Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, the Warrens and the Javeeds, filed suit against defendants (Chesapeake entities), alleging that defendants breached royalty provisions in oil and gas leases by deducting post-production costs from the sales proceeds of natural gas. The district court held that the leases contained "at the well" royalty provisions, under decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas in Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank and Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., Chesapeake was authorized to make post-production deductions in determining the amount realized at the mouth of the well, despite the provisions in the Warrens' leases that the royalty would be free of certain post-production costs. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Warrens' claims for failure to state a claim. However, the court concluded that the Javeeds' claim should not have been dismissed with prejudice where it was not apparent from the face of the complaint or attachments that they could not conceivably state a cause of action. Accordingly, the court modified the district court's judgment as to the Javeeds' claims. View "Warren, et al. v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

In 1952 an Illinois owner granted a pipeline operator an easement for two pipelines across the parcel. The first was built immediately; the second, if built, had to be within 10 feet of the first. The contract says that any pipeline must be “buried to such depth as will not interfere with such cultivation.” In 2012 the operator notified the owner that it planned to build a second pipeline. The owner filed a quiet-title suit, alleging that either the right to build a second line had expired or that another line would violate the farmability condition. The operator replied that 49 U.S.C. 60104(c), preempts enforcement of the farmability condition. The district court dismissed. A second pipeline has been built 50 feet from the first, using eminent domain to obtain the necessary rights, but the owner anticipates construction of a third pipeline. Vacating the judgment, the Seventh Circuit held that no construction is currently planned and the district court acted prematurely. Until details of a third pipeline’ are known, it is not possible to determine what effect it would have on agricultural use. Only if a third pipeline prevents using the land for agriculture would it be necessary (or prudent) to determine whether section 60104(c) establishes a federal right to destroy more of the land’s value than paid for in 1952. The court stated that it had no reason to think that Illinois would call the 1952 contract an option or apply the Rule Against Perpetuities. View "Knight v. Enbridge Pipelines, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A&G owns and operates the Kelly Branch Surface Mine in Virginia. Plaintiff filed suit against A&G for declaratory and injunctive relief and civil penalties, contending that A&G was violating the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., by discharging selenium from Kelly Branch without authorization to do so. The court held that A&G could not assert a "permit shield" defense for discharges of selenium when it failed to disclose the presence of this pollutant during the permit application process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff. View "Southern Appalachian Mountain v. A & G Coal Corp." on Justia Law

Eagle Point Solar proposed to enter into a long term financing agreement with the City of Dubuque that would provide the City with renewable energy. Under the agreement, Eagle Point would construct a solar energy system, and the City would purchase all of the electricity generated by the system. However, if Eagle Point was a “public utility” under Iowa Code 476.1 or an “electric utility” under Iowa Code 476.22 it would be prohibited from serving customers, such as the City, who were located within the exclusive service territory of Interstate Power and Light Company, another electric utility. The Iowa Public Utilities Board (IUB) concluded that Eagle Point would be a public utility under the proposed business arrangement. The district court reversed, concluding that Eagle Point’s proposed arrangement with the City did not make it an electric utility for purposes of the statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle Point was not a public utility under section 476.1 or section 476.22. View "SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd." on Justia Law

Shamokin Filler, a coal preparation facility in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, has been regulated by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) since 1977. After a change in ownership in 2009, the new owners challenged MSHA’s jurisdiction, contending that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), not MSHA, should oversee it. Presumably the new owners wanted to avoid the more stringent requirements imposed by MSHA regulations and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 801. MSHA, rather than OSHA, has much stricter oversight requirements including regarding respirable coal dust standards. The Secretary of Labor and an Administrative Law Judge for the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission disagreed and concluded that Shamokin was engaged in the “work of preparing the coal,” as defined in the Mine Act. Shamokin argued that its plant does not engage in the “work of preparing the coal” because it makes its 100% coal products out of already processed coal. The Third Circuit rejected the argument and denied a petition for review. Shamokin’s interpretation of the statute lacked any basis in the text of the Mine Act. View "Shamokin Filler Co. Inc v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of FERC's orders affecting the administration of the Independent System Operator-New England (ISO-NE) and specifically directed to curtailment of the exercise of market power in the New England energy market. The court held that FERC has jurisdiction to regulate the parameters comprising the Forward Capacity Market, and that applying offer-floor mitigation fits within the Commission's statutory rate-making power. The court concluded that none of the petitioners established that FERC has committed reversible error and the court denied the petition for review. View "New England Power Gen. Assoc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Issues of constitutional import stemming from cross-appeals taken from the Commonwealth Court's ruling on expedited challenges to Act 13 of 2012 were before the Supreme Court in this case. Act 13 contained sweeping legislation affecting Pennsylvania’s environment particularly the exploitation and recovery of natural gas in Marcellus Shale. The litigation was accelerated in part because the legislation itself was designed to take effect quickly and imposed obligations which required the challengers to formulate their legal positions swiftly; and in part in recognition of the economic importance of the legislation to the Commonwealth and its citizens. Following careful deliberation, the Supreme Court's decision found several challenged provisions of Act 13 were unconstitutional. Madame Justice Todd, and Mr. Justice McCaffery, found that several core provisions of Act 13 violated the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the Environmental Rights Amendment; other challenges lacked merit; and several issues required further Commonwealth Court proceedings. Mr. Justice Baer, concurred in the mandate, and joined the majority in all but Parts III and VI(C); Justice Baer would have found the "core constitutional infirmity" sounded in substantive due process. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson Township, et al v. Pa. Public Utility Commission and Attorney General -" on Justia Law

Public Service Company of Colorado applied for a tax refund from the state Department of Revenue. The company argued that it was entitled to a refund because it paid taxes when it was actually eligible for an exemption. The district court held in favor of the company, concluding that electricity was tangible personal property and that the production of electricity constituted manufacturing, thus entitling the company to the exemption (the "manufacturing exemption" under 39-26-709(1)(a)(II) C.R.S. (2013)). Upon review of the Department's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that section 39-26-104(1)(d.1) applied in this case: electricity did not qualify as tangible personal property, and that the Code "contemplate[d] that 'electricity furnished and sold'" was to be taxed as a service. View "Department of Revenue v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

These two appeals concerned the efforts of two corporations to explore and develop natural gas resources in two municipalities. In response, both municipalities adopted amendments to their zoning laws that prohibited all oil and gas exploration. The corporations brought actions challenging the zoning laws. Supreme Court declared the zoning laws valid, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the supersession clause in the statewide Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law does not preempt the home rule authority vested in municipalities to regulate oil and gas production activities, including hydrofracking, within municipal boundaries through the adoption of zoning laws. View "Wallach v. Town of Dryden " on Justia Law

Petitioners owned the royalty interests under two oil and gas leases. The leases were later pooled to form the Cogdell Canyon Reef Unit (CCRU). Since the CCRU was formed, a method of enhanced oil recovery began to be used by injecting carbon dixoide into the reservoir to sweep the oil to the production wells. With this method, the carbon dioxide returns to the surface entrained in casinghead gas, which is gas produced with the oil. At issue in this case was whether the royalty due on the gasinghead gas under the parties’ agreements must be determined as if the injected carbon dioxide were not present and whether the royalty owners were required to share with the working interest the expense of removing the carbon dioxide from the gas. The Supreme Court concluded that, under the parties’ agreements the royalty owners must share in the cost of carbon dioxide removal and were not entitled to a royalty based on the carbon dioxide’s value when it is produced with the casinghead gas. View "French v. Occidental Permian Ltd." on Justia Law