Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Sundown filed suit against defendants in state and federal court seeking a partition of land they co-owned, return of rental payments, and a right of way over Defendant Haller's property. In appeal No. 13-30294, Sundown challenges the district court's interpretation of the settlement agreement. In appeal No. 13-30721, Sundown challenges the district court's enforcement of the settlement. In appeal No. 13-30748, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motion for contempt. The court held that the district court erred when it interpreted the settlement agreement to include those items not mentioned during the parties' oral recitation of the settlement agreement; the district court abused its discretion when it enforced the settlement agreement; and defendants failed to demonstrate that the district court clearly erred in its factual findings in regards to the denial of the motion for contempt. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Sundown Energy v. Haller" on Justia Law

A.A. was electrocuted while playing on the farmland of David and Sherry Melton. Riley Berry, who worked for the Meltons, had parked a cotton picker under an allegedly sagging power line, which was owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Ultimately, A.A. climbed onto the cotton picker, touched the power line, and was electrocuted. At the time of the accident, A.A.'s mother, Mary Bethanne Acey, was en route to Moon Lake, in Coahoma County with her son and Charles Graves. A 911 dispatcher called Graves to inform him of the accident. Graves immediately turned the car around to proceed to the Meltons' home. Acey then spoke with the dispatcher, who explained the gravity of the situation to Acey and informed her that A.A. had been "shocked." Emergency medical responders arrived shortly after Acey's arrival. A.A. suffered severe burns to both of her arms and her hip. A.A. subsequently was airlifted to Le Bonheur Children's Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, and was later transferred to Shriners Hospitals for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, which specializes in treating burn patients. Thereafter, Acey commenced legal action on behalf of A.A., and individually, against defendants Entergy, David and Sherry Melton, Melton Farms, Mary Mac, Inc., and Norfleet Investments, LP. Defendants settled all claims on behalf of A.A. Regarding Acey's individual bystander claims for emotional distress, Entergy moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the affidavits of Acey and Dr. William Hickerson. The trial court subsequently denied each motion. According to the trial court, based on the nature of A.A.'s injuries, this case "cries out for the expansion of" the factors provided by the California Supreme Court in "Dillon [v. Legg," 441 P. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)], adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in "Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,"(414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)). Thereafter, Entergy was granted interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Court found that Entergy's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey" on Justia Law

Columbia, an interstate natural gas company subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), seeks to replace a portion of a natural gas pipeline that runs in and around York County, Pennsylvania. Because the original location of the pipeline has become heavily populated, the replacement will not track the original line but will be outside the existing right of way. To obtain easements necessary to complete construction of the replacement, in 2013, Columbia filed Complaints in Condemnation against four Landowners in federal court. The district court held that Columbia did not have the right of eminent domain required to condemn the easements, reasoning that 18 C.F.R. 157.202(b)(2)(i), was ambiguous. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation clearly anticipates replacement outside the existing right of way and contains no adjacency requirement. The district court erroneously adopted its own definition of “replace” and concluded that a “notice” of “proposed rulemaking” for “Emergency Reconstruction of Interstate Natural Gas Facilities” promulgated by FERC after 9/11 was relevant.View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres in Penn Twp" on Justia Law

Rita Sue Rasnic, (f/k/a Johnson) appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to disputed mineral interests in McKenzie County to Norris and Beverly Hildre. Rasnic argues she was entitled to the disputed mineral interests because those mineral interests were subject to a mortgage held by her predecessor in interest, American State Bank. Upon review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the plain language of the Hildres' 1988 mortgage applied only to mineral interests owned by them when the mortgage was executed and title to the disputed mineral interests, which was acquired by the Hildres after the mortgage was executed, did not inure to American State Bank as security for the Hildres' debt under N.D.C.C. section 35-03-01.2(4). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment quieting title in the disputed mineral interests to the Hildres. View "Rasnic v. ConocoPhillips Co." on Justia Law

The Smiths appealed from the district court's order condemning portions of their property for the construction of a natural gas pipeline owned and operated by Alliance and granting Alliance immediate use and possession of the condemned land. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Smiths' statutory challenges based on 18 C.F.R. 157.6(d) and North Dakota Administrative Code (NDAC) 69-06-08-01. The court also concluded that the Smiths received reasonable notice that Alliance was applying to FERC for the right to condemn their land; the court rejected the Smiths' allegation that Alliance violated several state procedural rules in bringing the condemnation action because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1 preempted all of these state procedures; Alliance satisfied any duty to negotiate with the Smiths in good faith pursuant to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717f(h); and the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Alliance was entitled to immediate use and possession pursuant to Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Alliance Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was the owner of certain fractional work interests in four Ritchie County mining partnerships. The court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Whether the proponent of his own working interest in a mineral lease may prove his entitlement thereto and enforce his rights thereunder by demonstrating his inclusion within a mining partnership or partnership in mining, without resort to proof that the lease interest has been conveyed to him by deed or will or otherwise in strict conformance with the Statute of Frauds.View "Valentine v. Sugar Rock, Inc." on Justia Law

The dispute between the parties in this case centered over mineral rights. Stull Ranches, LLC operated a grouse hunting business on its surface estate in rural Colorado. Entek GRB, LLC leased the right to explore and develop the minerals under much of Stull’s surface and adjoining surface estates from the federal government. This dispute arose when Entek asked permission to enter Stull’s surface estate (both to develop new oil well sites on Stull’s land and to get at one of its existing wells located on an adjacent surface estate owned by the Bureau of Land Management). Along the way, Entek pointed out that the only available road to the well on BLM’s estate crossed Stull’s land. Concerned that Entek’s presence would unsettle its grouse, Stull refused access. Entek sued to gain access. The district court held that Entek was entitled to access portions of Stull’s surface to mine certain leases lying below. But the court also held that Entek was entitled to no more than this - in particular, Entek could not cross Stull’s surface to service the well on the adjacent BLM land. Entek appealed, arguing to the Tenth Circuit that the district court erred by not granting it access to BLM lands. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court in not granting Entek the relief it originally requested. The Court therefore vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Stull and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC" on Justia Law

Hansard Mining, Inc. and Donald Hansard (the Hansards) sought resolution of a dispute with Barry McLean and the Estate of Glen Harold McLean (the McLeans) concerning overlapping property rights. The parties’ competing claims derived from conflicting patents issued by the United States. The district court granted judgment in favor of the Hansards, concluding that the Hansards’ mining patents had priority over the McLeans’ homestead patent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting the Hansards’ motion for summary judgment and in denying the McLeans’ cross-motion for summary judgment, as the Hansards owned the surface and the subsurface rights of their mining claims, and the conflicting portions of the McLeans’ patent were void. View "Hansard v. McLean" on Justia Law

In approximately twenty years PCS Nitrogen, Inc. contributed to environmental contamination by manufacturing fertilizer and disturbing contaminated soil during various demolition activities. In 2003, Ashley II of Charleston, Inc. purchased 27.62 acres of the PCS's property. Since that time, Ashley II has incurred substantial costs in remediating the environmental contamination. In July 2008, Ashley II filed a complaint against PCS seeking a declaration of joint and several liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) due to costs of the environmental cleanup at the Site. Additionally, PCS asserted a third-party indemnification claim against the site's previous owner based on the indemnity provision in a 1966 purchase agreement, seeking indemnification for attorney's fees, costs, and litigation expenses incurred in establishing that the predecessor contributed to the contamination. The South Carolina Supreme Court anwered the following certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "Does the rule that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligent acts, unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms, apply when the indemnitee seeks contractual indemnification for costs and expenses resulting in part from its own strict liability acts? " In the context of the underlying claim in federal court, the South Carolina Court answered the question, "no." View "Ashley II v. PCS Nitrogen" on Justia Law

In 1983 Bitler leased gas stations to Marathon. The Environmental Protection Agency adopted new regulations so that that underground petroleum tanks and pipes at the gas stations had to be removed, upgraded, or replaced, 40 C.F.R. 280.21(a). In 1992 the parties amended the leases to make Marathon “fully responsible for removing” the tanks and pipes, filling holes created by the removal, complying with all environmental laws, “leav[ing] the Premises in a condition reasonably useful for future commercial use,” and “replac[ing] any asphalt, concrete, or other surface, including landscaping.” Marathon agreed to return the Premises “as nearly as possible in the same condition as it was in prior to such remediation work,” and to be responsible “for any and all liability, losses, damages, costs and expenses,” and to continue paying rent. The properties can be restored as gas stations with above‐ground storage tanks, and may be suitable for other commercial outlets. After completion of the work Bitler sued Marathon, alleging breach of contract and “waste.” The Seventh Circuit vacated to waste regarding Michigan properties, with directions to double those damages. The court affirmed dismissal of some of the contract claims. It would not conform to the reasonable expectations of the parties to limit liability for waste or other misconduct by a tenant simply because a lease had to be extended for an indefinite period to allow a response to unforeseen changes. View "Bitler Inv. Venture II v. Marathon Petroleum Co. LP" on Justia Law