Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders issued in 2013 and 2014 approved the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) creation of a new wholesale electric power “capacity zone” comprising areas of Southeastern New York, including the lower Hudson Valley. The orders followed NYISO’s identification of areas in which customers received power from suppliers located on the other side of a “transmission constraint” in the electrical grid. Because of the way New York’s capacity markets work, NYISO concluded that financial incentives for capacity resources in the transmission‐constrained area that became the Valley Zone were inadequate, jeopardizing the reliability of the grid. FERC’s approval of the Zone, with a new “demand curve” to set capacity prices, were designed to address the reliability problem by providing more accurate price signals to in‐zone resources, but were expected to result in higher prices to customers. Utilities, the state, and the New York Public Service Commission alleged that FERC failed adequately to justify the expected higher prices, particularly without a “phase‐in” of the new zone and its demand curve, in violation of FERC’s statutory mandate to ensure that rates are “just and reasonable,” 16 U.S.C. 824d(a). The Second Circuit rejected the challenge. FERC adequately justified its decisions. View "Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, various landowners, entered into separate oil and gas leases with Victory Energy Corporation whereby Plaintiffs leased drilling rights to Victory. Victory shared its leasehold interests with Megaenergy, Inc. Inflection Energy, LLC subsequently assumed from Megaenergy the operational rights and responsibilities under most of the leases. Each of the leases contained a force majeure clause, which provided that nonperformance may be excused under certain circumstances, and a habendum clause, which established the primary and definite period during which the energy companies could exercise the drilling rights granted by the leases. After the primary term of the leases had expired with no operations having been conducted upon the leaseholds, Plaintiffs commenced this declaratory judgment action against Inflection, Victory, and Megaenergy, seeking a declaration that the leases had expired by their own terms. The energy companies counterclaimed for a declaration that each lease was extended by operation of the force majeure clause, arguing that New York’s moratorium on the use of horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing triggered the force majeure clause. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals certain questions. The Court of Appeals answered that the force majeure clause did not modify the habendum clause. Therefore, the leases terminated at the conclusion of their primary terms. View "Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

In the early 1980s, Georgia Power Company sold a number of its used electrical transformers to Ward Transformer Company (Ward). Because the electrical transformers contained toxic compounds that have been banned since 1979, Ward repaired and rebuilt the transformers for resale to meet third-party customers’ specifications. In the process, one of Ward’s facilities in Raleigh, North Carolina (the Ward Site) became contaminated. In the 2000s, the EPA initiated a costly removal action at the Ward Site. Consolidated Coal Company and PCS Phosphate Company, Inc. each paid more than $17 million in cleanup costs related to the Ward Site. In 2008 and 2009, they filed complaints under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act against Georgia Power alleging that, as supplier of some of the transformers to Ward, Georgia Power should be liable for a contribution to those costs. The district court granted summary judgment for Georgia Power. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the circumstances of the transformer sales did not indicate Georgia Power’s intent to dispose of the toxic compounds and therefore did not support arranger liability. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Georgia Power Co." on Justia Law

The parties in this case owned interests in certain oil and gas leases in Sublette County, Wyoming. In the underlying litigation, the district court granted a monetary judgment against Defendants for amounts due to Plaintiffs. Defendants paid the monetary judgment. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to enforce judgment, claiming that Defendants were not properly accounting to them as required by the prior declaratory judgment and a net profits contract (NPC). After the district court issued its judgment, Defendants appealed the court’s decisions on the merits and its order requiring Defendants to pay attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed as revised, holding that the district court (1) properly assumed jurisdiction over the issues presented; (2) correctly interpreted its prior judgment and Defendants’ accounting responsibilities under the NPC; and (3) properly granted Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees with one minor exception. View "Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman" on Justia Law

A blowout of oil, natural gas, and mud occurred in 2010 during deepwater drilling operations at the Macondo well, located on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. At the time of the blowout, the Deepwater Horizon, a drilling rig chartered by BP, plc. from Transocean Ltd., was attached to the Macondo well. Eleven men died from the resulting explosions and fires on the Deepwater Horizon. Defendants Robert Kaluza and Donald Vidrine were “well site leaders,” the highest ranking BP employees working on the rig. Defendants were indicted by a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Louisiana on 23 counts, including 11 counts of seaman’s manslaughter. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to charge an offense because neither defendant fell within the meaning of the criminal statute. The government appealed this determination. Because the Fifth Circuit agreed that neither defendant fell within the meaning of the phrase “[e]very . . . other person employed on any . . . vessel,” the Court affirmed. View "United States v. Kaluza" on Justia Law

In 1999-2000, AmerGen purchased three nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission transferred the operating licenses, making AmerGen obligated to decommission the plants, and extended the licensing to 2029, 2034, and 2026. Decommissioning may take 60 years. Prior owners had established qualified and nonqualified trust funds to pay for decommissioning. Contributions to a qualified fund (I.R.C. 468A), subject to limitations, are currently deductible. Investment incomes are taxed at a fixed rate. A nonqualified fund does not have those tax advantages. AmerGen's accountants advised that it was unlikely that the IRS would allow AmerGen to include the assumed decommissioning liability in the basis of the assets acquired on the date of the purchase and that the entire cash consideration would be allocated to the basis of transferred nonqualified funds, rather than to the basis of the plants. AmerGen sought IRS private letter rulings and required the sellers to make additional contributions to the trusts. They transferred $393 million in qualified funds and $581 million in nonqualified funds. On its 2001-2003 tax returns, AmerGen claimed that, in addition to the $93 million purchase price, it assumed decommissioning liabilities of $2.15 billion that should be included in the basis of the plants at the time of purchase. With that adjustment and corresponding depreciation and amortization deductions and reduced capital gains, AmerGen attempted to reduce its taxable income by $110 million per year. The IRS rejected the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that the economic performance requirement of 26 U.S.C. 461(h) applies to AmerGen as an accrual basis taxpayer so that it may not include the liabilities in basis. AmerGen did not economically perform decommissioning in the relevant tax years. View "Amergen Energy Co, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) extends roughly 200 miles into the ocean to the limit of U.S. international-law jurisdiction. Billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas lie beneath the OCS. Concerns about ecological vulnerability and potential harm to coastal tourism led to moratoriums on OCS drilling from 1982 until they were partially lifted in 2009. In 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster renewed debate about the safety of offshore drilling, but energy companies remain interested in offshore drilling. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) created a framework for exploration and extraction of OCS oil and gas deposits. It requires the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a program every five years with a schedule of proposed leases for OCS resource exploration and development; the program must balance competing economic, social, and environmental values, 43 U.S.C. 1344. CSE challenged the latest leasing program as failing to comply with Section 18(a), which governs the balancing of competing economic, social, and environmental values; quantifying and assessing environmental and ecological impact; and ensuring equitable distribution of benefits and costs between OCS regions and stakeholders. CSE claimed that the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement violated National Environmental Policy Act procedural requirements by using a biased analytic methodology and providing inadequate opportunities for public comment. The D.C. Circuit denied CSE’s petition. While CSE had associational standing to petition for review, its NEPA claims are unripe; two other challenges were forfeited and remaining challenges failed on their merits. View "Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) led the effort to clean up nuclear waste at the Hanford Nuclear Site in Washington state. URS Energy & Construction, Inc. (“URS Energy”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of URS Corporation, worked as a subcontractor on the project. An employee of URS Energy brought this action alleging violations of the Energy Reorganization Act (“ERA”) whistleblower protection provision concerning the cleanup efforts. The district court dismissed the DOE from the suit and granted summary judgment in favor of URS Corp. and URS Energy. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the DOE and URS Corp. were correctly dismissed for lack of administrative exhaustion, but administrative exhaustion was sufficient as to URS Energy; and (2) the employee introduced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue as to whether his whistleblowing activity was a contributing factor in the adverse employment action URS Energy took against him, and there were other existing genuine issues of fact that precluded summary judgment to URS Energy. Remanded. View "Tamosaitis v. URS Inc." on Justia Law

PRM Partners was a leaseholder of lands which covered an oil well. PRM Partners designated Petroleum Resource Managements, Corp. (PRM) as the operator of the well. PRM contracted with Hot Oil Services, Inc. to perform the day-to-day operations of the well. In 2009, Hot Oil requested that Basic Energy Services, LP perform workover operations on the well. While Basic Energy was performing the workover operations, a fire erupted, which damaged various pieces of equipment, including Basic Energy’s workover rig. Basic Energy sued PRM Partners and PRM to recover the damage to its equipment. The district court granted summary judgment for PRM Partners and PRM, concluding that Hot Oil was an independent contractor and that neither PRM nor PRM Partners could be held liable for the acts of an independent contractor. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded on the issue of whether PRM breached the contract and reversed and remanded on the claim that PRM acted negligently in hiring Hot Oil, holding that the district court erred in entering summary judgment on these issues, as PRM failed to carry the initial burden of a summary judgment movant; and (2) ordered that PRM Partners be dismissed from the appeal. View "Basic Energy Servs., LP v. Petroleum Res. Mgmt., Corp." on Justia Law

In these consolidated petitions, Carriers challenged FERC's authority to approve a cost pooling agreement among the Carriers that allocates most fixed costs on the basis of each Carrier's share of combined interstate and intrastate utilization of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). The court found that the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), 49 U.S.C. App. 13(6)(b), permits incidental regulation of intrastate commerce pursuant to approval of a pooling agreement under section 5(1); that any regulation of intrastate commerce challenged here was incident to the Pooling Agreement that FERC found just and reasonable for interstate commerce; and that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the Pooling Agreement or make findings unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, FERC did not have statutory authority to approve the settlement; did not improperly regulate intrastate commerce; and did comply with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., requirements in reaching the order challenged in this case. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions. View "Tesoro Alaska Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law