Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

SEECO, Inc. owned oil-and-gas leases and possessed rights authorizing it to explore for and develop minerals from several tracts of land. SEECO filed an interpleader action to determine the ownership of the oil, gas, and minerals in the land. Appellee requested that the circuit court quiet title and confirm title in Appellees. Several defendants were named in the action. The circuit court ruled that a 1929 mineral deed, even with a blank left empty in the granting clause, conveyed one hundred percent of the mineral interest in three tracts of land to J.S. Martin. Appellees included the Stanton Group, as Martin's heirs and successors in interest, and SEECO. Appellants appealed, arguing that the 1929 mineral deed was void because the description of the interest was so vague that it was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1929 mineral deed was unambiguous, and the circuit court did not err by refusing to consider the parol evidence of a subsequent 1930 deed. View "Barton Land Servs., Inc. v. SEECO, Inc." on Justia Law

Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. appealed a judgment ordering reformation of an oil and gas lease and quieting title to the oil and gas leasehold estate in Murex Petroleum Corporation, John H. Holt, LBK Sales & Service, Inc., Racer Oil & Gas, LC, and Double L, LLC. In 2007, a landman working for Morris Creighton signed an oil and gas lease with the original mineral holder. The lease was recorded, but a month later, a typographical error was discovered in the lease’s property description. Six months later, Creighton assigned his interest in the lease, with an exception of an overriding royalty interest, to Antares Exploration Fund, L.P. Antares then assigned its interest in the Creighton lease to Northern. Northern brought an action to quiet title against Creighton and Murex to determine rights of the parties to the oil and gas leasehold estate. Murex filed a third-party complaint against the original mineral rights holders, a cross-claim against Creighton, and a counterclaim against Northern. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Creighton was not a good faith purchaser and the Court held that there was a question of fact whether Creighton had constructive notice when he acquired rights under the lease. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Creighton" on Justia Law

Defendants The Pantry, Inc., and Herndon Oil Corporation appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs Kaycee Mosley and Alana Byrd. The appeals primarily concerned whether Kaycee and Alana's mother, Murel Mosley, unreasonably withheld consent to Herndon Oil's assignment of a lease between Murel and Herndon Oil. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case, concluding that Murel unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment of the lease from Herndon Oil to The Pantry. Thus, Herndon Oil had the right under the lease agreement to assign the lease to The Pantry despite Murel's failure to consent. Furthermore, neither Herndon Oil nor The Pantry could be liable on a conversion claim.View "The Pantry, Inc. v. Mosley" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet denied Kentucky Southern Coal Corporation's (KSCC) application to renew its surface and underground coal mining permit, finding that a bona fide dispute existed over KSCC's right of entry to 18.1 acres within the permit boundaries. The circuit court affirmed the Cabinet's decision, finding that the expiration of a surface lease adjudicated by another circuit court created a bona fide dispute over the rights of KSCC to mine the coal on the 18.1-acre tract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a bona fide property dispute existed in this case, which the Cabinet had no legal authority to adjudicate; and (2) accordingly, the Cabinet did not err in denying KSCC's renewal permit.View "Ky. S. Coal Corp. v. Ky. Energy & Env't Cabinet" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a deed executed in 1881 reserving the subsurface and removal rights of "one half of the minerals and petroleum oils" in the grantor included any natural gas contained within the shale formation beneath the subject land. The trial court, relying on the 1882 Supreme Court decision "Dunham & Shortt v. Kirkpatrick," (101 Pa. 36 (Pa. 1882)) and its progeny, held that because the deed reservation did not specifically reference natural gas, any natural gas found within the Marcellus Shale beneath the subject land was not intended by the executing parties to the deed to be encompassed within the reservation. The Superior Court reversed that decision and remanded the case with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing complete with expert, scientific testimony to examine whether: (1) the gas contained within the Marcellus Shale was "conventional natural gas"; (2) Marcellus shale was a "mineral"; and (3) the entity that owns the rights to the shale found beneath the property also owns the rights to the gas contained within that shale. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Superior Court erred in ordering the remand for an evidentiary hearing and reinstated the order of the trial court. View "Butler v. Charles Powers Estate" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Oil and Gas Division (DNR), petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a superior court decision that under AS 38.05.035, the lack of continuing best interest findings (BIF) at each phase of an oil and gas project violated article VIII of the Alaska Constitution and that the DNR must issue a written best interest finding at each step of a phased project to satisfy the constitution. Because best interest findings after the lease sale phase are not required under the Alaska Constitution or AS 38.05.035, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's ruling. Furthermore, the Court held that the State was constitutionally required to consider the cumulative impacts of an oil and gas project at its later phases. View "Sullivan v. Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved a 1925 tax sale and the failure to give notice of the pending tax sale to the property owner. The specific issue in the present case was whether "Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams," (462 U.S. 791 (1983)), could be applied retroactively to invalidate this 1925 tax sale. Plaintiffs, owners of oil, gas, and mineral interests, filed suit against four groups of record landowners including Pirate Lake Oil Corporation, the Mayronne Group, the Handlin-Jones Group, and the Zodiac Group, to determine the parties entitled to the proceeds of production. The Mayronne and Handlin-Jones Groups filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the Zodiac Group had no interest in the property. The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Zodiac Group’s claims of ownership in the property with prejudice. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the Zodiac Group’s ancestor in title was never the record owner of the property. Further, the Zodiac Group traced its ownership of the property to a 1925 tax sale, and there was no evidence the Sheriff provided notice of the sale to the record owner of the property, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause under "Mennonite." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "Mennonite" could not apply retroactively to invalidate the 1925 tax sale for lack of notice. Further, while the Zodiac Group’s ancestor in title was not the record owner of the property, any defect was cured by the five-year peremptive period of Article X, section 11 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts. View "Quantum Resources Management, LLC v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant Catherine Lakey and twelve other homeowners owned property that bordered a parcel owned by Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (PSE) on which there was an electrical substation. The homeowners sued PSE and the City of Kirkland after PSE constructed a new substation on PSE property. The homeowners sought review of the trial court's decision to exclude testimony of their expert under the "Frye" rule, and the court's ultimate decision to grant summary judgment on behalf of PSE. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court improperly excluded the expert's testimony under the "Frye" rule but properly excluded it under the Rules of Evidence ER702. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision with respect to their Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) claims, finding that LUPA did not apply to the homeowners' inverse condemnation claim. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects.View "Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents executed a land contract whereby Respondents agreed to sell a piece of property to Petitioners. After the land contract had been fully consummated, Respondents refused to tender a deed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed suit, seeking a delivery of a general warranty deed for the property, including all oil and gas rights. Two months later, Respondents tendered a deed to Petitioners reserving oil and gas rights. The deed was recorded on February 17, 2010. Petitioners moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the land contract did not contained any language indicating Respondents' intention to except oil and gas rights, any questions of interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grantees. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, finding that when the deed was recorded, the land contract was merged in the deed and any cause of action based upon the contract was extinguished. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous, and Respondents failed to establish any legally sufficient basis for varying its terms; and (2) therefore, Respondents were obligated to convey their title and interest to the property, including their vested oil and gas rights. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners.View "Spitznogle v. Durbin" on Justia Law

SM Energy Company appealed a summary judgment declaring that A.G. Golden and other plaintiffs were entitled to a four percent overriding royalty interest in leases and lands covered by a 1970 letter agreement and ordering SM to pay amounts due to Golden and the other plaintiffs for these interests, and an order denying SM's motion to amend or for relief from the judgment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that SM through its predecessors in interest, expressly assumed an "area of mutual interest" clause in the 1970 letter agreement and in expanding the judgment to include unpled and unlitigated properties within the area of mutual interest. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court correctly ruled as a matter of law that SM owed Golden and the other plaintiffs retroactive royalty payments on production from a certain well located on the subject property. View "Golden v. SM Energy Company" on Justia Law