Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

At dispute in this case was ownership of coalbed methane (CBM) under a 1938 deed. Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioners seeking a declaration of ownership of all CBM on the property conveyed in the deed and an accounting of royalties from Petitioners. Petitioners filed counterclaims and cross claims also seeking a declaration of ownership and an accounting of royalties. The dispositive issue for determination at trial was whether CBM was considered “gas” for purposes of Petitioners’ “oil and gas” reservation in the deed. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the predecessors of Petitioners did not intend the reservation in the 1938 deed to include an interest in the CBM. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the reservation in the 1938 deed did not include CBM due to the general opinion at the time that CBM was a hazard and a nuisance. View "Poulos v. LBR Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The power companies allege that they were overcharged for electricity during several months in 2000–2001 and sought to recover the overcharges from the federal government based on sales by the federal Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) and Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). The California Power Exchange (Cal-PX) and the California Independent System Operator (Cal-ISO) were responsible for acquiring and distributing electricity between producers and consumers in California and setting prices for the electricity. The power companies argued that a contract existed between all consumers of electricity (including themselves) and all producers of electricity (including the government agencies) in California. The government argued that the contracts were only between the middleman entities—Cal-PX and Cal-ISO—and the consumers and producers individually. The Claims Court dismissed for lack of standing. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The companies lack privity of contract or any other relationship with the government that would confer standing. Under the Tucker Act, the Claims Court has jurisdiction over contract cases in which the government is a party, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1); normally a contract between the plaintiff and the government is required to establish standing. The court noted that the companies may have claims against the parties with whom they are in contractual privity, the electricity exchanges. View "Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

In February 2012, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed Act 13, a "sweeping" law regulating the oil and gas industry, which, inter alia, repealed parts of the existing Oil and Gas Act of 1984 codified in Title 58 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, and created six new chapters therein. The specific provisions of two of which, Chapters 32 and 33, were at issue in this appeal. The questions raised in this appeal involved Sections 3218.1, 3222.1, and 3241 of Chapter 32, and Sections 3305 through 3309 of Chapter 33. This appeal was consolidated from the decision of the Commonwealth Court following the Supreme Court's remand to that court to resolve open issues pursuant to a mandate in "Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," (83 A.3d 901 (2013) (“Robinson II”)). In that case, the Supreme Court struck the entirety of Sections 3215(b), 3215(d), 3303, and 3304 of Act 13 of Feb. 14, 2012, P.L. 87 (“Act 13”), as violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Court enjoined the application and enforcement of Section 3215(c) and (e) and Sections 3305 through 3309, to the extent that they implemented or enforced the provisions of Act 13 which was invalidated. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the order the Commonwealth Court issued on remand, “Robinson III”, holding that Sections 3305 through 3309 were not severable from Sections 3303 and 3304, and the Court also upheld its conclusion that the passage of Act 13 did not violate Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (the “single subject rule”). However, because the Supreme Court concluded that Sections 3218.1, 3222.1(b)(10) and 3222.1(b)(11) contravened Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, due to the Court's determination that they constituted special legislation, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order upholding these sections, and enjoined their further application and enforcement. In that regard, the Supreme Court stayed its mandate with respect to Section 3218.1 for 180 days in order to give the General Assembly sufficient time to enact remedial legislation. Further, because the Court determined that Section 3241 was unconstitutional on its face, it reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and directed this provision be stricken as well, and enjoined from further application and enforcement. View "Robinson Twp, et al v. Public Utility Commission" on Justia Law

Carbon County Resource Council and Northern Plains Resources Council (collectively, Resource Councils) challenged the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation’s (the Board) approval of well stimulation activities at an exploratory gas well in Carbon County. Specifically, Resource Councils claimed that the Board’s permitting process violated their constitutional right to meaningfully participate in government decisions. The district court concluded that Resource Councils’ constitutional challenge was not ripe for judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Resource Councils’ claims are ripe for judicial review; but (2) the Board did not violate Resource Councils’ right to participate in its consideration of the permit at issue in this case. View "Carbon County Res. Council v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a declaratory-judgment action against Defendant, seeking to quiet title to a mineral interest. At issue between the parties was whether the 1989 version of the Dormant Mineral Act or the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 1989 version of the Act applied, and therefore, Defendant, the owner of the severed mineral estate, did not preserve his rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case; and (2) based on Dodd v. Croskey, Defendant preserved his mineral rights. View "Walker v. Shondrick-Nau" on Justia Law

Nile and Katheryn Batman claimed to hold an interest in minerals underlying the properties owned by Wayne Lipperman and the estate of James Albanese (“Albanese”). Albanese and Lipperman filed separate actions seeking to quiet title to their respective properties, claiming that the severed mineral interests held by the Batmans had been abandoned. Albanese and Lipperman also sought to cancel any oil and gas leases executed in relation to the Batmans’ interests in their properties. The trial court granted summary judgment against Albanese and Lipperman. The court of appeals affirmed in both cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (ODMA) applies in these cases; and (2) because neither Albanese nor Lipperman complied with the notice and affidavit requirements in the ODMA, the mineral interests are preserved in favor of their holder, the Batmans. View "Albanese v. Batman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants seeking to quiet title to oil and gas rights under his surface lands and requesting a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and compensation for conversion. The federal district court concluded that its ruling on the parties’ motions for summary judgment required a clarification of two areas of Ohio law and certified these questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the 2006 version of the Dormant Mineral Act, rather than the 1989 version of the Act, applies to all claims asserted after June 30, 2006 alleging that the rights to minerals vested in the surface land holder prior to the 2006 amendments as a result of abandonment; and (2) a payment of a delay rental during the primary of an oil and gas lease is neither a title transaction nor a savings event under the Act. View "Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of FERC's determination that various energy companies committed tariff violations in California during the summer of 2000. As part of a deregulation program, California created two nonprofit entities: the California Power Exchange Corporation (“CalPX”) and the California Independent System Operator Corporation (“Cal-ISO”). Both entities were subject to FERC jurisdiction, with CalPX operating pursuant to a FERC-approved tariff and wholesale rate schedule. The Cal-ISO tariff comprehensively regulated California’s power markets, and incorporated the Market Monitoring and Information Protocol (“MMIP”), which set forth rules for identifying and protecting against abuses of market power. The court concluded that FERC’s determination that Shell, MPS, and Illinova (“sellers”) violated the Cal-ISO tariff and MMIP during the Summer Period was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In this case, FERC reasonably interpreted the Cal-ISO tariff and the MMIP according to the plain text of those documents. Therefore, the court rejected the sellers’ claims that the tariff and MMIP did not proscribe the practices identified by the agency. Furthermore, FERC’s interpretation of the Cal-ISO tariff and the MMIP finds support not only in text, but in policy as well. The court concluded that FERC reasonably interpreted the Cal-ISO tariff and the MMIP to prohibit the practices of False Export, False Load Scheduling and Anomalous Bidding. In addition, the agency reasonably concluded that the tariff and MMIP sufficed to put sellers on notice that such practices were not permitted. The court also concluded that FERC reasonably concluded that the sellers engaged during the Summer Period in the practices deemed tariff violations by the orders on review. Finally, the court concluded that FERC’s Summer Period determinations regarding APX and BP were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review in part and dismissed in part. View "MPS Merchant Serv. v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed an order of the Ohio Power Siting Board granting a certificate to Buckeye Wind, LLC to construct a wind farm in Champaign County. Buckeye subsequently filed an application to amend the certificate in part so that the wind farm could share portions of its facilities with another authorized wind farm. After a hearing, the Board approved Buckeye’s amendment. Champaign County and associated townships (collectively, the County) appealed, contending that the Board unlawfully approved the requested amendment without holding a hearing on all of the proposed changes in the amendment application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the County forfeited its right to challenge the scope of the hearing on appeal; and (2) the Board acted reasonably and lawfully in limiting the scope of the hearing. View "In re Application of Buckeye Wind, LLC" on Justia Law

Sundance Energy Oklahoma, LLC, brought suit against Dan D. Drilling Corporation for damages resulting from the total loss of an oil and gas well. A jury found in favor of Sundance Energy, and the district court denied Dan D.'s motion for a new trial. On appeal, Dan D. argued the district court erred in: (1) giving one jury instruction and omitting another; (2) admitting certain evidence; and (3) awarding Sundance attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Sundance Energy Oklahoma v. Dan D Drilling Corp." on Justia Law