Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

In 1983 Bitler leased gas stations to Marathon. The Environmental Protection Agency adopted new regulations so that that underground petroleum tanks and pipes at the gas stations had to be removed, upgraded, or replaced, 40 C.F.R. 280.21(a). In 1992 the parties amended the leases to make Marathon “fully responsible for removing” the tanks and pipes, filling holes created by the removal, complying with all environmental laws, “leav[ing] the Premises in a condition reasonably useful for future commercial use,” and “replac[ing] any asphalt, concrete, or other surface, including landscaping.” Marathon agreed to return the Premises “as nearly as possible in the same condition as it was in prior to such remediation work,” and to be responsible “for any and all liability, losses, damages, costs and expenses,” and to continue paying rent. The properties can be restored as gas stations with above‐ground storage tanks, and may be suitable for other commercial outlets. After completion of the work Bitler sued Marathon, alleging breach of contract and “waste.” The Seventh Circuit vacated to waste regarding Michigan properties, with directions to double those damages. The court affirmed dismissal of some of the contract claims. It would not conform to the reasonable expectations of the parties to limit liability for waste or other misconduct by a tenant simply because a lease had to be extended for an indefinite period to allow a response to unforeseen changes. View "Bitler Inv. Venture II v. Marathon Petroleum Co. LP" on Justia Law

FirstEnergy, acting on behalf of its affiliates (ATSI), filed a complaint with FERC contending that the imposition of costs from transferring from one Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) to another on ATSI was unjust and unreasonable. The Commission disagreed and dismissed the complaint. FirstEnergy then petitioned for review. The court denied the petition for review because FirstEnergy failed to carry its burden under section 206 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824(e), that Schedule 12 of PJM's, the RTO FirstEnergy transferred to, tariff was unjust and unreasonable as applied to ATSI. View "FirstEnergy Service Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation, a gas utility that distributes natural gas, sought to raise its rates. CenterPoint’s proposed rate schedule included a “cost of service adjustment” (COSA) clause. The Railroad Commission of Texas approved a rate increase, including a revised COSA clause that provided for automatic annual adjustments based on increases or decreases in CenterPoint’s cost of service. On judicial review, the district court held that the Commission lacked the statutory authority to adopt the COSA clause as part of CenterPoint’s rate schedule. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission had the authority to enter the final order in this case, including the COSA clause. Remanded.View "Tex. Coast Utils. Coal. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex." on Justia Law

ACL contracted with ES&H and USES following an oil spill to provide cleanup services. After ACL failed to pay the outstanding amounts owed to the companies, the United States paid the balance out of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and then filed suit against ACL to recover its payments. The court concluded that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., provides the exclusive source of law for an action involving a responsible party's liability for removal costs governed by OPA and held that ACL does not have a cause of action against the spill responders who exercised their statutory right to file claims with the Fund after ACL failed to timely pay their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of ACL's claims against ES&H and USES as displaced under OPA. View "United States v. American Commercial Lines" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the Warrens and the Javeeds, filed suit against defendants (Chesapeake entities), alleging that defendants breached royalty provisions in oil and gas leases by deducting post-production costs from the sales proceeds of natural gas. The district court held that the leases contained "at the well" royalty provisions, under decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas in Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank and Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., Chesapeake was authorized to make post-production deductions in determining the amount realized at the mouth of the well, despite the provisions in the Warrens' leases that the royalty would be free of certain post-production costs. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Warrens' claims for failure to state a claim. However, the court concluded that the Javeeds' claim should not have been dismissed with prejudice where it was not apparent from the face of the complaint or attachments that they could not conceivably state a cause of action. Accordingly, the court modified the district court's judgment as to the Javeeds' claims. View "Warren, et al. v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

In 1952 an Illinois owner granted a pipeline operator an easement for two pipelines across the parcel. The first was built immediately; the second, if built, had to be within 10 feet of the first. The contract says that any pipeline must be “buried to such depth as will not interfere with such cultivation.” In 2012 the operator notified the owner that it planned to build a second pipeline. The owner filed a quiet-title suit, alleging that either the right to build a second line had expired or that another line would violate the farmability condition. The operator replied that 49 U.S.C. 60104(c), preempts enforcement of the farmability condition. The district court dismissed. A second pipeline has been built 50 feet from the first, using eminent domain to obtain the necessary rights, but the owner anticipates construction of a third pipeline. Vacating the judgment, the Seventh Circuit held that no construction is currently planned and the district court acted prematurely. Until details of a third pipeline’ are known, it is not possible to determine what effect it would have on agricultural use. Only if a third pipeline prevents using the land for agriculture would it be necessary (or prudent) to determine whether section 60104(c) establishes a federal right to destroy more of the land’s value than paid for in 1952. The court stated that it had no reason to think that Illinois would call the 1952 contract an option or apply the Rule Against Perpetuities. View "Knight v. Enbridge Pipelines, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A&G owns and operates the Kelly Branch Surface Mine in Virginia. Plaintiff filed suit against A&G for declaratory and injunctive relief and civil penalties, contending that A&G was violating the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., by discharging selenium from Kelly Branch without authorization to do so. The court held that A&G could not assert a "permit shield" defense for discharges of selenium when it failed to disclose the presence of this pollutant during the permit application process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff. View "Southern Appalachian Mountain v. A & G Coal Corp." on Justia Law

Eagle Point Solar proposed to enter into a long term financing agreement with the City of Dubuque that would provide the City with renewable energy. Under the agreement, Eagle Point would construct a solar energy system, and the City would purchase all of the electricity generated by the system. However, if Eagle Point was a “public utility” under Iowa Code 476.1 or an “electric utility” under Iowa Code 476.22 it would be prohibited from serving customers, such as the City, who were located within the exclusive service territory of Interstate Power and Light Company, another electric utility. The Iowa Public Utilities Board (IUB) concluded that Eagle Point would be a public utility under the proposed business arrangement. The district court reversed, concluding that Eagle Point’s proposed arrangement with the City did not make it an electric utility for purposes of the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle Point was not a public utility under section 476.1 or section 476.22. View "SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

Shamokin Filler, a coal preparation facility in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, has been regulated by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) since 1977. After a change in ownership in 2009, the new owners challenged MSHA’s jurisdiction, contending that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), not MSHA, should oversee it. Presumably the new owners wanted to avoid the more stringent requirements imposed by MSHA regulations and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 801. MSHA, rather than OSHA, has much stricter oversight requirements including regarding respirable coal dust standards. The Secretary of Labor and an Administrative Law Judge for the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission disagreed and concluded that Shamokin was engaged in the “work of preparing the coal,” as defined in the Mine Act. Shamokin argued that its plant does not engage in the “work of preparing the coal” because it makes its 100% coal products out of already processed coal. The Third Circuit rejected the argument and denied a petition for review. Shamokin’s interpretation of the statute lacked any basis in the text of the Mine Act. View "Shamokin Filler Co. Inc v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of FERC's orders affecting the administration of the Independent System Operator-New England (ISO-NE) and specifically directed to curtailment of the exercise of market power in the New England energy market. The court held that FERC has jurisdiction to regulate the parameters comprising the Forward Capacity Market, and that applying offer-floor mitigation fits within the Commission's statutory rate-making power. The court concluded that none of the petitioners established that FERC has committed reversible error and the court denied the petition for review. View "New England Power Gen. Assoc. v. FERC" on Justia Law