Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

PJM is a regional transmission organization that combines multiple utility power grids into a single transmission system to “reduce technical inefficiencies caused when different utilities operate different portions of the grid independently.” PJM coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity in 13 mid-Atlantic states and the District of Columbia. To prevent interruptions to the delivery of electricity, PJM upgrades its system in accordance with its governing agreements: the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, the Consolidated Transmission Owners Agreement, and the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff. The petitioners, incumbent owners, challenged orders in which the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) concluded that they had no right of first refusal for proposed expansions or upgrades and that PJM may designate third-party developers to construct transmission facilities within incumbent members’ zones. While their petition was pending, FERC directed PJM to remove or revise “any provision that could be read as supplying a federal right of first refusal for any type of transmission project that is selected in the regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation.” The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition, concluding that there is no live controversy between adverse parties, so that any decision would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion.it View "Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 1969, Grantors and an oil company entered into a continuing oil and gas lease covering Grantors’ property. Less than seven months later, Grantors entered into a mineral deed with Grantee covering the same property. The mineral deed had a primary term of fifteen years. In 2012, Plaintiffs, the sole heirs of Grantors, filed a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the royalty interest held by Defendants, the sole heirs of Grantee, had terminated. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that because the mineral deed stated that it was subject to the terms of the continuing oil and gas lease and because Grantor was a party to both the lease and the mineral deed, the parties intended that they be read together. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the “subject to” clause in the mineral deed did not incorporate the provisions of the lease; and (2) therefore, Defendants’ mineral interest did not continue past its fifteen-year term. View "Netahla v. Netahla" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a mineral owner, sued Defendant alleging breach of contract, failure to pay royalties, and fraud. The claims centered on three oil and gas leases that Plaintiff, the lessor, executed with Defendant, the lessee. Plaintiff prevailed on the majority of his claims in the trial court. As relevant to this appeal, the jury determined that Plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, discovered the fraud less than four years before filing suit. The trial court therefore concluded that the claims were not time barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the fraud should have been discovered, as a matter of law, more than four years before Plaintiff filed suit because Plaintiff should have discovered the relevant information in the Texas Railroad Commission’s public records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s reasonable diligence in discovering the underlying fraud was a question of fact for the jury. Remanded. View "Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

The TMP is a 5.6-mile stretch of pipeline, connecting Missouri with Illinois beneath the Mississippi River. Under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717f, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued MoGas a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a project that included using the TMP for natural gas service for the first time. On remand, the Commission approved inclusion of the acquisition cost in MoGas’s rate base because the TMP had been devoted to a new use, transporting natural gas instead of oil, and the cost of new construction would have been greater. Objectors challenged the Commission’s determination that the company had shown that the acquisition of pipeline facilities provided specific benefits in accordance with Commission precedent. Although acknowledging that a lower acquisition cost can produce benefits to customers in some cases, they argued the Commission failed to examine whether there were actual quantifiable dollar benefits for Missouri customers. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, deferring to the Commission’s benefits exception, which allows an acquisition premium to be included in a pipeline’s rate base when the purchase price is less than the cost of constructing comparable facilities, the facility is converted to a new use, and the transacting parties are unaffiliated. View "Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

At issue in this oil and gas dispute was the validity of a mineral lease on nearly two thousand acres of land in north Texas. The non-participating royalty interest holder (non-executive) claimed the executive-right holder (executive) procured the mineral lease in breach of a duty of good faith owed to her. The non-executive further alleged that the lessee acted in concert with the executive in facilitating the breach of duty and that the executive’s ill-gotten gains were fraudulently transferred to third parties. The trial court granted a take-nothing summary judgment on all claims. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that issues of material fact existed that precluded summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) fact questions precluded summary judgment as to the non-executive’s breach-of-duty claim against the executive; but (2) summary judgment was proper as to the claims against the remaining defendants. View "KCM Financial LLC v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this diversity action alleging that he owned fractional working interests in four Ritchie County mining partnerships, which owned six oil and gas wells, and demanding an accounting of the four partnerships. Defendant counterclaimed for the cumulative operating expenses attributable to Plaintiff’s asserted working interests in the partnerships. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff’s assertion of interests in the four mining partnerships failed because he could not produce a writing that evidenced his co-ownership of the subject leases or wells in conformance with the Statute of Frauds. The Supreme Court of West Virginia accepted the Fourth Circuit’s certified question of law and answered (1) if a person contends he owns an interest in a common-law mining partnership, the Statute of Frauds requires the person to prove he is a partner of the mining partnership through a written conveyance; and (2) if the partnership is a general partnership and the partnership owns oil and gas leases, the Statute of Frauds does not require a person to produce a written instrument to prove he is a partner in the general partnership. Having adopted the West Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion answering the Court’s certified question of law, the Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded. View "Valentine v. Sugar Rock, Inc." on Justia Law

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders issued in 2013 and 2014 approved the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) creation of a new wholesale electric power “capacity zone” comprising areas of Southeastern New York, including the lower Hudson Valley. The orders followed NYISO’s identification of areas in which customers received power from suppliers located on the other side of a “transmission constraint” in the electrical grid. Because of the way New York’s capacity markets work, NYISO concluded that financial incentives for capacity resources in the transmission‐constrained area that became the Valley Zone were inadequate, jeopardizing the reliability of the grid. FERC’s approval of the Zone, with a new “demand curve” to set capacity prices, were designed to address the reliability problem by providing more accurate price signals to in‐zone resources, but were expected to result in higher prices to customers. Utilities, the state, and the New York Public Service Commission alleged that FERC failed adequately to justify the expected higher prices, particularly without a “phase‐in” of the new zone and its demand curve, in violation of FERC’s statutory mandate to ensure that rates are “just and reasonable,” 16 U.S.C. 824d(a). The Second Circuit rejected the challenge. FERC adequately justified its decisions. View "Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, various landowners, entered into separate oil and gas leases with Victory Energy Corporation whereby Plaintiffs leased drilling rights to Victory. Victory shared its leasehold interests with Megaenergy, Inc. Inflection Energy, LLC subsequently assumed from Megaenergy the operational rights and responsibilities under most of the leases. Each of the leases contained a force majeure clause, which provided that nonperformance may be excused under certain circumstances, and a habendum clause, which established the primary and definite period during which the energy companies could exercise the drilling rights granted by the leases. After the primary term of the leases had expired with no operations having been conducted upon the leaseholds, Plaintiffs commenced this declaratory judgment action against Inflection, Victory, and Megaenergy, seeking a declaration that the leases had expired by their own terms. The energy companies counterclaimed for a declaration that each lease was extended by operation of the force majeure clause, arguing that New York’s moratorium on the use of horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing triggered the force majeure clause. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs. On appeal, the Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals certain questions. The Court of Appeals answered that the force majeure clause did not modify the habendum clause. Therefore, the leases terminated at the conclusion of their primary terms. View "Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

In the early 1980s, Georgia Power Company sold a number of its used electrical transformers to Ward Transformer Company (Ward). Because the electrical transformers contained toxic compounds that have been banned since 1979, Ward repaired and rebuilt the transformers for resale to meet third-party customers’ specifications. In the process, one of Ward’s facilities in Raleigh, North Carolina (the Ward Site) became contaminated. In the 2000s, the EPA initiated a costly removal action at the Ward Site. Consolidated Coal Company and PCS Phosphate Company, Inc. each paid more than $17 million in cleanup costs related to the Ward Site. In 2008 and 2009, they filed complaints under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act against Georgia Power alleging that, as supplier of some of the transformers to Ward, Georgia Power should be liable for a contribution to those costs. The district court granted summary judgment for Georgia Power. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the circumstances of the transformer sales did not indicate Georgia Power’s intent to dispose of the toxic compounds and therefore did not support arranger liability. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Georgia Power Co." on Justia Law

The parties in this case owned interests in certain oil and gas leases in Sublette County, Wyoming. In the underlying litigation, the district court granted a monetary judgment against Defendants for amounts due to Plaintiffs. Defendants paid the monetary judgment. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to enforce judgment, claiming that Defendants were not properly accounting to them as required by the prior declaratory judgment and a net profits contract (NPC). After the district court issued its judgment, Defendants appealed the court’s decisions on the merits and its order requiring Defendants to pay attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed as revised, holding that the district court (1) properly assumed jurisdiction over the issues presented; (2) correctly interpreted its prior judgment and Defendants’ accounting responsibilities under the NPC; and (3) properly granted Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees with one minor exception. View "Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman" on Justia Law