Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Ruling on a joint petition for declaratory order filed by Monongahela Power Company and Potomac Edison Company ("The Utilities"), The Public Service Commission of West Virginia held that the alternative and renewable energy resource credits attributable to energy purchases by the Utilities from Morgantown Energy Associates (MEA) and the City of New Martinsville ("the Generators"), were owned by the Utilities during the terms of electric energy purchase agreements between the entities. On appeal, the Generators contended that the Commission erred in its ruling and that the energy resource credits were owned by them. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in finding the credits at issue were owned by the Utilities; and (2) the Commission did not err in holding that it would deem MEA's Morgantown project as a certified facility under the Alternative and Renewable Energy Portfolio Act upon the submission of sufficient evidence by the Utilities. View "City of New Martinsville v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n " on Justia Law

NextEra Energy Resources, LLC appealed the Iowa Utility Board's decision to grant advance ratemaking principles to MidAmerican Energy Company for a proposed wind generation facility. The district court affirmed the Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly interpreted and applied Iowa Code 476.53; (2) substantial evidence supported the Board's findings; (3) Iowa Code 476.43 was not applicable to this ratemaking proceeding; and (4) section 476.53 as applied to a rate-regulated public utility that may compete in the wholesale energy market did not violate the Equal Protection clauses of the Iowa or U.S. Constitutions or the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. View "Nextera Energy Res., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

Covanta Maine, LLC (Covanta), a subsidiary of Covanta Energy, appealed from orders of the Public Utilities Commission denying Covanta's requests for certification of two of its facilities as Class I new renewable resources. Covanta argued that the Commission erred by basing its conclusion that the facilities were not refurbished on the ratio of Covanta's expenditures in the facilities to the value of those facilities, and it therefore asserted that the Commission improperly denied certification of its two facilities. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Commission, holding that the Commission erred by establishing a requirement that the expenditures meet some minimum level that equals an unspecified percentage of the total value of the facility. Remanded. View "Covanta Maine, LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case concerned the mechanics of NSTAR's, an electric distribution company, attempt to shift the recovery of one of it supply-related costs, supply-related bad debt costs, from its distribution rates to its supply rates. NSTAR filed a petition, through which it sought to begin recovery of its supply-related bad debt costs through its supply rates rather than, as before, through its distribution rates. Not withstanding that contention, the department conditioned its approval of NSTAR's petition on a corresponding reduction in NSTAR's distribution rates. The court concluded that the department had failed to provide an adequate statement of its reasons for imposing the condition. Specifically, the court was unable to determine whether this aspect of the department's order rested on a determination that NSTAR did not follow the correct procedural path in removing supply-related bad debt costs from its distribution rates, or rather on a determination that NSTAR did not in fact remove such costs from its distribution rates at all. The court concluded further that certain of the department's factual determinations were not adequately supported by subsidiary findings and that an aspect of the department's analysis was legally erroneous. Accordingly, the department's order was to be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "NSTAR Electric Co. vs. Dept. of Public Utilities" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101-10270, authorizing the Department of Energy to enter into contracts with nuclear facilities for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). Congress mandated that, under the Standard Contract, DOE dispose of SNF and HLW beginning not later than January 31, 1998. In 1983, DOE entered into a Standard Contract with Consolidated Edison under which DOE agreed to accept SNF stored at the Indian Point facility. Following DOE’s breach, the Claims Court awarded two categories of damages: wet storage costs for continued operation of its Unit 1 spent fuel pool and regulatory fees paid to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Federal Circuit reversed the awards, affirmed denial of damages for the cost of financing mitigation activities, but reversed denial of damages for indirect overhead costs associated with mitigation. The company had chosen to prioritize removal of Unit 2 SNF and Unit 1 material would not have been removed by the time at issue; the company did not establish that the breach caused an increase in fees to the NRC. View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. sought to recover over $30 million for the costs of restoring its system following the destruction caused by Hurricane Ike. The Public Utilities Commission allowed Duke to recover roughly half that amount, finding that several of Duke's requests lacked adequate supporting evidence. Duke appealed, raising five propositions of law, all variations on the theme that the Commission's order lacked record support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's finding reducing the amount that Duke could recover because it found substantial problems with the supporting evidence was confirmed by the record; and (2) each of Duke's arguments lacked merit. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the court of appeals erred in (1) reversing a circuit court's judgment and applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to the State Water Control Board's decision to reissue a Virginia pollutant discharge elimination system permit to Virginia Electric and Power Company for its nuclear power station; and (2) reversing the circuit court and affirming the Board's determination that the discharge of heated water from the station into a waste heat treatment facility, classified as a "waste treatment facility" under state and federal regulations, did not require a separate discharge permit. For the reasons stated in Commonwealth v. Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Inc., the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Blue Ridge Envtl. Defense League v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The City of Minden filed an application to construct a subtransmission line with the Nebraska Power Review Board (Board). Southern Public Power District (Southern) objected to the application. The Board denied the application, finding that Minden's proposal was not the most economical and feasible means of supplying electrical services and also that its proposal would unnecessarily duplicate Southern's existing line. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was evidence to support the Board's decision that Southern could more economically and feasibly transmit Minden's necessary power; and (2) the record showed sufficient evidence to support the Board's decision that Minden's line would be unnecessarily duplicative of Southern's line, and that decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable. View "In re Application of Minden" on Justia Law

PSEG challenged orders of the FERC accepting the results of an auction for electric generation capacity conducted by ISO New England. In those orders, FERC approved ISO New England's determination that PSEG's resources in Connecticut could not reduce their capacity supply obligation because doing so would endanger the system's reliability. FERC also held that ISO New England could reduce the per unit price paid to PSEG for that capacity. The court held that because the latter holding was based on tariff provisions that the FERC thought were clear but now conceded were ambiguous, and because in the course of construing those provisions it failed to respond to PSEG's facially legitimate objections, the petition was granted and the orders were remanded for further consideration. View "PSEG Energy Resources & Trade, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

A public power and irrigation district (District) filed an action against a development and other sublessees (collectively, Development) to quiet title to land owned by District and leased by Development. Development filed motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that District's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be grante. The district court sustained the motions and overruled Development's motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting Development's motions to dismiss because (1) the allegations in District's complaint, taken as true, were plausible and thus were sufficient to suggest that District had presented a justiciable controversy, and (2) the motions to dismiss filed in this case provided no notice that Development was asserting the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel and res judicata. Remanded. View "Central Neb. Pub. Power v. Jeffrey Lake Dev." on Justia Law