Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Enbridge Energy, LP v. Whitmer
Enbridge Energy owns and operates a pipeline that runs from Wisconsin, through Michigan, and into Canada, crossing the Straits of Mackinac under a 1953 easement with the State of Michigan. In 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer informed Enbridge that the State was revoking the easement, alleging that Enbridge had violated it by creating an unreasonable risk of an oil spill. Enbridge responded by filing a federal lawsuit against Governor Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the State from interfering with the pipeline's operation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan rejected the defendants' argument that Enbridge’s claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The court held that Enbridge’s lawsuit fell within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, which allows federal courts to hear cases seeking prospective relief against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Enbridge’s lawsuit was not barred by sovereign immunity because it sought prospective injunctive relief against state officials for alleged violations of federal law, fitting within the Ex parte Young doctrine. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the suit was equivalent to a quiet title action or a request for specific performance of a state contract, finding that the relief sought would not divest the State of ownership or regulatory control over the land. Thus, the court concluded that Enbridge’s claims could proceed in federal court. View "Enbridge Energy, LP v. Whitmer" on Justia Law
EOG Resources, Inc. v. Lucky Land Management, LLC
EOG Resources, Inc. holds drilling rights to oil and gas beneath property owned by Lucky Land Management, LLC in Ohio. The dispute arose over whether EOG's drilling rights included the right to drill horizontally from Lucky Land's surface to adjacent properties. EOG sought a preliminary injunction to access the land, cut down trees, and start constructing drills. The district court granted the injunction, finding that EOG would likely succeed on the merits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted EOG's request for a preliminary injunction, allowing EOG to access the land and begin drilling operations. The court found that EOG was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction. Lucky Land Management appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's findings. The appellate court held that Lucky Land had the better interpretation of oil-and-gas law, which generally does not allow a lessee to use the surface of one property to drill into neighboring lands without explicit permission. The court also found that EOG would not suffer irreparable harm if it had to wait for the litigation to proceed, as any potential losses could be compensated with monetary damages. The court emphasized that preliminary injunctions are meant to prevent irreparable injuries and preserve the court's ability to issue meaningful final relief, not to serve as shortcuts to the merits. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction. View "EOG Resources, Inc. v. Lucky Land Management, LLC" on Justia Law
Appalachian Voices v. Army Corps of Engineers
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP) proposed constructing a 32-mile natural gas pipeline across several Tennessee counties, which would involve crossing numerous waterbodies. TGP applied for a § 404 permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), a § 401 water quality certification from the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), and a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Corps issued the § 404 permit, allowing TGP to discharge materials into waterbodies during construction.The Corps issued public notices and received comments on TGP’s application. TGP responded to these comments, explaining its assessment of alternative routes and crossing methods. FERC issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement, concluding that the Pipeline would not result in significant environmental impacts. TDEC issued a § 401 water quality certification, and FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The Corps then issued the § 404 permit with special conditions, including requirements for TGP to use the least impactful trenching techniques and obtain approval before using blasting methods.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Corps' decision. The court held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing the § 404 permit. The Corps properly assessed practicable alternatives to open-cut trenching, determined that TGP’s proposed rock-removal methods were the least environmentally damaging practicable alternatives, and correctly relied on TDEC’s § 401 water quality certification. The court also found that the Corps provided sufficient support for its conclusions regarding suspended particulates and turbidity and adequately assessed the cumulative effects of the Pipeline’s construction. The court denied the petition for review. View "Appalachian Voices v. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law
The Grissoms, LLC v. Antero Resources Corp.
A certified class of Ohio landowners alleged that a Colorado-based mining company, Antero Resources Corporation, underpaid them $10 million in natural gas royalties. The landowners claimed that Antero improperly deducted costs for processing and fractionation from their royalties. Antero counterclaimed, seeking authority to deduct additional costs related to gathering, dehydrating, compressing, and transporting the unrefined natural gas. The district court certified the class, denied Antero's motion for summary judgment, granted the landowners' motion, and entered a final judgment after the parties stipulated damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the landowners, finding that Antero improperly deducted processing and fractionation costs from the royalties. The court determined that these costs were necessary to transform the gas into marketable form and thus could not be deducted under the lease agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Antero could not deduct the costs of processing and fractionation from the landowners' royalties. The court found that the lease agreement's Market Enhancement Clause allowed deductions only for costs that enhanced the value of already marketable products, not for costs required to make the products marketable. The court concluded that the gas products first became marketable after processing and fractionation, and thus, these costs were not deductible. The court also noted that the Fourth Circuit had reached a similar conclusion in a related case involving the same defendant and lease terms. View "The Grissoms, LLC v. Antero Resources Corp." on Justia Law
Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Dayton Power & Light Company, along with other utilities, sought an RTO adder from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as an incentive for joining a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Ohio law mandates that utilities join an RTO, which led FERC to deny Dayton Power's application, arguing that the adder is meant to incentivize voluntary actions, not those required by law. The Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) challenged the existing RTO adders for other Ohio utilities, leading FERC to remove the adder for AEP but not for Duke and FirstEnergy, citing the latter's comprehensive settlement agreements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether the utilities could challenge the voluntariness requirement of Order 679, concluding that they could because FERC's past practices did not clearly indicate a strict voluntariness requirement. The court then interpreted Section 219(c) of the Federal Power Act, agreeing with FERC that the best reading of the statute supports the requirement that RTO membership must be voluntary to qualify for the adder.The court also considered the utilities' preemption argument, which claimed that federal law should override Ohio's mandate for RTO membership. The court held that the Federal Power Act does not preempt Ohio law, as Congress did not intend to prevent states from mandating RTO participation, especially when such mandates align with federal goals of increasing RTO membership.Finally, the court found FERC's differential treatment of AEP, Duke, and FirstEnergy to be arbitrary and capricious. It noted that all three utilities' rates included a 50-basis-point RTO adder, whether explicitly approved or impliedly included in settlements. The court affirmed FERC's denial of Dayton Power's application and the removal of AEP's adder but reversed the decision to retain the adders for Duke and FirstEnergy, remanding for further proceedings. View "Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law
Energy Michigan, Inc. v. Public Service Commission
The case involves Michigan's electricity market regulations, specifically the Individual Local Clearing Requirement (ILCR), which mandates that electricity retailers in Michigan's lower peninsula procure a certain percentage of their capacity from within that region. Plaintiffs, including Energy Michigan and the Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity (ABATE), challenged the ILCR on the grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan initially dismissed the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) on Eleventh Amendment grounds but allowed the case to proceed against individual commissioners. The court denied summary judgment motions from both sides, finding that there were factual disputes regarding whether the ILCR discriminated against interstate commerce. After a three-day bench trial, the district court concluded that the ILCR did not violate the Commerce Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the ILCR is facially discriminatory because it requires electricity to be generated within a specific geographic region, effectively favoring in-state over out-of-state electricity. The court held that this discrimination necessitates strict scrutiny, which the district court did not properly apply. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the ILCR can survive strict scrutiny by proving it is the only means to achieve the state's goal of ensuring a reliable energy supply. View "Energy Michigan, Inc. v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law
Wilmington Trust Co. v. AEP Generating Co.
Nearly 20 years after defendants built, sold, and leased back a Rockport Indiana coal-burning power plant, they committed, in a consent decree resolving lawsuits involving alleged Clean Air Act violations at their other power plants, to either make over a billion dollars of emission control improvements to the plant, or shut it down. The sale and leaseback arrangement was a means of financing construction. Defendants then obtained a modification to the consent decree providing that these improvements need not be made until after their lease expired, pushing their commitments to improve the air quality of the plant’s emissions to the plaintiff, the investors who had financed construction and who would own the plant after the 33-year lease term. The district court held this encumbrance did not violate the parties’ contracts governing the sale and leaseback, and that plaintiff’s breach of contract claims precluded it from maintaining an alternative cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a Permitted Lien exception in the lease unambiguously supports the plaintiff’s position and that the defendants’ actions “materially adversely affected’ plaintiff’s interests. View "Wilmington Trust Co. v. AEP Generating Co." on Justia Law
Maxxim Rebuild Co., LLC v. Mine Safety & Health Administration
Maxxim’s Sidney, Kentucky repair shop makes and repairs mining equipment and machine parts, employing seven workers. Roughly 75% of the shop’s work is for equipment that Alpha (Maxxim’s parent company) uses to extract or prepare coal at several mines. The rest of the work is for other mining companies and for repair shops that might sell the equipment to mining or non-mining companies. The Maxxim facility does not extract coal or any other mineral, and it does not prepare coal or any other mineral for use. Sidney Coal, another Alpha subsidiary, owned the property and had an office in the upper floor of the Maxxim shop. The Mine Safety and Health Administration had asserted jurisdiction (30 U.S.C. 802(h)) over the Sidney shop and, in 2013, issued several citations. Maxxim challenged the Administration’s power to issue the citations. An administrative law judge’s ruling that the Sidney shop was “a coal or other mine” was upheld by the independent agency responsible for reviewing the Administration’s citations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The definition of “coal or other mine” refers to locations, equipment and other things in, above, beneath, or appurtenant to active mines; the Maxxim facility is not a mine subject to the Administration’s jurisdiction. View "Maxxim Rebuild Co., LLC v. Mine Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law
Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Trust v. Trina Solar Ltd.
The defendant companies, based in China, produce conventional solar energy panels. Energy Conversion and other American manufacturers produce the newer thin-film panels. The Chinese producers sought greater market shares. They agreed to export more products to the U.S. and to sell them below cost. Several entities supported their endeavor. Suppliers provided discounts, a trade association facilitated cooperation, and the Chinese government provided below-cost financing. From 2008-2011, the average selling prices of their panels fell over 60%. American manufacturers consulted the Department of Commerce, which found that the Chinese firms had harmed American industry through illegal dumping and assessed substantial tariffs. The American manufacturers continued to suffer; more than 20 , including Energy Conversion, filed for bankruptcy or closed. Energy Conversion sued under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and Michigan law, seeking $3 billion in treble damages, claiming that the Chinese companies had unlawfully conspired “to sell Chinese manufactured solar panels at unreasonably low or below cost prices . . . to destroy an American industry.” Because this allegation did not state that the Chinese companies could or would recoup their losses by charging monopoly prices after driving competitors from the field, the court dismissed the claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Without such an allegation or any willingness to prove a reasonable prospect of recoupment, the court correctly rejected the claim. View "Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Trust v. Trina Solar Ltd." on Justia Law
Journey Acquisition-II, L.P. v. EQT Prod.Co.
In 2001, EQT sold or leased to Journey several oil- and natural-gas-producing properties in Kentucky. Both parties continued to conduct oil and natural-gas operations in the state, but Journey later concluded that EQT was operating on some of the lands that had been conveyed to Journey. Journey sought a declaration that it owned or controlled those properties and that EQT was liable for the oil and natural gas that EQT had removed from those properties. The district court concluded on summary judgment that the parties’ 2001 contract had unambiguously conveyed the disputed properties to Journey. A jury found that EQT’s trespasses on Journey’s lands were not in good faith. The court subsequently required EQT to pay $14,288,432 in damages and transfer certain oil and natural-gas wells to Journey. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in construing the parties’ contract, in excluding portions of EQT’s proffered evidence, and in crafting the remedy for EQT’s trespasses. EQT carried out its drilling despite obvious indicators that its ownership of the underlying property was doubtful, establishing an ample basis to conclude that EQT’s trespasses were not in good faith. View "Journey Acquisition-II, L.P. v. EQT Prod.Co." on Justia Law