Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the Superior Court properly applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed to conclude that an oil and gas lease between Appellee, Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P. and Appellants, Leo and Sandra Shedden, covered the oil and gas rights to 100% of the property identified in the lease, notwithstanding the fact that, unbeknownst to them, Appellants owned only a one-half interest in the oil and gas rights to the property at the time the lease was executed, and, consequently, received a bonus payment only for the oil and gas rights they actually owned. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Superior Court properly affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Anadarko based on estoppel by deed. View "Shedden v. Anadarko E&P Co." on Justia Law

Capital Electric Cooperative, Inc. appealed a judgment affirming a Public Service Commission order granting Montana-Dakota Utilities Company ("MDU") a certificate of public convenience and necessity to extend its electric service in Burleigh County. Because the Commission's order was in accordance with the law, its findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and sufficiently addressed the evidence presented, and those findings supported the conclusions of law, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Capital Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. N.D. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

In this opinion the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed two orders issued by the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) that affected the revenues of local telephone networks including rural telephone companies that made up the New Mexico Exchange Carrier Group. The first was an annual order that had to be issued by the PRC on or before October 1 each year that adopted a Surcharge Rate for the succeeding year. On September 17, 2014, the PRC issued the Surcharge Rate Order, which adopted a 3% Surcharge Rate for calendar year 2015. The second was a Rule Order that amended the 2005 rules which set forth the procedures for administering and implementing the Fund. The Rule Order was issued on November 26, 2014; the rule changes became effective on January 1, 2015. After review of both orders, the Supreme Court reversed, persuaded that the both Orders were arbitrary, not supported by substantial evidence, and clear violations of its own rules. The Court reversed the PRC and remanded for further proceedings. View "N.M. Exch. Carrier Grp. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellants, property owners and holders of oil and gas leases, filed a class-action complaint against Appellee, the circuit court clerk, alleging that Appellee and two of her deputies falsely and fraudulently notarized oil and gas leases. On remand and following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, concluding that Appellants had failed to show any damages as a result of Appellee’s purportedly unlawful act in recording the leases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the grant of summary judgment was not in error, as none of the evidence relied upon by Appellants created a factual question as to whether they sustained damages as a result of the actions alleged in the complaint. View "Lipsey v. Cox" on Justia Law

Pennaco Energy Inc. acquired mineral leases beneath a surface estate owned by Brett Sorenson, Trustee of the Brett L. Sorenson Trust. A surface damage and use agreement between the parties granted Pennaco access to and use of the land for exploration and production of minerals, and, in return, required Pennaco to pay for the damage to and use of the surface estate, and to reclaim the land once operations ended. When Pennaco refused to perform its obligations under the contract, Soreson brought this lawsuit. The jury rendered a verdict finding that Sorenson suffered more than $1 million in damages. The district court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and also awarded Sorenson costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) ruling that Pennaco remained liable under the surface damage and use agreement after assignment, and (2) using a 2.5 multiplier to enhance the lodestar amount in awarding attorney fees. View "Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson" on Justia Law

Appellants (collectively, the Teisingers) claimed a 3/5ths royalty interest in oil, gas, and minerals located on several sections of land in Richland County. The Teisingers’ assert that their 3/5ths royalty interest was reserved in a 1953 warranty deed. The district court denied the Teisingers’ claim and quieted title to the royalty interest in favor of Appellees (collectively, the Sundheims). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) improperly admitted testimony from an English professor interpreting the language of the warranty deed’s royalty interest reservation; (2) erred by resolving the ambiguity in the warranty deed in favor of the Sundheims; and (3) erred in applying the doctrine of laches to bar the Teisingers’ claim to the 3/5ths royalty interest. Remanded for entry of judgment quieting title to the 3/5ths royalty interest reserved in the warranty deed in favor of the Teisingers. View "Wicklund v. Sundheim" on Justia Law

Section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824d(a), mandates that all rates and charges demanded, or received by any public utility for the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission shall be just and reasonable. Xcel petitioned for review of three of the Commission's orders denying a retroactive refund for unlawful rates. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that, to the extent the Commission denied Xcel relief because it lacks authority to order refunds from Tri-County, a non-jurisdictional entity, this was not responsive to Xcel’s request. On the merits, the court concluded that the Commission’s reliance on section 2.4(a) of its regulations and related cases to deny Xcel retroactive relief is misplaced. Because the Commission’s reliance on section 2.4(a) of its regulations as applied in its precedent is inapposite, and its position that its section 205 error of law is irremediable beyond prospective relief under section 206 appears irreconcilable with the authority Congress granted it in section 309 to remedy its errors, the court granted the petition in part and remanded the case to the Commission for appropriate action. View "Xcel Energy Servs. Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Sierra Club brought a citizen suit seeking civil penalties against Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company “(OG&E)” for alleged violations of the Clean Air Act. Sierra Club claimed that in March and April 2008, OG&E, the owner and operator of a coal-fired power plant in Muskogee, modified a boiler at the plant without first obtaining an emission-regulating permit as required under the Act. Because Sierra Club filed its action more than five years after construction began on the plant, the district court dismissed its claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations grounds. The court also dismissed Sierra Club’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because these remedies were predicated on the unavailable claim for civil penalties. Finding no error in the district court's conclusions, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Sierra Club v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

Federal law required electric utilities to purchase power generated by cogeneration facilities that met certain standards. A facility must be certified that it meets the standards. It may self-certify, by filing a form describing the project and asserting that it believes it meets the standards, or it may request a formal determination that it meets the standards. The Regulatory Commission of Alaska implemented this certification scheme on the state level, but the determination whether a facility qualifies fell within exclusive federal jurisdiction. The main issue this case presented for the Alaska Supreme Court's review was whether a self-certification constituted a federal determination that a facility meets the standards and whether the Commission must defer to this self-certification. The Court concluded that a self-certification did not constitute a federal determination and that the Commission’s broad discretion to implement the federal scheme meant it had the power to require a developer to formally certify its projects. View "Alpine Energy, LLC v. Matanuska Electric Association" on Justia Law

Until 1997, Illinois residents could only purchase power from the local public utility, whose rates were regulated by the Commerce Commission (ICC). The 1997 Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law allows residents to buy electricity from their local public utility, another utility, or an Alternative Retail Electric Supplier (ARES). The ICC was not given rate-making authority over ARESs, but was given certain oversight responsibilities, 220 ILCS 5/16-115. The Law did not explicitly provide a mechanism for recovering damages from an ARES related to the rates. In 2012, Zahn began purchasing electricity from NAPG, after receiving an offer of a “New Customer Rate” of $.0499 per kilowatt hour in her first month of service, followed by a “market-based variable rate.” Zahn never received NAPG’s “New Customer Rate.” NAPG charged her $.0599 per kilowatt hour for the first two months, followed by a rate higher than Zahn’s local public utility charged. Zahn filed a class-action complaint, claiming violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit certified, to the Illinois Supreme Court, the question of whether the ICC has exclusive jurisdiction to hear Zahn’s claims, noting that Illinois appellate courts are in conflict. View "Zahn v. N. Am. Power & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law