Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Danisco and Novozymes compete as suppliers of Rapid Starch Liquefaction products, genetically modified industrial enzymes that convert plant-based material into ethanol. They have patents that claim α-amylase enzymes, genetically engineered through substitution of amino acids in the peptide sequence to improve liquefaction performance. Novozymes has sued Danisco several times. Once Novozymes amended a pending patent application to claim one of Danisco’s new products, and sued Danisco the same day that the patent issued. Danisco owns the 240 patent, issued 2011 and claiming priority from a 2008 provisional application, claiming a variation for increased viscosity reduction in a starch liquefaction assay; it is the active ingredient in Danisco’s RSL products. After the PTO issued a Notice of Allowance, Novozymes amended a pending application to claim the enzyme, and contested entitlement to priority, arguing that its amended claim covered the same invention as the 240 patent. After Danisco’s 240 patent issued, Novozymes requested continued examination and made comments about its refusal to “acquiesce.” Upon issuance of Novozymes’s 573 patent, Danisco sought declaratory judgments that its products did not infringe and that the 573 patent was invalid, or that its 240 patent had priority under 35 U.S.C. 291. The district dismissed, acknowledging that Novozymes’s 573 patent presented a substantial risk to Danisco, but that Danisco’s action was filed before Novozymes could take action to enforce its rights. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the totality of the circumstances established a justiciable controversy. View "Danisco U.S. Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, Inc." on Justia Law

Drillers filed a mineral lien on Debtor's well after Drillers performed work on the well and were never paid. The bankruptcy court dismissed Drillers' constructive trust and equitable lien claims and granted summary judgment to Debtors on Drillers' mineral contractor's and subcontractor's lien claims. The district court affirmed. The court affirmed the dismissal of Drillers' constructive trust and equitable lien claims. However, the court reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment on Drillers' mineral subcontractors' lien claims because Drillers submitted sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. The court held that it is possible under Texas law for an owner to also be a contractor, and for a laborer to secure liens against both the contracting and non-contracting owners. Viewed in the light most favorable to Drillers, the facts demonstrate that Drillers were subcontractors with regard to Debtors. View "Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P, et al. v. Heritage Consolidated, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1202(a) allows states to enact and administer regulatory programs consistent with federal standards, subject to federal approval. Kentucky’s Department for Natural Resources assumed responsibility for SMCRA implementation through its Division of Mine Permits, Ky. Rev. Stat. 350.028, .465(2). Its program has been approved by the U.S. Department of the Interior since 1982. A typical surface mining operation also requires permits under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251: a 401 permit for “discharge into the navigable waters;” a 402 permit for “discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants;” and a 404 permit for “discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” A 404 permit is issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in compliance with EPA guidelines, 33 U.S.C. 1344(b)(1). Kentucky authorized a Perry County surface mining operation; the operator obtained 404 permit from the Corps, authorizing it to “mine through” and fill surface stream beds, which are already in a degraded state, requiring offset of the limited environmental effect by improving other streams in the watershed. Opponents argued that the National Environmental Policy Act required the Corps to consider the public health impacts related to surface mining in general, and that the Corps violated the CWA by using flawed analysis of the mitigation plan. The district court rejected the arguments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824d(c), requires regulated utilities to file with the Commission, as a matter of open and accessible public record, any rates and charges they intend to impose for sales of electrical energy that are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Consequently, utilities are forbidden to charge any rate other than the one on file with the Commission, a prohibition known as the "filed rate doctrine." At issue on appeal was, when a utility filed more than one rate with the Commission during the time it was negotiating an agreement with a prospective customer, which of the two filed rates governs: the rate at the time negotiations commenced or the rate at the time the agreement was completed? The Commission is of the view that it can pick and choose which rate applies on a case-by-case basis. Because the Commission has provided no reasoned explanation for how its decision comports with statutory direction, prior agency practice, or the purposes of the filed rate doctrine, the court vacated the Commission's orders in part and remanded. View "West Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case called for a determination of whether section 15-11-1106(2) C.R.S. (2013) required a court to reform a revocable option that was negotiated as part of a commercial contract entered into before the effective date of the statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act. In Colorado, the Act superseded the common law rule for nonvested property interests created after May 31, 1991. The common rule still applied to nonvested property interests created prior to that date. Under the Act, all donative transfers after that date were valid so long as the property interest created vested or terminated within ninety years of its creation. With regard to the specifics of this case, the trial court concluded that the revocable option at issue violated the common law rule against perpetuities. The Court then inserted a savings clause pursuant to statute, to prevent the option from being voided by the common law rule, and ruled that the option holder was entitled to specific performance of the reformed option. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the option did not violate the common law rule, and therefore no reformation by the trial court was necessary. View "Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil and Gas Corp." on Justia Law

This case involves challenges to the most recent forms of electric transmission planning and cost allocation adopted by the Commission under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791 et seq. In Order No. 1000, as reaffirmed and clarified in Order Nos. 1000-A and 1000-B (together, the Final Rule), the Commission required each transmission owning and operating public utility to participate in regional transmission planning that satisfies the specific planning principles designed to prevent undue discrimination and preference in transmission service, and that produces a regional transmission plan. The court held that the Commission had authority under Section 206 of the Act to require transmission providers to provide in a regional planning process; there was substantial evidence of a theoretical threat to support adoption of the reforms in the Final Rule; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require removal of federal rights of first refusal provisions upon determining they were unjust and unreasonable practices affecting rates, and that determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious; the Mobile-Sierra objection to the removal is not ripe; the Commission had authority under Section 206 to require the ex ante allocation of the costs of new transmission facilities among beneficiaries, and that its decision regarding scope was not arbitrary or capricious; the Commission reasonably determined that regional planning must include consideration of transmission needs driven by public policy requirements; and the Commission reasonably relied upon the reciprocity condition to encourage non-public utility transmission providers to participate in a regional planning process. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review of the Final Rule. View "South Carolina Public Service v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's approval of a proposal for the construction of a natural gas compressor station in the Town of Minisink, New York. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the Commission's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious, particularly given the existence of a nearby alternative site (the Wagoner Alternative) they insist is better than the Minisink locale. The court concluded that the Commission's consideration of the Wagoner Alternative falls within the bounds of its discretion and the court had no basis to upset the Commission's application of its Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717-717z, authority on this point; the court was satisfied that the Commission properly considered cumulative impacts of the Minisink Project; the court reject petitioners' argument that the Minisink Project violates the siting guidelines; and the court rejected petitioners' claims of procedural errors. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Minisink Residents for Enviro., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Two firms receiving gas storage service in the Washington Storage Field ceased taking service and "released" their storage rights to Paribas. The departing customers exercised their contract rights to buy back so-called "base gas" from the field's operator, Transco. Given the buy-back, Transco had to make new purchases to replenish its base gas so as to maintain service at the levels prevailing before the replacement. At the time of the exiting customers' departure, the historic customers who remained, and the new replacement customers, disputed whether the cost of the new base gas should be charged entirely to the replacement shippers ("incremental pricing") or should be charged to all shippers in proportion to their usage ("rolled-in pricing"). On appeal, Paribas challenged the Commission's ratemaking decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. In a decision purporting to apply the familiar "cost causation" principle, the Commission chose incremental pricing. The court concluded that the Commission failed to offer an intelligible explanation of how its decision manifested the cost causation principle; failed to explain how or why or in what sense the historic customers' continued demand did not share, pro rata, in causing the need for the new base gas, or, how or why or in what sense the historic customers did not share proportionately in the benefits provided by the new base gas; and brushed off Paribas's invocation of a seemingly parallel set of the Commission's own decisions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.View "BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from violations issued by the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration. At issue was whether the word "corporation" includes limited liability companies (LLCs) for purposes of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq. The court concluded that the terms "corporation" and "corporate operator" in the Mine Act are ambiguous. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable where, most importantly, construing section 110(c) to include agents of LLCs is consistent with the legislative history. Therefore, the court held that an LLC is a corporation for purposes of the Mine Act and that section 110(c) can be used to assess civil penalties against agents of an LLC. Because substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision to hold petitioners personally liable for the order at issue, the court affirmed on this issue. Finally, the order underlying their civil penalties was not duplicative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the ALJ's decision. View "Sumpter, et al. v. Secretary of Labor, et al." on Justia Law

Shirley Adams and other landowners challenged a petition of the U.S. Oil and Gas Association that proposed amendments to Statewide Rule 681 which authorized the surface and subsurface landspreading of NORM as additional methods of disposal. The Mississippi Oil and Gas Board approved the proposed amendments to Rule 68, and its decision was upheld by the Chancery Court. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found that the landowners failed to prove that the Board's adoption of amended Rule 68 was arbitrary and capricious or against the weight of the evidence. In addition, the Board's decision did not violate federal law or the landowners' constitutional rights; however, the Board violated state law when it exceeded its statutory authority under Section 53-1-17 by amending Rule 68 without gaining the approval of the Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality. Accordingly, the Chancery Court's decision was reversed and the case remanded for review by the Commission.View "Adams v. Mississippi State Oil & Gas Board" on Justia Law