Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the State Corporation Commission (SCC) that approved a petition filed by the Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) to obtain a rate-adjustment clause pursuant to Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(5)(e), holding that, contrary to the arguments brought by Applalachian Voices on appeal, the SCC applied the proper legal standard governing such requests.VEPCO made its request to recover projected costs of purchasing allowances through the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade market regulating carbon dioxide emissions by electric utilities. On appeal, Appalachian Voices, a nonprofit environmental organization, argued that the SCC failed to apply the law when it approved VEPCO's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the SCC did not misunderstand or fail o apply the legal standard governing petitions filed pursuant to Va. Code 56-585.1(A)(5)(e). View "Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part rulings made by the State Corporation Commission during its triennial review of Appalachian Power Company's rates, terms, and conditions pursuant to Va. Code 56.585.1, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Commission (1) erred in finding that it was not reasonable for Appalachian to record its costs associated with the early retirement of its coal-fired power plants as asset impairments; (2) did not err when it implemented depreciation rates from the revised 2017 Depreciation Study for the years 2018 and 2019 in the triennial review; (3) did not err by refusing to apply Va. Code 56-585.1(E) retroactively; and (4) did not err in finding Appalachian's affiliate costs under an Inter-Company Power Agreement with Ohio Valley Electric Cooperation to be reasonable. View "Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the State Corporation Commission finding that a pumped storage hydroelectric facility (or pumped storage) generates "renewable energy" under the former definition in Va. Code 56-576 and that the amended definition would not apply to contracts executed before the amendment's effective date, holding that there was no error.The Commission concluded that pumped storage satisfied the statutory definition of renewable energy in effect at the time that the service provider executed its contracts and declined to find that the amended definition would apply retroactively to contracts executed before the amendment's effective date. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in its interpretation of the statute or its finding that pumped storage satisfied the former definition of renewable energy; and (2) the Commission did not err in refusing retroactively to apply the amended statutory definition of renewable energy to the service provider's contracts that were executed before the amendment took effect. View "Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed an order of the State Corporation Commission denying Walmart's petitions filed pursuant to Va. Code 56-577(A)(4) seeking the Commission's permission to combine the electric-energy demand of separate Walmart locations to qualify to buy electricity from sources other than the incumbent public utilities regulated by the Commission, holding that the Commission exercised its delegated discretion in a manner consistent with its statutory authority.On appeal, Walmart conceded that the Commission was given the discretion under section 56-577(A)(4) to grant or deny Walmart's request but that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously and erred as a matter of law in denying its petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission interpreted section 56-577(A)(4) correctly; (2) there was no error in the Commission's fact-finding; and (3) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Walmart's motion to reconsider. View "Wal-Mart Stores East, LP v. State Corporation Commission" on Justia Law

A majority of the Supreme Court held (1) Va. Code 56-49.01(A) allows a natural gas company to gain access to private property for the purpose of conducting surveys and other activities that are only necessary for the selection of the most advantageous route; and (2) the trial court did not misapply section 56-49.01 in this case.Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (ACP), which was engaged in the regulatory approval process to build a natural gas pipeline, sought permission to enter Landowners’ properties to conduct preliminary surveys and other activities. Landowners withheld their consent. ACP filed the instant second amended petition for declaratory judgment seeking an order affirming ACP’s authority to enter Landowners’ properties for the purposes defined in section 56-49.01. The trial court granted ACP permission to enter the properties to conduct the necessary activities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in its construction of section 56-49.01(A); and (2) the trial court’s application of section 56-49.01 was not improper. View "Barr v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the State Corporation Commission concluding that certain large customers may purchase electricity from any licensed supplier of energy in the Commonwealth under Va. Code 56-577(A)(5) without being subject to the notice requirement set forth in section 56-577(A)(3). Specifically, the Court held (1) customers who satisfy the size requirements of section (A)(3) can purchase electricity from a competitive service provider under section (A)(5), provided that they satisfy the separate conditions of section (A)(5); (2) sections (A)(3) and (A)(5) are not in conflict; and (3) the notice requirement in section (A)(3) does not apply to purchases made under section (A)(5). View "Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. State Corp. Commission" on Justia Law

The Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (ACP) sought permission to enter Hazel Palmer’s property to conduct preliminary surveys in order to build a natural gas transmission line. When Palmer withheld her consent, ACP provided a notice of intent to enter her property pursuant to Va. Code 56-49.01. Palmer continued to deny permission, and ACP filed a petition for a declaratory judgment requesting a declaration of its rights under section 56-49.01. Palmer filed a plea in bar and a demurrer, arguing that section 56-49.01 applies only to domestic public service companies and is unconstitutional under Va. Const. art. I, 11 because it impermissibly burdens a fundamental right. The circuit court overruled Palmer’s plea in bar and demurrer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 56-49.01 establishes the General Assembly’s intent that the entry-for-survey privilege be available to foreign natural gas companies that do business within the Commonwealth; and (2) Palmer’s fundamental property rights do not include the right to exclude ACP in this case. View "Palmer v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC" on Justia Law

The Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (ACP) sent Landowners letters seeking permission to enter their properties to conduct preliminary surveys and studies in order to build a natural gas transmission line. When Landowners withheld their permission, ACP provided notices of intent to enter their properties pursuant to Va. Code 56-49.01. ACP then filed petitions for declaratory judgment against Landowners seeking an order declaring that the notices of intent to enter provided ACP with a right to enter Landowners’ properties. The circuit court issued a final order concluding that ACP was entitled to enter landowners’ properties pursuant to section 56-49.01. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that ACP’s notices were deficient because they did not “set forth the date of the intended entry” as required by section 56-49.01(C). View "Chaffins v. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC" on Justia Law

Dominion obtained necessary certificates for transmission lines to connect Dominion’s recently-approved Wise County power plant with an existing Russell County substation. In 2008, Dominion offered Hylton $19,100 to purchase a 7.88-acre easement. Hylton owned 354 acres across 20 contiguous and two non-contiguous tracts. He owned the surface and mineral rights of some tracts and only the mineral rights of others. Dominion included an appraisal, acknowledging that, according to Hylton, two major coal seams run through or near the property and that Hylton’s ability to sell or lease those mineral rights might be damaged. The appraisal did not consider mineral rights in determining fair market value. The parties signed an agreement granting Dominion the right to enter and construct the transmission line. Dominion filed its petition for condemnation, limited to the surface use of Hylton’s property and moved to prohibit Hylton from presenting evidence of “the separate value of coal,” damage to tracts not taken, and “damages for duplicative or inconsistent claims.” Hylton later moved to dismiss, arguing that Dominion’s pre-petition offer to purchase was not a bona fide offer, under Code 25.1-204, so that Dominion had failed to meet jurisdictional requirements for condemnation. The trial court dismissed and awarded Hylton attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the dismissal and the denial of Dominion’s motion in limine with regard to evidence related to the separate value of the coal and the potential surface mine. Because the issue of whether the unity of lands doctrine applies with respect to neighboring lands, not part of the taking, is a question of fact, denying the motion on that issue was appropriate. View "Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Hylton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a successor in title to property interests retained by grantors in two severance deeds executed in 1886 and 1887, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the term “minerals” used in the deeds did not effect a conveyance of the natural gas and coal bed methane underlying her land. The circuit court sustained demurrers to Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints, holding that the term “minerals” included the gas as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed after reaffirming the holding in Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., holding that the two severance deeds at issue in this case conveyed the gas as a matter of law. View "Dye v. CNX Gas Co., LLC" on Justia Law