Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was the owner of gas, oil, and other minerals situated within the Ozark Highlands Unit (OHU). SEECO, Inc. applied to create a drilling unit in the OHU and to integrate all unleased and uncommitted mineral interests within the unit. The Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission established the unit and integrated all unleased and uncommitted mineral interests within the unit with the exception of Appellant’s unleaded mineral interests. At a hearing before the Commission to hear evidence related to SEECO’s request to integrate Appellant’s unleaded mineral interests into the drilling unit, Appellant asserted that the Commission’s forced-integration procedures amounted to a taking of his property. The Commission subsequently integrated Appellant’s unleaded mineral interests into the drilling unit. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the forced integration procedures do not amount to an unconstitutional taking; and (2) the Commission’s order did not deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to a jury trial to determine just compensation for his property. View "Gawenis v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm'n" on Justia Law

Since 2001, Cape Wind Associates, LLC has attempted to acquire the necessary permits and approvals for a wind power generation facility in Nantucket Sound. Under a settlement agreement, NSTAR Electric Company agreed to purchase one-quarter of Cape Wind’s output. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) approved the contract. Plaintiffs - the Town of Barnstable, a non-profit advocacy group, and businesses and individuals residing near the proposed facility - filed this action in federal district court seeing an injunction and a declaratory judgment against officials of the DPU, the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources, Cape Wind, and NSTAR. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that the Eleventh Amendment barred the assertion of federal court jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of dismissal and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims fell outside the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment; and (2) the case was not moot or unripe. View "Town of Barnstable v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

The Districts and the Trust petitioned for review of FERC's order determining that the La Grange Hydroelectric Project fell within the mandatory licensing provisions of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 817(1). Because the Trust has failed to establish standing either for itself or on behalf of its members, the court dismissed its petition for lack of jurisdiction. As to the merits of the Districts' arguments, the court concluded that FERC’s evidence of actual use in the past, together with current use of the Tuolumne River by California DFG crews, constitutes substantial evidence supporting FERC’s finding that La Grange is located on a navigable water of the United States; FERC properly relied on the results of its backwater analysis to conclude that the La Grange reservoir extends onto federal lands; and the Districts' challenges to FERC's finding that the La Grange Project is subject to FERC's mandatory licensing jurisdiction based on Congress's "authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States" are without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition, concluding that FERC's jurisdictional determinations were supported by substantial evidence and reached by reasoned decisionmaking. View "Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a crew member aboard a supply vessel that was mud-roped to the Deepwater Horizon and was off-loading drilling mud on the night of the 2010 blowout, filed suit claiming that he sustained physical injuries when the explosion rocked the vessel and threw him against a bulkhead. On appeal, BP challenged the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff where the district court, over BP's objection, enforced a putative settlement agreement against BP in plaintiff's favor. The court held that the parties formed a binding settlement agreement; the district court correctly excused plaintiff’s failure to sign the release document where BP's refusal to send plaintiff the release excused that failure; but the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether plaintiff fraudulently induced BP into entering the settlement agreement. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order in part, but vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Young v. BP" on Justia Law

Respondent owned the mineral rights to a certain parcel of land. When the Division of Highways (DOH) began construction of a highway through the land owned by the surface owner, the DOH excavated approximately 237,187 tons of limestone from the property. Respondent filed a mandamus action against DOH seeking to force DOH to institute a condemnation proceeding for the limestone removed from her mineral reservation in the land. The DOH filed this condemnation action, and the condemnation commission returned a verdict favorable to DOH. Respondent subsequently demanded a jury trial. Based on the jury’s findings, the trial court awarded Respondent $941,304. DOH appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "W. Va. Dep’t of Transp. v. Newton" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, BP appealed three settlement awards, related to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, that it paid to nonprofits through its Court-Supervised Settlement Program. On appeal, BP argued that the Claims Administrator improperly interpreted the Settlement Agreement. The awards were based on the Claims Administrator’s determination that nonprofits may count donations and grants as “revenue” under the terms of the Agreement (the Nonprofit-Revenue Interpretation). As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it has jurisdiction over this appeal under the collateral order doctrine and that BP's appeals were timely. On the merits, the court concluded that BP failed to show that the Nonprofit-Revenue Interpretation violates the plain language of the Agreement. The court held that the Nonprofit-Revenue Interpretation does not alter the class definition in violation of Rule 23 or Article III. Finally, the court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of review of the individual awards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

BP and the Economic Property Damages Class entered into a Settlement Agreement in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. At issue is the district court's order approving the Final Rules Governing Discretionary Court Review of Appeal Determinations for claims processed through the Settlement Program. After determining that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, the court concluded that the parties preserved their right to appeal from the district court under the settlement agreement. The court followed its sister circuits' decisions in similar cases involving consent decrees to hold that, where a settlement agreement does not resolve claims itself but instead establishes a mechanism pursuant to which the district court will resolve claims, parties must expressly waive what is otherwise a right to appeal from claim determination decisions by a district court. In this case, the parties have preserved their right to appeal. Finally, the court concluded that the Final Rules violate the right for parties to appeal claim determinations to this court where the district court failed to provide for the docketing of its orders regarding requests for review. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Lake Eugenie Land v. BP" on Justia Law

Linda Golden owned a fifty percent mineral interest that was within a “spacing unit” in which Luff Exploration Company desired to drill for oil. Golden declined Luff’s offer to lease her mineral interest or participate with Luff in the cost of the drilling. After Luff decided to proceed with drilling, it filed a petition with the South Dakota Board of Minerals and Environment (Board) seeking to “compulsory pool” the mineral interests in the spacing unit and seeking “risk compensation” from Golden. The Board issued a compulsory pooling order and found that Golden should pay 100 percent risk compensation. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board failed to comply with the plain language of S.D. Codified Laws 45-9-32 by granting a pooling order that contained no provision specifying a time and manner for Golden to elect to participate in the well by paying her proportionate share of the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the well. View "In re Petition of Luff Exploration Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff's applications to SCE to interconnect solar generating systems to the SCE electricity grid to generate electricity for use on plaintiff's properties and to sell to SCE. At issue is the potential conflict between Public Utilities Code section 1759,2 which limits jurisdiction to review an order of the PUC to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and section 2106, which grants jurisdiction to the superior court to hear actions for damages against a public utility that violates California law. The court concluded that the trial court correctly held that the PUC had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims under its Supreme Court’s holding in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court because adjudication of plaintiff’s claims would “‘hinder or frustrate the commission’s declared supervisory and regulatory policies’” with respect to interconnection of solar generating facilities under Rule 21, Rule 16 and the California Renewable Energy Small Tariff (CREST) and Net Energy Metering (NEM) programs. To the extent plaintiff has viable damage claims following the PUC’s adjudication of his administrative complaints currently pending before the PUC, those claims will only become ripe for filing in the trial court once the PUC reaches a final decision. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Davis v. Southern Cal. Edison" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three Mexican states, filed suit against BP and others for damages incurred as a result of the 2010 oil spill from the Deepwater Horizon drilling unit off the Louisiana coast. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants because plaintiffs did not hold a sufficient "proprietary interest" in the allegedly damaged property. The court affirmed, concluding that the Robins Dry Dock doctrine bars recovery in this case where plaintiffs , while they have some authority to use or exploit some of the land and other resources at issue here, do not have a proprietary interest that rises to the requisite level for the court to permit the recovery of economic damages under its case law. View "State of Veracruz v. BP" on Justia Law