Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Pusateri, a former employee of Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company (PG) filed a complaint under the False Claims Act, 740 ILCS 175/1, alleging that PG used falsified gas leak response records to justify a fraudulently inflated natural gas rate before the Illinois Commerce Commission. As a customer, the State of Illinois would have paid such fraudulently inflated rates,. The Cook County circuit court dismissed with prejudice, finding that as a matter of law, there was no causal connection between the allegedly false reports and the Commission-approved rates. The appellate court reversed, construing the complaint’s allegations liberally to find PG could have submitted the safety reports in support of a request for a rate increase, despite not being required to do so under the Administrative Code. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, reasoning that the court lacked jurisdiction to order relief. The legislature did not intend the False Claims Act to apply to a Commission-set rate. The Commission has the duty to ensure regulated utilities obey the Public Utilities Act and other statutes, except where enforcement duties are “specifically vested in some other officer or tribunal.” View "Pusateri v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co." on Justia Law

LPSC sought review of FERC's orders relating to the allocation of production costs among Entergy's six operating companies. LPSC argued that certain revenues and expenses should be removed from the bandwidth calculation for 2008 because they were not incurred in that test year and that the production cost formula should account for the mid-year acquisition of generation facilities by Entergy Gulf States Louisiana and Entergy Arkansas on a partial-year basis. The court concluded that FERC reasonably excluded challenges to the "justness and reasonableness" of formula inputs from annual bandwidth implementation proceedings where FERC reasonably interpreted the System Agreement and correctly applied the filed rate doctrine, and FERC's reversal of its initial interpretation of the scope of bandwidth implementation proceedings was not arbitrary. The court also concluded that FERC reasonably required Entergy to include casualty loss Net Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes (ADIT) in its third bandwidth calculation where LPSC had notice of the casualty loss ADIT issue, and FERC's decision to include casualty loss ADIT in the bandwidth formula was rational. Accordingly, the court denied LPSC's petition for review. View "Louisiana Public Svc. Cmsn. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer (URS) and the DOE, alleging violations of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5851(b)(4), whistleblower protection provision, and requested a jury trial. The district court partially dismissed the complaint, denied a jury trial, and granted summary judgment against plaintiff. The court held that before an employee may opt out of the agency process and bring a retaliation suit against a respondent in federal court, that respondent must have had notice of, and an opportunity to participate in, the agency action for one year. In this case, plaintiff's claim against DOE failed for lack of administrative exhaustion. The court concluded that the administrative exhaustion was sufficient as to URS E&C. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of URS Corp. for lack of administrative exhaustion. The court also concluded that, since plaintiff has shown that his protected activity was a "contributing factor" in the adverse employment action he suffered, he has met his burden for establishing a prima facie case of retaliation under the ERA. Further, the evidence created a genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment were affected by his transfer. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment to URS E&C for ERA whistleblower retaliation. Finally, the court held that plaintiff has a constitutional right to a jury trial for his claims seeking money damages against URS E&C and the court reversed the district court's ruling. View "Tomosaitis v. URS Inc." on Justia Law

In this tax refund case, Chevron challenged the method by which the Kern County Assessor and Assessment Appeals Board valued oil and gas wells as new construction during three tax years, Rev. & Tax. Code, 5140 et seq. The trial court found that the Board used the wrong valuation method and remanded. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that Chevron has standing to maintain this action; concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law when it approved the assessor's valuation method; rejected Chevron's exemption argument; and reversed in part, affirming in part. View "Chevron USA v. County of Kern" on Justia Law

In 2010, Idaho Power entered into two Firm Energy Sales Agreements, one with New Energy Two, LLC, and the other with New Energy Three, LLC, under which Idaho Power agreed to purchase electricity from them that was to be generated by the use of biogas. The agreement with New Energy Two stated that the project would be operational on October 1, 2012, and the agreement with New Energy Three stated that the project would be operational on December 1, 2012. Both contracts were submitted for approval to the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, and were both approved on July 1, 2010. Each of the agreements contained a force majeure clause. By written notice, New Energy Two and New Energy Three informed Idaho Power that they were claiming the occurrence of a force majeure event, which was ongoing proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission. New Energy asserted that until those proceedings were finally resolved "the entire circumstance of continued viability of all renewable energy projects in Idaho is undecided"and that as a consequence "renewable energy project lenders are unwilling to lend in Idaho pending the outcome of these proceedings."Idaho Power filed petitions with the Commission against New Energy Two and New Energy Three seeking declaratory judgments that no force majeure event, as that term was defined in the agreements, had occurred and that Idaho Power could terminate both agreements for the failure of the projects to be operational by the specified dates. New Energy filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the ground that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to interpret or enforce contracts. After briefing from both parties, the Commission denied New Energy's motion to dismiss. The Commission's order was an interlocutory order that is not appealable as a matter of right. New Energy filed a motion with the Supreme Court requesting a permissive appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12, and the Court granted the motion. New Energy then appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order. View "Idaho Power v. New Energy Two" on Justia Law

A.A. was electrocuted while playing on the farmland of David and Sherry Melton. Riley Berry, who worked for the Meltons, had parked a cotton picker under an allegedly sagging power line, which was owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Ultimately, A.A. climbed onto the cotton picker, touched the power line, and was electrocuted. At the time of the accident, A.A.'s mother, Mary Bethanne Acey, was en route to Moon Lake, in Coahoma County with her son and Charles Graves. A 911 dispatcher called Graves to inform him of the accident. Graves immediately turned the car around to proceed to the Meltons' home. Acey then spoke with the dispatcher, who explained the gravity of the situation to Acey and informed her that A.A. had been "shocked." Emergency medical responders arrived shortly after Acey's arrival. A.A. suffered severe burns to both of her arms and her hip. A.A. subsequently was airlifted to Le Bonheur Children's Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, and was later transferred to Shriners Hospitals for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, which specializes in treating burn patients. Thereafter, Acey commenced legal action on behalf of A.A., and individually, against defendants Entergy, David and Sherry Melton, Melton Farms, Mary Mac, Inc., and Norfleet Investments, LP. Defendants settled all claims on behalf of A.A. Regarding Acey's individual bystander claims for emotional distress, Entergy moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the affidavits of Acey and Dr. William Hickerson. The trial court subsequently denied each motion. According to the trial court, based on the nature of A.A.'s injuries, this case "cries out for the expansion of" the factors provided by the California Supreme Court in "Dillon [v. Legg," 441 P. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)], adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in "Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,"(414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)). Thereafter, Entergy was granted interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Court found that Entergy's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey" on Justia Law

Appellants the South Carolina Energy Users Committee (the SCEUC) and the Sierra Club appealed orders of the Public Service Commission that approved Respondent South Carolina Electric & Gas's (SCE&G) application for updated capital cost and construction schedules, pursuant to the Base Load Review Act, (the BLRA). The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Commission applied the correct section of the BLRA, and whether the Commission had to also consider the prudence of project completion at the update stage. Finding no reversible error in the Commission's orders, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "SC Energy Users Committee v. SCE&G" on Justia Law

Passadumkeag Windpark, LLC (PW) sought approval to construct a wind farm on property owned by Penobscot Forest, LLC (PF) located in Grand Falls Township. The Department of Environmental Protection denied the requested permit. On review, the Board of Environmental Protection (Board) granted the permit. Passadumkeag Mountain Friends (PMF), a Maine nonprofit corporation, and Alexander and Rhonda Cuprak appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding (1) the decision of the Board was operative for purposes of appellate review; (2) the Board’s findings and conclusion were supported by substantial evidence in the record; and (3) certain communications between the Board, PW, and PF during the application process did not affect the Cupraks’ due process rights. View "Passadumkeag Mountain Friends v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the lower courts’ interpretation of portions of a written mineral agreement. The agreement was prepared by a mineral leaseholder and ostensibly conveyed to an exploration company an “exclusive option to sublease” at least 15 percent of the leaseholder’s mineral rights. The lower courts interpreted the agreement as imposing an obligation on the exploration company to execute the sublease rather than simply allowing the exploration company the right to execute the sublease. Because the exploration company did not execute such a sublease, the lower courts awarded damages to the leaseholder for breach of contract. When the Court granted certiorari review, the lower courts had awarded to the leaseholder other damages, related to the exploration company’s obligation to execute a mineral sublease. The Supreme Court determined that the lower courts erred in ruling that the exploration company was obligated by the agreement to sublease mineral rights. Instead, the Court found the agreement afforded the exploration company a non-binding option to sublease (for which the exploration company paid $1.4 million), but that if the exploration company exercised the non-binding option, it was then obligated to sublease at least 15 percent of the leaseholder’s rights described in the agreement. Accordingly, the damage award on the breach of contract claim for failing to sublease at least 15 percent of the leaseholder’s mineral rights was reversed. However, the Court also found the exploration company breached its obligation to complete a seismic survey, and the Court affirmed the corresponding award of damage. Because the record did not support a finding that the exploration company acted in bad faith, we examine the effects of a contractual prohibition against consequential damages that the lower courts refused to apply based on those courts’ findings of bad faith. Because of the court of appeal's error, any meaningful review of the merits of the exploration company’s argument that its reconventional demand for improper use and sharing of its seismic data was improperly dismissed. The case was therefore remanded to the court of appeal the question of the propriety of that dismissal and, as that court then deems necessary, the question of whether the record supports the exploration company’s request for relief, or whether remanding to the district court for the taking of additional evidence is required. View "Olympia Minerals, LLC v. HS Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Shieldalloy, manufacturer of metal alloys in New Jersey, petitioned for review of the NRC's order reinstating the transfer of regulatory authority to the State of New Jersey under the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2021. The order at issue addressed concerns raised by this Court in Shieldalloy II. The court concluded that the NRC's transfer of regulatory authority to New Jersey under section 2021 was not arbitrary or capricious because New Jersey's regulations are compatible with the NRC's regulations and its reading of 10 C.F.R. 20.1403(a). The NRC has rationally addressed concerns when it provided a textual analysis of section 20.1403 and explained how New Jersey's regulatory regime is adequate and compatible with the NRC's regulatory program. The order does not conflict with the NRC's prior interpretations or amount to a convenient, post hoc litigation position. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. NRC" on Justia Law