Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The Federal Power Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate “sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” including wholesale electricity rates and any rule or practice “affecting” such rates, 16 U.S.C. 824(b), 824d(a), 824e(a), leaving the states to regulate retail sales. To ensure “just and reasonable” wholesale rates. FERC encourages nonprofit entities to manage regions of the nationwide grid. These entities hold auctions to set wholesale prices, matching bids from generators with orders from utilities and other wholesale buyers. Bids are accepted from lowest to highest until all requests are met. Rates rise dramatically during peak periods and the increased flow of electricity can overload the grid. Wholesalers devised demand response programs, paying consumers for commitments to reduce power use during peak periods. Offers from aggregators of multiple users or large individual consumers can be bid into the wholesale auctions. When it costs less to pay consumers to refrain from use than it does to pay producers to supply more, demand response can lower prices and increase grid reliability. FERC required wholesalers to receive demand response bids from aggregators of electricity consumers, except when the state regulatory authority bars participation. FERC further issued Order 745, requiring market operators to pay the same price for conserving energy as for producing it, so long as accepted bids actually save consumers money. The D.C. Circuit vacated the Rule as exceeding FERC’s authority. The Supreme Court reversed. FERC has authority to regulate wholesale market operators’ compensation of demand response bids. The practice directly affects wholesale rates; FERC has not regulated retail sales. Wholesale demand response is all about reducing wholesale rates as are the rules and practices that determine how those programs operate. Transactions occurring on the wholesale market unavoidably have natural consequences at the retail level. View "Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n" on Justia Law

This dispute arose under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117. At issue is whether the district court abused its discretion when it entered an order indefinitely staying this proceeding to allow the Commission to act on an administrative complaint filed by Occidental against a non-party to this action, which largely concerns the same issues. The court concluded that, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a district court with subject matter jurisdiction may, under appropriate circumstances, defer to another forum, such as an administrative agency, which also has non-exclusive jurisdiction, based on its determination that the benefits of obtaining aid from that other forum outweigh the need for expeditious litigation. The court concluded that it has appellate jurisdiction under Hines v. D'Artois because Hines remains good law and this case is sufficiently close to the facts of Hines to give the court appellate jurisdiction under the “effectively out of court” rule. The court also concluded that, given that all parties agree it could take years for FERC to resolve the Integration Complaint, a deadline will give FERC a reasonable opportunity to act without the costs inherent in an indefinite delay. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's stay order and remanded with instructions. View "Occidental Chemical Corp. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

On September 16, 2013, the Commission issued an Order Conditionally Accepting Tariff Revisions filed by ISO New England. In the same order, the Commission rejected the tariff proposal to allocate costs to transmission owners as inconsistent with cost-causation principles and directed ISO New England to submit a compliance filing that would allocate the costs of the Program to Real-Time Load Obligation. On April 8, 2014, FERC issued orders denying requests for rehearing of the Orders issued in Docket ER13-1851 and Docket ER13-2266. TransCanada and the Retail Energy Supply Association filed petitions for review challenging the Orders issued by FERC approving the Winter 2013-14 Reliability Program. The court declined to assess FERC’s conditional approval of the Program in Docket ER13-1851 because FERC made it clear that its decision was only tentative. The court concluded that the Commission’s decision regarding the allocation of the costs of the Program to Load-Serving Entities was a final action in Docket ER13-1851 and is ripe for review; the court found no merit in petitioners' challenges to the cost-allocation decision; and therefore, the court denied the petitions for review of the cost-allocation decision in Docket ER13-1851. The court granted in part the petition for review of Docket ER13-2266 because FERC could not properly assess whether the Program’s rates were just and reasonable. View "TransCanada Power Marketing v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged several FERC orders that were issued following the court's remand in Port of Seattle v. FERC. The key issue on appeal is the applicability of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, which requires FERC to “presume that the rate set out in a freely negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the ‘just and reasonable’ requirement” imposed by law. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction only as to the issue of whether FERC erred by invoking the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and that it lacks jurisdiction to review FERC’s evidentiary orders. The court held that FERC reasonably applied Mobile-Sierra to the class of contracts at issue and that FERC's interpretation is reasonable. In this case, FERC’s baseline assumption that the presumption applies to the contracts at issue is not unreasonable in light of Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1. Accordingly, the court denied the petition with respect to petitioners' claim that the Mobile-Sierra presumption cannot apply to the spot sales at issue and dismissed the evidentiary challenges for lack of jurisdiction. View "State of California v. FERC" on Justia Law

Western Minnesota and intervenors petitioned for review of FERC's award of a permit for a hydroelectric project in Polk County, Iowa. The Commission concluded that the municipal preference under Section 7(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 800(a), applies only to municipalities “located in the[] vicinity” of the water resources to be developed. Petitioners claimed that the Commission’s geographic proximity test is an impermissible interpretation of the plain text of the statute. The court agreed that Congress has spoken directly to the question in defining “municipality” in Section 3(7) of the FPA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the permit order and rehearing order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Western Minnesota Municipal v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Swecker farm in Iowa has a wind generator and is a qualifying power production facility certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Sweckers sell surplus electric energy to Midland Power Cooperative at a rate established by the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), implementing FERC rules and regulations, 16 U.S.C. 824a-3(f). For many years, the Sweckers and Midland have litigated rate disputes. The district court dismissed their current suit against Midland and its primary supplier, Central Iowa Power Cooperative (CIPCO), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Midland “to purchase available energy from plaintiffs . . . at Midland’s full avoided cost, rather than CIPCO’s avoided cost.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. FERC’s interpretation is controlling and forecloses the contrary interpretation of 18 C.F.R. 292.303(d) urged by the Sweckers. View "Swecker v. Midland Power Coop." on Justia Law

IDACORP submitted proposed settlements to FERC involving the FERC proceeding related to electricity sales in the Pacific Northwest in 2000 and 2001. At issue was whether FERC abused its discretion in considering these proposed settlements. The court concluded that the agency departed from its rules and precedent without explanation when it treated the first proposed settlement as uncontested. In this case, FERC abused its discretion by foregoing the Trailblazer Pipeline Co. analysis and merits analysis dictated by FERC’s regulations. The court granted both petitions for review and remanded for further proceedings because the settlements and petitions are inextricably intertwined. View "Idaho Power Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

MISO, an organization of independent transmission-owning utilities, has linked the transmission lines of its members into a single interconnected grid across 11 states. The Generators, which operate 150-megawatt wind-powered electric generation facilities in Illinois, wish to connect to the system run by MISO. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), acting under 16 U.S.C. 824(a), has standardized the process: the Generators submitted requests to MISO, which then produced studies (paid for by the Generators) to assess potential impact on the grid and calculate the cost of necessary upgrades. After the studies were complete and agreements signed, MISO notified the Generators of a “significant error” that failed to include certain upgrades and that the Generators would either have to agree to fewer megawatts or pay for additional upgrades estimated to cost $11.5 million. MISO presented superseding Agreements to both Generators. The companies refused to sign. FERC found that the Generators should pay for the additional network upgrades. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The record failed to show that the Generators relied on the original, mistaken studies or that reducing the output would have made their farms economically unsustainable. They also had an exit option. The court noted that the Generators apparently built their wind farms despite the dispute. View "Pioneer Trail Wind Farm, LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners, wholesale electricity customers, challenged FERC's orders requiring the Bonneville Power Administration to provide transmission services on terms "not unduly discriminatory or preferential." Petitioners are wholesale electricity customers of Bonneville. The court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing by demonstrating that they have an injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The court concluded, however, that petitioners failed to demonstrate statutory standing, which requires them to be "aggrieved" within the meaning of the Federal Power Act section 313(b) (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 8251(b), and the Administrative Procedure Act section 10, 5 U.S.C. 702. In this case, the zone-of-interests test was not satisfied where petitioners' interests are not arguably protected by section 211A of the FPA. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "NRU V. FERC" on Justia Law

Under Pub. Util. Code 1701(a)1, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC ) promulgated Rule 1.1, stating: Any person who . . . transacts business with the Commission . . . agrees . . . never to mislead the Commission or its staff by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. After a massive 2010 explosion of an underground gas pipeline owned and operated by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), the PUC imposed reforms, including requiring that PG&E improve its recordkeeping and information technology capabilities. PG&E was directed to keep the PUC informed of any reported pipeline leaks and any discovered information regarding the safety of pipeline operations. Following discovery of a pipeline leak, PG&E also discovered that some information it had provided to the PUC concerning the internal pressure at which certain pipelines could be safely operated might not be correct. About seven months after internally verifying the information, PG&E, communicated to the PUC via a written “Errata”‖ to a previous filing. Following extensive hearings, the PUC deemed this filing both a substantive and a procedural violation and imposed civil penalties totaling $14,350,000. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the penalties were not grossly disproportional to the gravity of PG&E‘s tardiness. View "Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n" on Justia Law