it disregarded the work-product privilege and entered an order compelling Mobile Gas to produce the documents included in the privilege log and when it denied Mobile Gas's motion for a protective order. Thus, Mobile Gas has established a clear legal right to a protective order regarding the production of the documents listed on the privilege log it submitted to the trial court. Accordingly, the Court granted Mobile Gas's petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to set aside its order compelling the production of documents included in the privilege log and to order those documents protected (including the engineer's report) from discovery. View "Parker et al. v. Mobile Gas Service Corporation et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Beckie Price sued Defendant High Pointe Oil Company, Inc. claiming, among other things, for damages for the mental anguish, emotional distress, and other psychological injuries sustained when High Pointe negligently pumped 400 gallons of oil into the basement of her house. The incident created a hazard such that Plaintiff's house had to be razed. High Pointe moved for summary judgment, aruging that noneconomic damages resulting from real property damage were not compensable. The circuit court denied part of High Pointe's motion, concluding that damages could be recovered in a negligence action. The jury awarded Plaintiff $100,000 for noneconomic damages; High Pointe moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The circuit court denied High Pointe's motion, and the company subsequently appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that no Michigan case has ever allowed a plaintiff to recover noneconomic damages resulting solely from the negligent destruction of property, either real or personal. "Rather, the common law of this state has long provided that the appropriate measure of damages in cases involving the negligent destruction of property is simply the cost of replacement or repair of the property." The Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in High Pointe's favor. View "Price v. High Pointe Oil Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs the State and the Vermilion Parish School Board filed a "Petition for Damages to School Lands" in 2004 seeking damages and remediation of a sixteenth section of property in Vermilion Parish owned by the State and managed by the School Board. The property was allegedly polluted by oil and gas exploration and production performed pursuant to an oil, gas and mineral lease originally granted on the property in 1935 and a surface lease entered into in 1994. The plaintiffs claimed damage to the land’s soil, surface waters and ground waters. Plaintiffs raised various causes of action including negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract and violations of both the Mineral Code and the Civil Code. Several defendants were named in the original petition and in supplemental and amending petitions as companies which conducted, directed, controlled or participated in various oil and gas exploration and production activities as operators and/or working interest owners, and/or joint venturers in the mineral interest. At the time of this appeal, the remaining defendants were Union Oil Company of California; Union Exploration Partners; Carrollton Resources, L.L.C.; Chevron USA Inc.; and Chevron Midcontinent, L.P. In a motion for summary judgment, Chevron USA Inc. sought dismissal from suit, which was denied. Upon review of Chevron's argument that it should have been dismissed from the suit, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal’s conclusion that there seemed to be a genuine issue of material fact as to Chevron USA Inc.’s successor status to Union Oil Company of California, and as such, should not have been dismissed from the case. Consequently, the Court affirmed the court of appeal’s opinion in this regard. View "Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company" on Justia Law