Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned three rivers which flow through Montana and then beyond its borders. At issue was whether discrete, identifiable segments of these rivers in Montana were nonnavigable, as federal law defined that concept for purposes of determining whether the State acquired title to the riverbeds underlying those segments, when the State entered the Union in 1989. Montana contended that the rivers must be found navigable at the disputed locations. The Court held that the Montana Supreme Court's ruling that Montana owned and could charge for use of the riverbeds at issue was based on an infirm legal understanding of the Court's rules of navigability for title under the equal-footing doctrine. The Montana Supreme Court erred in its treatment of the question of river segments and portage and erred as a matter of law in relying on evidence of present-day primarily recreational use of the Madison River. Because this analysis was sufficient to require reversal, the Court declined to decide whether the State Supreme Court also erred as to the burden of proof regarding navigability. Montana's suggestion that denying the State title to the disputed riverbeds would undermine the public trust doctrine underscored its misapprehension of the equal-footing and public trust doctrines. Finally, the reliance by petitioner and its predecessors in title on the State's long failure to assert title to the riverbeds was some evidence supporting the conclusion that the river segments over those beds were nonnavigable for purposes of the equal-footing doctrine. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed. View "PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiffs entered into a five-year oil and gas lease covering 47 acres in Ross Township, Ohio, and granting Chesapeake exclusive rights to “all oil and gas and their constituents” for $5.00 per mineral acre per year and a royalty on production. The lease provides for extension, if “Operations” are being “conducted on the Leasehold, or on lands pooled, unitized or combined with all or a portion of the Leasehold.” In 2011, Chesapeake submitted drilling-permit applications for property that did not include Plaintiffs’ property. Later, Chesapeake filed a “Declaration and Notice of Pooled Unit,” consisting of 21 properties, including Plaintiffs’ property, and declared that “operations and/or production … anywhere within the Unit shall be deemed to be operations and/or production on each separate tract sufficient to extend and maintain each included lease in the Unit.” It specified that production from the unit would be allocated among all leases in the unit proportional to the surface area of each lease. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the lease expired; Chesapeake filed a counterclaim. The district court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that Chesapeake’s actions did not extend the lease because the lease required that a permit application pertaining to the leased property or a property already unitized with the leased property, be filed before the expiration of the lease. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. View "Henry v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC" on Justia Law

G&M filed suit against BP, asserting that it was a co-owner of both the pumping station and the land on which it sits and seeking an accounting for all revenue and profit that BP made from the pumping station. The district court granted summary judgment for BP where BP contended that the St. Julien Doctrine prescribed G&M's claim and contested G&M's assertion of co-ownership. The court concluded that the St. Julien Doctrine did not apply in this case where the bare existence of the pumping station did not demonstrate G&M's consent or acquiescence to a servitude. Nor could G&M's inaction in the expropriation action serve as the basis for finding this final element of the St. Julien Doctrine. Because G&M never acquired an ownership interest in the pumping station, the resolution of this issue turned on whether those profits were the "civil fruits" of the co-owned Tract. The district court reversed and remanded to the district court to further consider whether the profits were civil fruits of the Tract and, if so, whether G&M was therefore entitled to an accounting. View "Gulf and Miss. River Transp. Co., Ltd. v. BP Oil Pipeline Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Chesapeake seeking an injunction and damages based on claims arising from the drilling and operation by Chesapeake of three natural gas wells on surface property owned by plaintiffs. Chesapeake owns lease rights to minerals beneath plaintiffs' surface property and the property rights of both parties ultimately flowed from two severance deeds that originally split the surface and mineral estates of the 101 acres of land plaintiffs owned. The only issue on appeal was whether the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for Chesapeake on plaintiffs' claim for common law trespass. The court concluded that the district court was correct to hold that creating drill waste pits was reasonably necessary for recovery of natural gas and did not impose a substantial burden on plaintiffs' surface property, that creation of the pits was consistent with Chesapeake's rights under its lease, was a practice common to natural gas wells in West Virginia, and consistent with requirements of applicable rules and regulations for the protection of the environment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against GenOn, on behalf of a putative class of at least 1,500 individuals who own or inhabit residential property within one mile of GenOn’s 570-megawatt coal-fired electrical generation facility in Springdale, Pennsylvania. The complaint asserted state tort law claims, based on ash and contaminants settling on plaintiffs’ property. The district court dismissed, finding that because the plant was subject to comprehensive regulation under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, it owed no extra duty to the members of the class under state tort law. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the plain language of the Clean Air Act and controlling Supreme Court precedent indicate that state common law actions are not preempted. View "Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, Genon Power Midwest, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated landowners who used agents in an effort to lease oil and gas rights in Mercer County. When the transactions did not go as planned, plaintiffs sued an oil and gas company, Halcon, alleging breach of agreement and the duty of fair dealing. After Halcon claimed that the agents were “necessary parties,” plaintiffs decided to file direct claims against the agents, which destroyed diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs intended to pursue all of their claims in state court. Halcon argued that it did not oppose joining agents, agreed that the all claims would benefit from being heard in a single proceeding, but asserted that the case should proceed in federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2), (d)(2)(A), (d)(5)(B), because discovery had begun and there were ongoing ADR activities. The district court dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs filed in state court, with some changes. Halcon then removed the state court action to the same federal district court, which again remanded, citing the “home state” exception to subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing CAFA’s “local controversy” exception because the case relates to Pennsylvania owners and their land. View "Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy Props., Inc." on Justia Law

REX was unsuccessful in privately obtaining easements from defendants to install an interstate natural-gas pipeline authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under a coal mine in Ohio and had to condemn the easement, 15 U.S.C. 717f. REX built the pipeline and gas began flowing in 2009. Defendants believed that safety concerns regarding the pipeline would delay its mining permits and accelerated its mining, resulting in unanticipated costs associated with inefficient mining techniques. In valuing the easement, the district court determined that the defendants suffered no compensable damages to its coalmining operations as a result of the pipeline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that FERC found as a matter of fact that the pipeline would not compromise mining and that the two operations could co-exist. View "Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC v. 4.895 Acres of Land, More or Less" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of Mississippi Gulf Coast residents and property owners, alleged that emissions by energy companies contributed to global warming, which intensified Hurricane Katrina, which, in turn, damaged their property. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that res judicata barred plaintiffs' claims because the district court's judgment in Comer I was final and on the merits. Because true res judicata compelled good repose and barred plaintiffs' claims, the court need not address whether collateral estoppel applied or decide plaintiffs' other claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Comer v. Murphy Oil USA Inc, et al" on Justia Law

The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA), as amended by the Reform Act of 1987, required the Secretary of the Interior to issue leases for parcels of land to the highest bidding energy company within sixty days of payment to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Appellants (collectively, "Energy Companies") sued to compel the Secretary to issue pending leases on which they were the high bidders and more than sixty days had passed since they had paid the BLM in full. The district court construed the MLA to impose a mandate on the Secretary to decide whether to issue the leases, and ordered BLM to make such decisions regarding the still pending leases of Energy Companies within thirty days. Energy Companies appealed the district court's order and asserted that the MLA required the Secretary to issue the pending leases within sixty days rather than merely make a decision on whether the leases will be issued. Upon review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s order was not a "final decision," and as such, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Energy Companies' appeal. View "Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Columbia Gas disagrees with the Singhs over the scope of an existing pipeline right-of-way. Columbia suit in federal court to enjoin the Singhs and their tenant from engaging in activity that Columbia believed could lead to violations of Columbia’s duties under federal laws regulating natural gas service and pipeline safety. Although the cause of action appeared to be an Ohio interference-with-easement claim, Columbia’s complaint referred to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717–717w, as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Without explicitly addressing jurisdiction, the district court held a status conference at which the parties reached a settlement. When the Singhs refused to comply with Columbia’s understanding of the settlement, the district court granted Columbia’s motion to enforce the settlement. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this property dispute between nondiverse parties. Columbia’s complaint neither asserted a federal cause of action nor showed that a substantial federal interest was implicated by its state-law claim. View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Singh" on Justia Law