Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a company that constructs and operates fuel cells, sought municipal property tax exemptions for its fuel cell modules and related equipment installed on the Pfizer campus. The property primarily provided electricity and converted waste heat into thermal energy. The plaintiff applied for tax exemptions under Connecticut General Statutes § 12-81 (57), which exempts class I renewable energy sources from taxation. The defendant, the town of Groton, denied the applications, classifying the property as a cogeneration system under § 12-81 (63), which allows but does not require municipalities to exempt such systems from taxation.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, ruling that the property was exempt from taxation for the years 2017 through 2019 under § 12-81 (57). The court found that the property, which included fuel cells with a heat recovery steam generator (HRSG), fell within the definition of a class I renewable energy source. For the 2016 tax year, the court held a trial and determined that the property was not completely manufactured by October 1, 2016, and thus was exempt under § 12-81 (50) as "goods in the process of manufacture." The court also ruled that the plaintiff was not required to file a personal property declaration for the exempt property, and the penalties imposed by the defendant for failing to file such a declaration were improper.The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the trial court's rulings. It agreed that the property was exempt from taxation under § 12-81 (57) for the years 2017 through 2019, as the statute specifically exempts class I renewable energy sources, including fuel cells. The court also affirmed that the property was exempt for the 2016 tax year under § 12-81 (50) as it was still in the process of manufacture. Finally, the court held that the plaintiff was not required to file a personal property declaration for the exempt property, and the penalties for failing to do so were not permitted. View "FuelCell Energy, Inc. v. Groton" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over fees related to contracts between independent solar generators (the plaintiffs) and National Grid USA Services Co., Inc. and its affiliate Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the defendants). The plaintiffs are required to pay costs for interconnecting their solar energy projects to the defendants' electric distribution grid, which includes a "tax gross-up adder" to offset the defendants' federal income tax liability. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that these interconnection payments are not taxable income and also sought to recover the allegedly unlawful tax-related fees through state-law claims for damages.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the case, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment was barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act because the federal tax issue would only arise as a defense to a state-law breach of contract claim. The court also found that the plaintiffs' state-law claims did not raise a substantial federal question, as the federal tax issue was not significant to the federal system as a whole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief did not meet the threshold requirement for federal subject-matter jurisdiction, as the federal tax issue would only arise as a defense in a hypothetical state-law breach of contract claim. The court also found that the federal issue in the plaintiffs' state-law claims was not substantial, as it was fact-bound and situation-specific, and did not have broader significance for the federal government. Therefore, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was upheld. View "Sunvestment Energy Group NY 64 LLC v. National Grid USA Services Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Equinor Energy LP's appeal against the North Dakota State Tax Commissioner's denial of sales tax refunds. Equinor, an oil and gas producer, had purchased and paid North Dakota sales tax on oilfield equipment, including separators, for several facilities. The company applied for a refund, arguing that the equipment was installed into a system used to compress, process, gather, collect, or refine gas, thus qualifying for a tax refund. The Tax Commissioner approved a portion of the claim but denied the remaining refund claim related to the purchase of separators.The Tax Commissioner issued an administrative complaint requesting denial of the remaining requested refund amount. The Commissioner argued that initial separators used during production do not qualify for the exemption, which applies only to equipment installed downstream of the wellsite transfer meter, i.e., off the wellsite. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the denial of the refund claim, and the Commissioner adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Equinor appealed to the district court, which reversed the Commissioner’s order. However, on remand, the ALJ again recommended the denial of Equinor’s refund. The district court affirmed the final order of the Commissioner, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that the Commissioner's interpretation was in accordance with the language of the relevant statute. The court found that the separators merely isolated the three component parts of the well stream and did not gather or compress gas. Therefore, they did not qualify for the tax exemption. The court also noted that the legislature's intent in using the phrases “recovered from,” “a system to compress gas,” or “a system to gather gas” was clear, and it was unnecessary to apply “the rule of last resort” and construe the ambiguity in favor of the taxpayer. View "Equinor Energy v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Toolpushers Supply Co., a Wyoming-based company with a retail location in Mississippi that sells supplies and items used in the oil-and-gas industry. In 2016, the Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) audited Toolpushers’ sales and concluded that the company owed an additional $124,728 based on the failure to remit sales tax on certain sales. Toolpushers considered these sales wholesale and thus tax-exempt, but the MDOR determined they were not qualified as wholesale. Toolpushers appealed to the MDOR’s Board of Review, which affirmed the decision. The company then appealed to the Mississippi Board of Tax Appeals, which also affirmed. Toolpushers continued to appeal to the Hinds County Chancery Court, First Judicial District, and both Toolpushers and the MDOR sought summary judgment. The chancellor denied Toolpushers’ motion and granted the MDOR’s. Toolpushers then appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.The Supreme Court of Mississippi stated that the chancery court correctly applied the de novo standard of review. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the chancery court, which in turn affirmed the MDOR’s decision. The Supreme Court agreed with the chancery court that Toolpushers could not establish its claim that the sales were wholesale. The court emphasized that the amended Mississippi Code Section 27-77-7(5) made it clear that the chancery court should give no deference to the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, the Board of Review, or the Department of Revenue when trying the case de novo and conducting a full evidentiary judicial hearing on all factual and legal issues raised by the taxpayer. The court declared that the Court of Appeals' decision to discuss and apply caselaw addressing the pre-2015 version of Section 27-65-77, seemingly giving deference to the MDOR’s tax decision, was an error but was not reversible. View "Toolpushers Supply Co. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed a lower court's ruling in a tax dispute between Bluebird Energy LLC and the State of Montana Department of Revenue. Bluebird Energy acquired three oil wells that had previously qualified for a tax incentive known as the New Well Tax Incentive, which provides a reduced tax rate for the first 18 months of production from a well. After acquiring the wells, Bluebird Energy invested in permanent production facilities and resumed oil production, believing that it would qualify for the New Well Tax Incentive. However, the Department of Revenue determined that the wells were not eligible for the incentive because the initial 18-month incentive period had already expired under the previous ownership. Bluebird Energy appealed this decision.The Supreme Court held that, according to the statutes governing the New Well Tax Incentive, the 18-month period for the reduced tax rate begins when production begins and runs contiguously, regardless of whether production is continuous. The court found that the Department of Revenue's interpretation of the statutes was correct and consistent with the legislative intent. The court also held that the relevant administrative rules were consistent with and reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of the Oil and Gas Production Tax statutes. Therefore, Bluebird Energy was not entitled to the reduced tax rate. View "Bluebird Energy v. DOR" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled against Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refining and Marketing, LLC ("Philadelphia Energy"). Philadelphia Energy, a fuel producer, had appealed a decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims denying their claim for tax refunds for excise taxes they had paid on fuel mixtures of butane and gasoline. Philadelphia Energy argued that these fuel mixtures should be considered "alternative fuel mixtures" under 26 U.S.C. § 6426(e), making them eligible for a tax credit. However, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision, finding that butane, despite being considered a liquefied petroleum gas, is not considered an "alternative fuel" under this statute. This is because butane is also a "taxable fuel," and the statutory language creates a dichotomy between "taxable fuels" and "special motor fuels", with the two being mutually exclusive. Consequently, Philadelphia Energy's mixture of butane and gasoline does not qualify for the alternative fuel mixture credit, and they are not entitled to the claimed tax refunds. View "PHILADELPHIA ENERGY SOLUTIONS REFINING v. US " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Equalization affirming the Wyoming Departments of Audit and Revenue's mineral tax audit assessments of Chesapeake Operating, LLC's oil and gas production, holding that the State Board of Equalization did not misinterpret Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-14-203(b)(iv) when it found that Chesapeake's field facilities did not qualify as processing facilities.On appeal, Chesapeake argued that the Board erred in concluding that Chesapeake's facilities qualified as processing facilities under the mineral tax statutes and that the proper point of valuation for its gas production was at the custody transfer meters. The district court certified the case directly to the Supreme Court, which affirmed, holding that the Board correctly interpreted and applied Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-14-201(a)(xviii) when it found that the seven facilities at issue were not processing facilities. View "Chesapeake Operating, LLC v. State, Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Equalization upholding the final determinations of the Department of Revenue (DOR) increasing the taxable value of Jonah Energy LLC's natural gas liquids (NGL) production for 2014 through 2016, holding that Jonah was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.On appeal, Jonah argued that the Board misinterpreted the NGL purchase agreement between Jonah and the purchaser of its NGL, Enterprise Products Operating LLC, by refusing to account for deficiency fees Jonah paid to Enterprise in determining the NGL's taxable value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not misinterpret the NGL purchase agreement at issue; and (2) the Board did not err by failing to take the facts and circumstances surrounding execution of the purchase agreement into account when interpreting it because there was no basis for losing outside the four corners of the purchase agreement to determine its meaning. View "Jonah Energy LLC v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that some of Taxpayer's equipment used in fracking was subject to Ohio's sales and use tax, holding most of the equipment at issue was exempt from taxation.While Ohio law generally exempts from taxation equipment used direction in oil and gas production not everything in the production of oil and gas qualifies for the exemption. After Taxpayer purchased equipment for use in its fracking operations the tax commissioner issued use-tax assessments, one for each piece of equipment. The commissioner then canceled about half the assessments. The BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that equipment consisting of blenders, hydration units, chemical-additive units, t-belts, and sand kings are tax exempt. View "Stingray Pressure Washing, L.L.C. v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the order of the district court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the State of Rhode Island, acting by and through the Division of Taxation (Division), in this appeal stemming from a series of transactions for the purchase and sale of gasoline, holding that the district court erred in granting the Division's motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies.The tax at issue was levied on a transaction between Plaintiff and another party and was the subject of several transactions between various entities. Plaintiff reimbursed a third-party for the tax assessed on the sale of 300,000 barrels of gasoline and then initiated this action alleging constitutional violations and violations of the Motor Fuel Tax. The trial judge dismissed the case for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial judge erroneously dismissed the action based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. View "Gunvor USA, LLC v. State, ex rel. Division of Taxation" on Justia Law