Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Salisbury, North Carolina relies on the Yankin River for its drinking water. The City constructed a pump station on the Yankin River, which the City believed was threatened by a plan proposed by the operator of a nearby hydroelectric damn and approved by FERC. The City challenged the plan and FERC's approval.The D.C. Circuit dismissed the City's petition, finding that the proposed rule was within the license granted to the dam operator and was not arbitrary. The operator of the dam was required to implement a flood protection plan, including 1.) physical modifications to the facilities such as a protective dike for the pump station, 2.) improved access to the pump station with the road consistent with the City of Salisbury’s design or 3.) other feasible options for achieving the same benefits. The proposed plan meets the requirement of the flood protection plan. Additionally, the court determined that FERC's approval of the plan was not arbitrary. View "City of Salisbury, North Carolina v. FERC" on Justia Law

LSP, an independent electric transmission developer, bids on proposals to build transmission projects throughout the U.S. LSP sought judicial review of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) decision under 16 U.S.C. 824e concerning ISO New England’s compliance with Commission Order 1000, which required “the removal from Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and agreements” of rights of first refusal to construct transmission facilities and directed incumbent transmission providers to engage in competitive selection of developers. FERC recognized an exception if the time needed to solicit and conduct competitive bidding would delay the project and thereby threaten system “reliability.” FERC found “insufficient evidence” that ISO was incorrectly implementing Order 1000.The D.C. Circuit denied LSP’s petition for judicial review, first holding that FERC’s ruling bears all the indicia of a substantive decision produced after a contested proceeding involving ISO and numerous intervenors and is subject to judicial review. The court found nothing irrational in FERC’s response to LSP’s general criticism of ISO’s use of more conservative assumptions regarding its system capacity and future management in determining when to apply the exception. Although the number of reliability projects exempted from competitive bidding exceeded those open to competition, the appropriate balance between competitive procurement and quick redress of reliability needs is a policy judgment for FERC. View "LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Commission's decision to authorize a new natural gas pipeline and compressor station in Agawam, Massachusetts. One of the petitioners, Berkshire, has failed to establish standing to challenge the Commission's decision. The other petitioner, Food & Water Watch, has raised challenges related to the Commission's compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act.The DC Circuit mainly rejected Food & Water Watch's claims, but agreed with its contention that the Commission's environmental assessment failed to account for the reasonably foreseeable indirect effects of the project—specifically, the greenhouse-gas emissions attributable to burning the gas to be carried in the pipeline. Accordingly, the court granted Food & Water Watch's petition for review on that basis and remanded for preparation of a conforming environmental assessment. View "Food & Water Watch v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

For seven years, NTE worked to build a natural gas-fueled power plant in Killingly, Connecticut to sell electricity on the New England grid. NTE worked with ISO, the independent system operator authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to manage the regional grid, to have the project “qualified” to bid for the right to sell electricity. NTE secured a “capacity supply obligation” (CSO) for the 2022 commitment period. NTE secured a guaranteed income stream for the first seven years of the plant’s operation.NTE subsequently encountered setbacks that prevented it from meeting its financing and construction goals. On November 4, 2021, NTE told ISO that it remained confident it could complete construction on time but ISO-NE asked FERC to terminate the Killingly plant’s CSO. In January 2022, FERC did so. In February, the Second Circuit issued an emergency stay of FERC’s order. FERC likely fell short of its obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act to explain its decision. Absent emergency relief, FERC’s order would have irreparably harmed NTE, preventing it from participating in an auction to sell future electricity capacity to New England consumers. Nothing in FERC’s reasoning suggests the risk that incumbents may have to reallocate electricity capacity amongst themselves outweighs the harm of delaying NTE’s project, which could benefit consumers through more efficient, less expensive electricity. View "In re: NTE Connecticut, LLC" on Justia Law

The owners of New England electric generation facilities are paid through formula rates established by ISO New England’s (a regional transmission organization) open access transmission tariff. The owners challenged Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) orders approving Schedule 17, an amendment to the ISO tariff, establishing a new recovery mechanism for costs incurred by certain electric generation and transmission facilities to comply with mandatory reliability standards FERC had approved.FERC ruled that the owners could use Schedule 17 to recover only costs incurred after they filed and FERC approved a cost-based rate under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824d. FERC reasoned that recovery was limited to prospective costs, citing the filed rate doctrine, which forbids utilities from charging rates other than those properly filed with FERC, and its corollary, the rule against retroactive rate-making, which prohibits FERC from adjusting current rates to make up for a utility’s over- or under-collection in prior periods.The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review. FERC’s application of the filed rate doctrine and the rule against retroactive rate-making to Schedule 17 was not arbitrary or capricious. Schedule 17 does not expressly permit recovery of mandatory reliability costs incurred prior to a facility’s individual FPA filing. View "Cogentrix Energy Power Management, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission owns a power supply system in the Hetch Hetchy Valley and transmission lines but does not own distribution lines and relies on PG&E’s distribution system. The Commission is both a customer and a competitor of PG&E. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved PG&E’s Tariff, which stated the generally applicable terms for “open-access” wholesale distribution service. In 2019, San Francisco filed a complaint under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824e, 825e, 825h, challenging PG&E’s refusal to offer secondary-voltage service in lieu of more burdensome primary-voltage service to certain San Francisco sites and provide service to delivery points that San Francisco maintains are eligible for service under the Tariff’s grandfathering provision. PG&E maintained that it had not given customers the right to dictate the level of service to be received and that any denials of secondary-voltage service were supported by “technical, safety, reliability, and operational reasons.”FERC denied San Francisco’s complaint, ruling that PG&E should retain discretion to determine what level of service is most appropriate for a customer because the provider “is ultimately responsible for the safety and reliability of its distribution system.” The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded, citing FERC’s own precedent and noting a “troubling pattern of inattentiveness to potential anticompetitive effects of PG&E’s administration of its open-access Tariff.” View "City and County of San Francisco v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Duke generates electricity for Power, a “joint agency” of 32 North Carolina municipalities. Power pays Duke an Energy Charge that “reimburses Duke only for its fuel costs and variable operations and maintenance costs associated with producing the energy consumed by Power" and a Capacity Charge, designed to cover Duke’s fixed costs and provide a return on its infrastructure investments, calculated by determining its pro-rata share of the demand on Duke’s system during a one-hour “snapshot” of system usage taken during the peak hour on Duke’s system each month.Their agreement regulates activities Power may employ to modify its electricity use, including Demand-Side Management and Demand Response. Demand-Side Management involves end-users accepting an inducement to sign up for a program where Power can turn off and on their appliances around high-demand periods. Demand Response involves a supplier providing end-users information on the price of energy at a given time and those end users then modifying their consumption to avoid elevated prices.In 2019, Power petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) arguing that the provisions that permit Demand-Side Management and Demand Response activities permit deploying battery storage technology to reduce metered demand during peak load periods and drawing from those batteries during the high-demand “snapshot” hour. Concerned that Power would reduce its Capacity Charge to zero, Duke opposed the petition. The D.C. Circuit affirmed FERC’s grant of Power’s petition, finding that the agreement permits Power to use battery storage technology as either Demand-Side Management or Demand Response. View "Duke Energy Progress, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit granted the City's petitions for review of FERC orders rejecting the City's complaint regarding periodic outflow coming from the operation of the Pensacola Project, a downstream dam licensed by FERC. The court found FERC's position unpersuasive and remanded for the Commission to determine the role of the Corps, the responsibility the Authority bears if it caused flooding in the City, analyze the evidence petitioner has produced, and finally interpret the Pensacola Act. View "The City of Miami, Oklahoma v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Several utilities that are managed by the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), a regional transmission operator, paid for upgrades to the transmission grid. The operative tariff required other utilities who benefitted from these upgrades to share the costs of the expanded network. The tariff, however, also required SPP to invoice the charges monthly and to make adjustments within one year. The reimbursement calculation proved complicated. It took SPP eight years to implement it, during which time SPP did not invoice for the upgrade charges. FERC initially granted SPP a waiver of the tariff’s one-year time bar but later determined it lacked the authority to waive this provision retroactively. FERC’s revised determination meant the utilities that had made substantial outlays for upgrades were denied reimbursement for the eight years that had elapsed.The D.C. Circuit denied petitions for review filed by SPP and a company that sponsored upgrades and has been denied reimbursement. Once a tariff is filed, FERC has no statutory authority (16 U.S.C. 824d(d)) to provide equitable exceptions or retroactive modifications to the tariff. SPP may impose only those charges contained in the filed rate. Because the one-year time bar for billing is part of the filed rate, FERC could not retroactively waive it, even to remedy a windfall for users of the upgraded networks. View "Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Entergy, a public utility holding company, owns five operating companies that sell electricity in four states, including Louisiana. The companies have been governed by an agreement requiring them to act as a “single economic unit” and requiring “rough equalization” of their production costs. In 2005, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determined that the production costs were not roughly equal and imposed a “bandwidth remedy”: Whenever the yearly production costs of an individual operating company deviated from the average by more than 11%, companies with lower costs were required to pay companies with higher costs as necessary to bring all five companies within that range. Entergy filed a tariff establishing a formula to calculate production costs subject to the bandwidth remedy, which FERC largely accepted.Utilities often spread their recovery of large, non-recurring costs by creating a regulatory asset, a type of credit. The company then amortizes the asset in later years, creating debits chargeable to customers. Historically, the Entergy companies recorded regulatory assets and their related amortization expenses in FERC accounts not referenced in the bandwidth formula; this effectively accounted for deferred production costs when they were incurred, rather than when the related amortization expenses were recorded. FERC rejected that approach and excluded purchased-power costs that a Louisiana affiliate incurred in 2005 and amortized in 2008 and 2009.The D.C. Circuit denied the Louisiana Public Service Commission’s petition for review. The Federal Power Act requires electric utilities to charge “just and reasonable” rates. 16 U.S.C. 824d(a). If FERC finds a rate unreasonable, it may establish a just and reasonable rate; FERC may reallocate production costs under the Entergy system agreement, including by ensuring compliance with the bandwidth remedy. View "Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law