Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

A natural gas company operating in multiple states applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for permission to build new pipeline facilities and abandon some existing ones, requesting that the costs of these improvements be included in future customer rates. The company’s customers, a group of retail natural gas distributors, challenged the application, arguing that less costly alternatives existed, that the improvements were not justified by customer needs, and that FERC should not pre-determine the rate treatment for the project. The core dispute arose when the customers requested access to specific pipeline flow data, designated as sensitive Critical Energy Infrastructure Information, which was withheld from the public docket. FERC eventually released the requested data, but the customers claimed that the delay impaired their ability to participate meaningfully in the proceedings.FERC granted the company’s application, issuing a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity and permitting facility abandonment. The Commission found that the evidence, including flow data, demonstrated the necessity of the project and justified the proposed rate treatment, noting that objections to rates could be addressed in future proceedings. The customers filed a rehearing request, alleging that FERC’s decision was premature and unsupported by substantial evidence due to delayed data access. FERC denied rehearing, later provided the requested data, and solicited comments, but the customers maintained that the timing was inadequate and refused to comment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the consolidated petitions. The court found the customers had standing, the case was not moot, and limited its review to arguments raised in the rehearing request. Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court held that FERC’s procedures and consideration of the record, including flow data, were sufficient and did not violate due process. The petitions for review were denied. View "East Tennessee Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

Venture Global CP2 LNG and Venture Global CP Express sought authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal and an 85-mile pipeline in Louisiana. FERC’s review included extensive environmental analysis in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), resulting in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and a Supplemental EIS (SEIS). Both assessments concluded that, with recommended mitigation measures, the project’s environmental impacts, including those on air quality and the commercial fishing industry, would not be significant.Individuals and advocacy groups challenged FERC’s authorization, raising eleven alleged errors under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and NEPA. After FERC’s initial order in 2024, the challengers sought rehearing. FERC partially granted rehearing to address concerns raised by recent D.C. Circuit decisions and directed additional environmental review, which led to the SEIS. The SEIS found no exceedances of relevant air quality standards for the terminal and compressor station. FERC reaffirmed its authorization in 2025, and subsequent rehearing requests were denied. The challengers then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s interpretation and application of the NGA was lawful and not arbitrary, emphasizing the presumption in favor of terminal authorization under Section 3, absent an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest. The court found FERC’s NEPA analysis reasonable, deferring to FERC’s use of established air quality standards and its reliance on expert agency data. The court also upheld FERC’s treatment of cumulative impacts and harm to commercial fisheries as sufficiently addressed and explained. The petitions for review were denied in full. View "For a Better Bayou v. FERC" on Justia Law

Four electric transmission facilities located in the Sunflower Zone of central and western Kansas had their costs primarily allocated to local customers under the existing regional cost allocation method, known as the Highway/Byway framework. Over time, due to the growth of wind generation in the Sunflower Zone, these facilities increasingly served customers outside the local zone, transmitting surplus wind-generated electricity to other areas within the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) region. SPP, the regional transmission organization, determined that these facilities were functioning more like regional “Highway” facilities, which typically have their costs spread across the entire SPP region, rather than “Byway” facilities, whose costs are mostly local.SPP initially attempted to institute a process that would allow for waivers from the voltage-based cost allocation on a facility-by-facility basis, but the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected these proposals due to concerns over discretion and transparency. Subsequently, SPP made a more targeted filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, seeking prospective reclassification of the four facilities as Highway assets based on specific studies and criteria. FERC approved this reclassification, finding that the facilities primarily benefited customers outside the Sunflower Zone, and reaffirmed its decision on rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The court held that FERC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was adequately reasoned. The court found that FERC was not required to conduct zone-by-zone benefit analysis or adhere strictly to the existing allocation method when evidence showed that the facilities’ benefits were primarily regional. The court denied the petitions for review and upheld FERC’s orders. View "City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri v. FERC" on Justia Law

The case centers on reforms to the process by which new energy generators, particularly renewable energy sources, connect to the nation’s power grid. At the end of 2023, a significant backlog existed, with about 2,600 gigawatts of proposed generation and storage capacity awaiting interconnection studies, mainly from solar, wind, and energy storage projects. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determined that delays and inefficiencies in the existing interconnection process were creating unjust and unreasonable conditions in wholesale energy markets, hindering timely development and competition.FERC responded by issuing Order 2023, acting under its remedial authority in Section 206 of the Federal Power Act. Order 2023 mandated nationwide reforms for transmission providers, replacing the prior serial study model with a clustered study approach, requiring more substantial deposits, imposing withdrawal fines, establishing firm study deadlines, and implementing automatic late fees for missed deadlines. FERC also standardized affected-system study procedures and adopted energy-service modeling as the default. Following thirty-two rehearing and clarification requests, FERC issued Order 2023-A, reaffirming its findings and adjustments.Petitioners challenged three major aspects: the withdrawal fines, study deadlines backed by late fees, and the energy-service modeling requirement. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FERC acted within its statutory authority, reasonably explained its reforms, and provided adequate process and safeguards. The court denied all petitions, holding that FERC’s nationwide interconnection regime and rulemaking under Order 2023 were lawful, not arbitrary or capricious, and did not unduly discriminate or violate constitutional protections. The court also affirmed that FERC reasonably balanced competing interests and that its reforms were supported by substantial evidence. View "Advanced Energy United v. FERC" on Justia Law

A non-profit river conservation and recreation organization, whose members include kayakers and canoers in Missouri, sought to intervene out of time in a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license surrender proceeding for the Niangua Hydroelectric Project in Missouri. The project, completed in 1930, impounded the Niangua River and created Lake Niangua. After decades of operation and relicensing, the licensee decided not to pursue relicensing, proposing to decommission the project but leave the dam in place. The organization argued its members would be directly affected and that its participation would represent public interest, but it missed the intervention deadline due to lack of awareness of the proceeding.FERC denied the organization’s unopposed motion to intervene out of time, finding it failed to demonstrate good cause for late filing under its procedural rules. FERC also denied rehearing, reiterating that lack of awareness of a publicly noticed proceeding did not constitute good cause and that, per its precedent, failure to show good cause was sufficient to deny intervention without considering other factors. The Commission subsequently approved the license surrender with the dam left in place, rejecting the organization’s comments.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC did not err in interpreting its rule to require a late intervenor to show good cause for the late filing, but concluded that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by inconsistently applying its precedent on late intervention without providing a reasoned explanation. The court vacated FERC’s orders and remanded the case for reconsideration and a reasoned explanation consistent with FERC’s precedent. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law

A Barbados-based company acquired an 18 percent share in a Venezuelan oil company, alongside two state-owned shareholders. When dividends were distributed in 2008 and 2009, the state-owned entities received their share, but the Barbados-based company did not. In 2013, the company initiated arbitration proceedings against Venezuela in The Hague, seeking damages for not receiving its dividends. The arbitral tribunal, after a jurisdictional and merits phase, eventually awarded the company $59 million plus costs, fees, and interest. During the proceedings, a dispute arose about which government and legal counsel represented Venezuela, given the contested presidency between Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó.The company sought to enforce the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Venezuela argued that enforcement would violate U.S. public policy by contradicting the U.S. President’s official recognition of the Guaidó government, as the tribunal had allowed the Maduro regime to change legal counsel during the arbitration. The district court rejected Venezuela’s argument, concluding that the President’s recognition power was not a cognizable public policy under the New York Convention, and even if it were, enforcement would not violate it. The court granted the company’s petition to enforce the award.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that none of the exceptions in the New York Convention, including the public policy exception, applied to prevent recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. The court found that enforcing the award did not undermine the President’s exclusive recognition power or express any view on the legitimacy of either Venezuelan government, and thus did not violate fundamental U.S. public policy. View "Venezuela US SRL v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" on Justia Law

At an oil and gas wellsite in Texas, a contractor, TCP Specialists, LLC, provided wireline services alongside other companies that managed the well’s pressure and equipment. During a maintenance operation, a pressurized pipe ruptured while the well was being depressurized, causing fatal injuries to two workers and serious injury to a TCP employee. Although TCP did not control the depressurization or supply the faulty pipe, its employees were standing near the wellhead at the time of the accident. The Department of Labor alleged that TCP exposed its employees to known hazards by not establishing a buffer zone around the well during depressurization.An administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission held a hearing and found that TCP had violated the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The ALJ determined that TCP had control over its employees’ proximity to the hazard and that a buffer zone would have been a feasible and effective abatement measure. The ALJ concluded that TCP failed to implement adequate safety policies and upheld the citation, imposing a penalty. The full Commission declined to review the ALJ’s decision, making it a final order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed TCP’s petition and denied it. The court held that the hazard was properly defined by reference to the physical agents (the frac stack and pressurized piping) and that TCP had control over its employees’ exposure to that hazard. The court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of a buffer zone, and rejected TCP’s constitutional and procedural arguments. The order upholding the citation and penalty was affirmed. View "TCP Specialists, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

KC Transport, an independent trucking company, provides hauling services for mining and other companies. It operates a maintenance facility for its haul trucks about a mile from one of its primary client’s active mines. During an inspection, a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector observed two KC Transport trucks at the facility undergoing maintenance in conditions that violated federal safety standards—specifically, the trucks were raised and unblocked, with one worker standing underneath. The inspector issued citations for these violations.In an administrative proceeding, KC Transport contested the citations, arguing that MSHA lacked jurisdiction over its facility and trucks since they were not located at an extraction site or on an appurtenant road. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that MSHA had jurisdiction, reasoning that the facility and trucks were “used in” mining-related activities and thus constituted a “mine” under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act. KC Transport appealed, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission reversed the ALJ, holding that only facilities or equipment located at extraction sites or appurtenant roads qualify as “mines” under the Act and vacated the citations.The Secretary of Labor, acting through MSHA, petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review. After an intervening Supreme Court decision overruled Chevron deference, the D.C. Circuit independently interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The court held that a “facility” constitutes a “mine” under the Mine Act when it is necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing minerals, even if not located directly at an extraction site or appurtenant road. Concluding that KC Transport’s facility met this definition, the court vacated the Commission’s decision and affirmed the Secretary’s citations. View "Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Several oil refineries with average daily crude oil throughput below 75,000 barrels in 2024 applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2025 for exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program for the 2024 compliance year. The RFS program, established under the Clean Air Act, requires refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels. The Act provides for a “small refinery” exemption for facilities that do not exceed the 75,000-barrel threshold in a calendar year. The petitioning refineries did not seek exemptions for 2023 and based their applications solely on their 2024 throughput.After the refineries submitted their applications, the EPA informed them that, under its 2014 regulation, eligibility required a refinery to meet the “small refinery” definition both for "the most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and for "the year or years for which an exemption is sought." The EPA interpreted this to mean petitioners needed to satisfy the throughput limit in both 2023 and 2024. Since the refineries exceeded the threshold in 2023, the EPA denied the exemption requests. The refineries then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA’s interpretation of its 2014 regulation was contrary to the regulation’s plain text. The court found that, because the applications were filed in 2025 for the 2024 compliance year, both the “most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension” and “the year for which an exemption is sought” referred to 2024. Since the petitioners met the threshold in 2024, they were eligible under the regulation. The court vacated the EPA’s denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

A provider of energy efficient resources (EERs), which are projects that reduce electrical consumption, challenged a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approving a change to PJM Interconnection LLC’s tariff. PJM manages the electrical grid in parts of thirteen states and the District of Columbia, and it operates capacity auctions to ensure reliable electricity supply. Historically, EERs were allowed to bid in these auctions for up to four consecutive years to compensate for a lag in PJM’s statistical model (load forecast), which previously did not account for new EERs’ impact on energy consumption. In 2016, PJM updated its model to capture these effects in real time, removing the need for EERs to participate in the auctions.In 2024, PJM proposed a tariff amendment to exclude EERs from future capacity auctions, citing the improved accuracy of its load forecast and the unnecessary costs imposed on consumers by double-counting EERs’ effects. FERC approved this amendment, finding it would lower costs for consumers without compromising grid reliability. Affirmed Energy LLC, an EER aggregator, protested, arguing that the amendment was unlawfully retroactive and arbitrary and capricious, as it would disrupt settled expectations and reliance interests, particularly for projects that had already cleared prior auctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC’s orders were not retroactive because they only applied to future auctions and did not strip EER providers of entitlements to past payments or auction results. The court also found that FERC had reasonably evaluated PJM’s updated forecast, weighed the reliance interests at stake, and explained why the amendment was justified. The petition for review was denied. View "Affirmed Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law