Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Issues of constitutional import stemming from cross-appeals taken from the Commonwealth Court's ruling on expedited challenges to Act 13 of 2012 were before the Supreme Court in this case. Act 13 contained sweeping legislation affecting Pennsylvania’s environment particularly the exploitation and recovery of natural gas in Marcellus Shale. The litigation was accelerated in part because the legislation itself was designed to take effect quickly and imposed obligations which required the challengers to formulate their legal positions swiftly; and in part in recognition of the economic importance of the legislation to the Commonwealth and its citizens. Following careful deliberation, the Supreme Court's decision found several challenged provisions of Act 13 were unconstitutional. Madame Justice Todd, and Mr. Justice McCaffery, found that several core provisions of Act 13 violated the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the Environmental Rights Amendment; other challenges lacked merit; and several issues required further Commonwealth Court proceedings. Mr. Justice Baer, concurred in the mandate, and joined the majority in all but Parts III and VI(C); Justice Baer would have found the "core constitutional infirmity" sounded in substantive due process. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson Township, et al v. Pa. Public Utility Commission and Attorney General -" on Justia Law

Public Service Company of Colorado applied for a tax refund from the state Department of Revenue. The company argued that it was entitled to a refund because it paid taxes when it was actually eligible for an exemption. The district court held in favor of the company, concluding that electricity was tangible personal property and that the production of electricity constituted manufacturing, thus entitling the company to the exemption (the "manufacturing exemption" under 39-26-709(1)(a)(II) C.R.S. (2013)). Upon review of the Department's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that section 39-26-104(1)(d.1) applied in this case: electricity did not qualify as tangible personal property, and that the Code "contemplate[d] that 'electricity furnished and sold'" was to be taxed as a service. View "Department of Revenue v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

These two appeals concerned the efforts of two corporations to explore and develop natural gas resources in two municipalities. In response, both municipalities adopted amendments to their zoning laws that prohibited all oil and gas exploration. The corporations brought actions challenging the zoning laws. Supreme Court declared the zoning laws valid, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the supersession clause in the statewide Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law does not preempt the home rule authority vested in municipalities to regulate oil and gas production activities, including hydrofracking, within municipal boundaries through the adoption of zoning laws. View "Wallach v. Town of Dryden " on Justia Law

Petitioners owned the royalty interests under two oil and gas leases. The leases were later pooled to form the Cogdell Canyon Reef Unit (CCRU). Since the CCRU was formed, a method of enhanced oil recovery began to be used by injecting carbon dixoide into the reservoir to sweep the oil to the production wells. With this method, the carbon dioxide returns to the surface entrained in casinghead gas, which is gas produced with the oil. At issue in this case was whether the royalty due on the gasinghead gas under the parties’ agreements must be determined as if the injected carbon dioxide were not present and whether the royalty owners were required to share with the working interest the expense of removing the carbon dioxide from the gas. The Supreme Court concluded that, under the parties’ agreements the royalty owners must share in the cost of carbon dioxide removal and were not entitled to a royalty based on the carbon dioxide’s value when it is produced with the casinghead gas. View "French v. Occidental Permian Ltd." on Justia Law

The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) approved a contract for the purchase of substitute natural gas and directed the procedure for resolving future related disputes. The court of appeals reversed the IURC's approval of the contract because a definition term in the contract deviated from the required statutory definition. The parties to the contract subsequently amended the contract to delete the language that the court of appeals found improper. The Supreme Court vacated the reversal of the IURC's order, held that the amended contract that corrected the definitional error rendered the definitional issue moot, and summarily affirmed the court of appeals as to all other claims.View "Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. Ind. Fin. Auth." on Justia Law

A Regional Transmission Organization is a voluntary association primarily of utilities that either own electrical transmission lines that comprise a regional electrical grid or generate electricity that is transmitted to the customers in the region. Members of a Regional Transmission Organization and the Illinois Commerce Commission, on behalf of the largest electrical utility in Illinois, (collectively PJM) obtained a remand of an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 2009. That order allocated costs for certain new high‐voltage network transmission lines that are part of a regional grid that includes the western utilities, but are all located in PJM’s eastern region and primarily benefit that region. Unhappy with the order issued on remand, PJM returned to court. The Seventh Circuit again remanded, acknowledging that the benefits of new facilities to the utilities may be unquantifiable because they depend on the likelihood and magnitude of outages and other contingencies. The order should not shift a grossly disproportionate share of costs to western utilities, given that the projects will confer only future, speculative, and limited benefits to those utilities.View "IL Commerce Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendants Citation Oil & Gas Corp., Petro-Hunt LLC, and other working interest owners appealed a district court summary judgment quieting title to an oil and gas lease in Greggory Tank. In 1982, George and Phyllis Tank executed an oil and gas lease in favor of Petro-Lewis Funds, Inc. The parties agreed to extend the primary term of the lease for three more years, ending July 15, 1989. In May 1983, the Tank 3-10 well was spudded in the northwest quarter. The well produced until October 1996. In June 1998, the Tank 3-10R well was spudded and replaced the Tank 3-10 well. The Tank 3-10R well continues to produce oil or gas. In June 1988, the Tank 13-10 well was spudded in the southwest quarter. The well continuously produced oil or gas until October 2008, and intermittently produced oil or gas until January 2012. Tank was the successor in interest to George and Phyllis Tank and was the owner of minerals in the southwest quarter of section 10. In September 2011, Tank sued the defendants, seeking to cancel the oil and gas lease to the extent it covered the southwest quarter. The defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Tank's claims. The defendants argued the continued drilling and operation of oil and gas wells on the leased property maintained the lease beyond the primary term and the lease remained in full force and effect. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling the lease had expired and was no longer valid on the southwest quarter. The court determined summary judgment was appropriate because there were only issues of law to resolve, including the interpretation of an unambiguous contract and the application of undisputed facts. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

Helmerich & Payne, Inc. (H&P) appeals a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, who are a class of oil and gas royalty owners. The class alleged that the defendant breached contractual and fiduciary duties by allowing uncompensated drainage of natural gas to occur from the leases and that the defendant engaged in constructive fraud and was unjustly enriched by failing to pay royalty amounts that the class alleged were included in a settlement between the defendant and ANR Pipeline. The jury returned verdicts on three alternative theories of recovery. The trial court judge granted judgment that included disgorgement of profits based on a sum the trial court found unjustly enriched H&P. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. H&P argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that: (1) the trial court erred in its jury instructions for uncompensated drainage that barred consideration of counterdrainage; (2) the appellate court erred by allowing a breach of contract claim to be recast as an equitable unjust enrichment claim; (3) the appellate court erred in affirming a "mathematically impossible" jury verdict on plaintiffs' constructive fraud claims; and (4) the appellate court erred in affirming the constructive fraud damage award notwithstanding that no fraud claim was ever certified. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) the trial court committed no reversible error; (2) the jury found that plaintiffs did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that H&P acted in reckless disregard for the rights of others, nor that H&P acted intentionally and with malice toward others; (3) because the Court reversed the judgment based on equity, the third reason for granting certiorari was answered; and (4) having reversed the constructive fraud damage award, the Court held this issue was moot. View "Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc." on Justia Law

A mineral lessee operated two wells on two contiguous tracts of land. When one of the wells stopped producing, the lessee pooled parts of the two mineral leases. Landowners subsequently bought a tract of land that included the road the lessee used to access the producing well. The road was across the surface of the lease without production. After traffic on the road increased, the landowners filed suit against the lessee, claiming that the lessee had no legal right to use the surface of their tract of land to produce minerals from the operating well. The trial court determined that the lessee did not have the right to use the road to access the producing lease and granted declaratory and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) once pooling occurred, the pooled parts of the two contiguous tracts no longer maintained separate identities insofar as where production from the pooled interests was located; and (2) therefore, the lessee had the right to use the road to access the pooled part of the tract of land containing the producing well. View "Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was an order of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission holding that it had jurisdiction to decide whether the force majeure clauses in the Appellants' contracts with Idaho Power Company excused them from their contractual obligations to have their power generation facilities constructed and in operation by specified dates in order to sell electricity to Idaho Power. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Idaho Power v. New Energy Two & IPUC" on Justia Law