Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs allege that, beginning in 2008, they have had a persistent film of dust over their properties, coming from Cane Run power plant, which is owned and operated by LGE. Louisville’s Air Pollution Control District, the agency charged with enforcing environmental regulations in Jefferson County, investigated and issued several Notices of Violation concerning particulate emissions and odors, finding finding that LGE allowed fly ash particulate emissions to enter the air and be carried beyond its property line. The NOVs were resolved by an administrative proceeding before Louisville’s Air Pollution Control Board, which resulted in an Agreed Board Order, requiring LGE to implement and comply, with a “Plant-Wide Odor, Fugitive Dust, and Maintenance Emissions Control Plan.” Plaintiffs provided a Notice of Intent to Sue, alleging violations of the Clean Air Act and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and state-law claims of nuisance, trespass, negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. The district court dismissed all federal law claims except the claim that Cane Run was operating without a valid Clean Air Act permit and rejected defendants’ argument that the Clean Air Act preempted plaintiffs’ state common law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, View "Little v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) required that owners of underground storage tanks demonstrate their ability to pay cleanup costs and compensate third parties for bodily injury and property damage arising out of releases of petroleum products from their tanks. New Hampshire’s Oil Discharge and Disposal Cleanup Fund (ODD Fund) was an EPA-approved program that complied with the federal requirement. In 2003, the State sued several gasoline suppliers, refiners, and chemical manufacturers seeking damages for groundwater contamination allegedly caused by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). In 2012, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment and equitable relief against the State. Each petitioner was a “distributor” of oil under RSA chapter 146-D and paid fees into the ODD Fund. They alleged that “[t]o date, the costs of MTBE remediation in the State of New Hampshire has been paid for primarily through” the ODD Fund, and that that fund was financed, in part, through fees that they paid. Petitioners sought a declaration that those fees “are unconstitutional as the [State] has recovered and/or will recover funds from the MTBE Lawsuit for the cost of MTBE remediation,” and that those fees should be reimbursed to them from: (1) “the settlement proceeds the [State] has received and will receive through the MTBE Litigation”; (2) “any future recovery the [State] receives through the MTBE Litigation”; and (3) “[a]dditionally, or in the alternative, . . . from the funds recovered, and/or to be recovered in the future in the MTBE Litigation, . . . under principles of equitable subrogation and/or unjust enrichment.” On appeal, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred in ruling that they lacked standing to seek reimbursement of their fees from the settlement funds. They also argued that the trial court erred in ruling that their equitable claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Find View "Aranosian Oil Co., Inc. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Valley Authority, a federal agency, operates power plants that provide electricity to nine million Americans in the Southeastern United States, 16 U.S.C. 831n-4(h). Like private power companies, TVA must comply with the Clean Air Act. In 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency told TVA that it needed to reduce emissions from some of the coal-fired units at its plants, including the Drakesboro, Kentucky, Paradise Fossil Plant. TVA considered several options, including maintaining coal-fired generation by retrofitting the Paradise units with new pollution controls and switching the fuel source from coal to natural gas. After more than a year of environmental study, TVA decided to switch from coal to natural-gas generation and concluded that the conversion would be better for the environment. TVA issued a “finding of no significant impact” on the environment stemming from the newly configured project. The district court denied opponents a preliminary injunction, and granted TVA judgment on the administrative record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that TVA acted arbitrarily in failing to follow the particulars of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act for making such decisions, and in failing to consider the project’s environmental effects in an impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act. View "Ky. Coal Ass'n, Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth." on Justia Law

This case arose from a petition filed by vendors of mineral rights, plaintiff John C. McCarthy, individually and as trustee of the Kathleen Balden Trust, and plaintiff Marjorie Moss. Plaintiffs named as defendant Evolution Petroleum Corporation, which was formerly known as Natural Gas Systems, Inc. Plaintiffs also named as a defendant NGS Sub. Corp. (“NGS”). Plaintiffs sought damages and rescission of their sale of royalty interests in mineral leases within the Delhi Field Unit, located in Richland Parish. Plaintiffs alleged fraud and error as grounds for rescission. The defendants filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action, which the district court granted, and the case was dismissed. In the first of two appeals in this case, the appellate court affirmed the exception of no cause of action, but reversed the dismissal with instructions to the district court on remand to allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their petition to state a cause of action. The cause of action that plaintiffs came up with was, according to the appellate court, "novel and untested," and the Supreme Court granted review to determine whether that cause of action comported with Louisiana mineral law. The purported cause of action imposed a duty on a mineral lessee purchasing the lessor’s mineral royalty rights to disclose to the lessor that the lessee has already negotiated the resale of the mineral rights to a third party for a significantly higher price. Finding the lessee’s duties upon which the appellate court premised its cause of action to be expressly excluded in the Mineral Code, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, and reinstated the district court’s decision, which ruled plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action and dismissed this case with prejudice. View "McCarthy v. Evolution Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

Trona is a sodium carbonate compound that is processed into soda ash or baking soda. Because oil and gas development posed a risk to the extraction of trona and trona worker safety, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the leasing of federal public land for mineral development, indefinitely suspended all oil and gas leases in the mechanically mineable trona area (MMTA) of Wyoming. The area includes 26 pre-existing oil and gas leases owned by Barlow. Barlow filed suit, alleging that the BLM’s suspension of oil and gas leases constituted a taking of Barlow’s interests without just compensation and constituted a breach of both the express provisions of the leases and their implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of the contract claims on the merits and of the takings claim as unripe. BLM has not repudiated the contracts and Barlow did not establish that seeking a permit to drill would be futile. View "Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Randy Braswell sued Ergon Oil Purchasing, Inc. in Amite County over some oil contracts. Two days later, Ergon brought a declaratory judgment action against Braswell in Rankin County over those same contracts. Ergon removed the Amite County action to federal court, where it remained for eighteen months before it was remanded. In the meantime, Ergon obtained summary judgment against Braswell in Rankin County. Braswell appealed, arguing that the Rankin County judge erred when he granted summary judgment in Ergon's favor and when he refused to transfer the action to Amite County. The Supreme Court agreed with Braswell that the action should have been transferred to Amite County, and reversed the judgment of the Rankin County circuit judge based on the doctrine of priority jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the circuit court. View "Braswell v. Ergon Oil Purchasing, Inc." on Justia Law

The Swecker farm in Iowa has a wind generator and is a qualifying power production facility certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The Sweckers sell surplus electric energy to Midland Power Cooperative at a rate established by the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB), implementing FERC rules and regulations, 16 U.S.C. 824a-3(f). For many years, the Sweckers and Midland have litigated rate disputes. The district court dismissed their current suit against Midland and its primary supplier, Central Iowa Power Cooperative (CIPCO), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Midland “to purchase available energy from plaintiffs . . . at Midland’s full avoided cost, rather than CIPCO’s avoided cost.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. FERC’s interpretation is controlling and forecloses the contrary interpretation of 18 C.F.R. 292.303(d) urged by the Sweckers. View "Swecker v. Midland Power Coop." on Justia Law

The Public Regulation Commission (PRC) granted Southwestern Public Service Company’s (SPS) application to: (1) include a prepaid pension asset in its rate base in order for SPS to earn a return on this asset; and (2) obtain a renewable energy cost rider to recover approximately $22 million of renewable energy procurement costs from those customers who did not have a legislatively imposed limit on their renewable energy costs (non-capped customers). The Attorney General appealed the PRC’s final order granting SPS’s application, arguing that the approved rates were unjust and unreasonable because the inclusion of the entire prepaid asset in the rate base was not supported by substantial evidence, and the PRC acted contrary to law in allowing SPS to recover the aforementioned renewable energy costs from non-capped customers. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the PRC because: (1) SPS was entitled to earn a reasonable rate of return on the investor-funded prepaid pension asset; and (2) SPS could recover its renewable energy costs in excess of the large customer cap from non-capped customers because such a recovery mechanism was the only viable method of cost recovery that was consistent with the purposes of the Renewable Energy Act. View "N.M. Att'y. Gen. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. was an oil and gas exploration, production, and brokerage company. Border Resources, LLC provided landman services to clients, including acquiring leases, performing due diligence, and providing title curative work. This case involved Border's claim against Irish Oil for breach of contract for landman services Border provided to Irish Oil and Irish Oil's counterclaim against Border for breach of fiduciary duty in performing those services. Irish Oil appealed the judgment entered after a bench trial, that awarded Border damages and prejudgment interest and dismissed Irish Oil's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding Border did not breach its fiduciary duty while providing professional landman services to Irish Oil and in finding leases Border acquired for Irish Oil were sold for $1,100 per net mineral acre. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Irish Oil's motion to amend its counterclaim to add individual landmen as counterclaim defendants. View "Border Resources, LLC v. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc." on Justia Law

Phillips owns an underground petroleum pipeline, built in 1930. A 1963 report stated that 100 barrels of leaded gasoline had leaked beneath West Alton, Missouri, and not been recovered. The leak was repaired. In 2002 a West Alton resident noticed a petroleum odor in his home. He contacted Phillips, which investigated. West Alton has no municipal water. Testing on the owner’s well disclosed benzene, a gasoline additive and carcinogen, at three times allowable limits. Phillips purchased the property, and two nearby homes and, with the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR), established a remediation plan. In 2006 Phillips demolished the homes, removed 4000 cubic yards of soil, and set up wells to monitor for chemicals of concern (COCs). Phillips volunteered to provide precautionary bottled water to 50 residents near the site. Sampling of other wells had not shown COCs above allowable limits. MDNR requested that Phillips test the wells of each family receiving bottled water before ending its water supply program. Phillips chose instead to continue distributing bottled water. Most of the recipients are within 0.25 miles of the contamination site. In 2011 nearby landowners sued, alleging nuisance, on the theory that possible pockets of contamination still exist. The Eighth Circuit reversed class certification, noting the absence of evidence showing class members were commonly affected by contamination, View "Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co." on Justia Law