Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Commissioner of Environmental Protection (Commissioner) and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Dominion) alleging that the operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station owned and operated by Dominion was causing unreasonable pollution of the state’s waters in violation of the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff had standing to bring her action under Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-16. The Court ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether the pending administrative permit renewal proceeding for the nuclear power station’s operation was inadequate to protect the rights recognized by the Act. The administrative proceeding then terminated when the Commissioner issued a renewal permit for Millstone. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff’s action was moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s claims were not moot because a determination that the renewal proceeding was inadequate to protect the rights recognized under the Act could result in the invalidation of the permit under which Millstone is currently operating. View "Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

Great Lakes filed suit against ESML for breach of contract. ESML later filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the district court denied the motion. The case proceeded to trial and judgment was entered for Great Lakes. The court agreed with the district court that the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717u, does not create an express cause of action under which Great Lakes may sue for breach of contract; the NGA also does not create an implied cause of action where there is no indication of legislative intent to create a federal cause of action displacing traditional state law breach of contract causes of action; and assuming that the district court correctly held that federal issues were “necessarily raised” and “actually disputed,” the court concluded that the federal issues in this case are not “substantial,” and the federal courts cannot exercise federal question jurisdiction “without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Great Lakes Gas Transmission v. Essar Steel Minnesota LLC" on Justia Law

Zahn is a residential consumer, decided to purchase electricity from North American Power & Gas (NAPG), an alternative retail electric supplier (ARES) under the Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law , 220 ILCS 5/16-102. NAPG sent Zahn a letter stating that she would receive its “New Customer Rate” of $0.0499 per kilowatt-hour during her first month of service and a “market based variable rate” thereafter. NAPG's “Customer Disclosure Statement” indicated a month-to-month term and that “[o]ther than fixed and/or introductory/promotional rates, all rates shall be calculated in response to market pricing, transportation, profit and other market price factors” and that its prices were “variable” based on “market prices for commodity, transportation, balancing fees, storage charges, [NAPG] fees, profit, [and] line losses ... may be higher or lower than your [local public utility].” Zahn never received the $0.0499 per kilowatt-hour rate. During her first two months of service, NAPG charged her $0.0599 per kilowatt-hour. Thereafter, the rate it charged her was always higher than what she would have paid her local public utility. Zahn filed a class action, alleging Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act violations (815 ILCS 505/1), breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Zahn appealed dismissal of the case to the Seventh Circuit, which certified a question of Illinois law: Does the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) have exclusive jurisdiction over a reparation claim, as defined in precedent in Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison, brought by a residential consumer against an ARES? The Illinois Supreme Court responded that the ICC does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over such claims. The claims may be pursued through the courts. View "Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued EQT Production Company and five related entities alleging that Plaintiffs were underpaid royalties with respect to their ownership of oil and gas interests that EQT was contracted to exploit. A federal district court granted summary judgment to the related entities and partial summary judgment EQT. The court reserved its ruling on the remaining aspects of Plaintiff’s claims against EQT pending the disposition of questions certified to the Supreme Court relevant to the claims’ resolution. The Supreme Court declined to answer the second certified question and answered the first certified question as follows: When the lessee-owner of a working interest in an oil or gas well must tender to the lessor-owner of the oil or gas a royalty not less than one-eighth of the total amount paid to or received by or allowed to the lessee, W. Va. Code 22-6-8(e) requires in addition that the lessee not deduct from that amount any expenses that have been incurred in gathering, transporting, or treating the oil or gas after it has been initially extracted any sums attributable to a loss or beneficial use of volume beyond that initially measured or any other costs that may be characterized as post-production. View "Leggett v. EQT Production Co." on Justia Law

Bangor Hydro-Electric (BHE) and Maine Public Service Company (MPS) were regulated utilities engaged in the transmission and distribution of electric it. The companies merged to become Emera Maine during the pendency of this proceeding. BHE and MPS filed a petition for reorganization, under which Emera Maine’s parent company would increase its ownership interest in Algonquin Power & Utilities Corporation (APUC), a publicly-traded company that is in the electricity generation business. The petition was subject to approval by the Maine Public Utilities Commission because of the relationship that would result between Emera Maine, as a transmission and distribution entity, and APUC, a generator. The Commission approved the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order approving the petition, holding that the Commission misconstrued the governing statute in the Electric Industry Restructuring Act. On remand, the Commission once again approved the petition. On the second appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Commission’s order, holding that the Commission acted outside of its authority when it imposed conditions that would regulate APUC beyond what the Restructuring Act allows. Remanded with instructions to deny the petition. View "Houlton Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

This proceeding consisted of four consolidated appeals. The issue in two of the appeals was whether the alternative-energy infrastructures installed by Petitioners for their businesses met the statutory definition of “qualified alternative fuel vehicle refueling infrastructure” for the purpose of receiving an alternative-fuel infrastructure tax credit. The issue in the other two appeals was whether the alternative-energy infrastructures installed by Petitioners for their residences met the statutory definition of “qualified alternative fuel vehicle home refueling infrastructure” for the purpose of receiving an alternative fuel-infrastructure tax credit. The circuit court affirmed the final orders of the West Virginia Office of Tax Appeals that denied Petitioners’ requests for alternative-fuel infrastructure tax credits under W. Va. Code 11-6d-4(c). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "Martin Distributing Co. v. Matkovich" on Justia Law

Bryan and Doris McCurdy filed an action against Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) seeking a declaration that MVP had no right to enter their property to survey the area as a potential location for a natural gas transmission pipeline MVP planned to construct. The McCurdys further sought both a preliminary and a permanent injunction prohibiting MVP from entering their property. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment to the McCurdys and also granted the McCurdys a preliminary and a permanent injunction prohibiting MVP from entering their property. The circuit court based its decision on its finding that MVP’s pipeline is not being constructed for a public use in West Virginia. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding (1) MVP could enter the MCurdys’ land to survey the land only if the MVP pipeline was for a public use, and (2) the MVP pipeline was not being constructed for a public use in West Virginia. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline v. McCurdy" on Justia Law

Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation (MERC) challenged the Commissioner of Revenue’s 2008 to 2012 valuation of its natural-gas pipeline distribution system. After a trial, the Commissioner determined (1) for each of the years from 2008 to 2011, the market value of MERC’s property was lower than the Commissioner’s valuation; and (2) for 2012, the Commissioner undervalued MERC’s pipeline distribution system. Both MERC and the Commissioner appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the tax court’s explanation of the beta factors it used to calculate MERC’s cost of equity was insufficient; and (2) the tax court evaluated MERC’s evidence of external obsolescence under the wrong legal standard. Remanded. View "Minnesota Energy Resources Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

Respondents, landowner-lessors, filed a putative class action in federal court claiming that Petitioner, the lessee, underpaid gas royalties under the terms of their leases. Under each lease, the lessee must bear all the production costs. The federal court certified to the Ohio Supreme Court a question regarding whether the lessee was permitted to deduct postproduction costs from the lessors’ royalties and, if so, how those costs were to be calculated. Specifically, the federal court asked the Supreme Court whether Ohio follows the “at the well” rule, which permits the deduction of post-production costs, or whether it follows some version of the “marketable product” rule, which limits the deduction of post-production costs under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question and dismissed the cause, holding (1) under Ohio law, an oil and gas lease is a contract that is subject to the traditional rules of contract construction; and (2) therefore, the rights and remedies of the parties in this case are controlled by the specific language of their lease agreement. View "Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their request for a preliminary injunction to prevent the drilling of certain oil and gas wells in the Mancos Shale formation of the San Juan Basin in New Mexico. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy three of the four elements required to obtain a preliminary injunction: (1) Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims; (2) the balance of harms weighed against Plaintiffs; and (3) Plaintiffs failed to show that the public interest favored an injunction. Finding no reversible error in the district court's denial, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Dine Citizens v. Jewell" on Justia Law