Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1201, imposes a fee to underwrite the costs of restoring lands damaged by mining. The fee is 28 cents per ton of coal produced by surface mining and the lesser of 12 cents per ton produced by underground mining, or 10 percent of the value of the coal at the mine. The reclamation fee for lignite coal is the lesser of eight cents per ton or two percent of the value of the coal at the mine. Lignite coal produces less than 8,300 British thermal units per pound, less energy than produced by bituminous, subbituminous, and anthracite coal. In the area of Wyodak’s strip mine near Gillette, Wyoming, coal transitions from subbituminous to lignite in the seams. The end product of the mine’s process is a mixture of subbituminous and lignite coal. Wyodak paid the higher reclamation fee for non-lignite coal. In 2005, Wyodak‘s consultant estimated that 12 percent of its coal was lignite and 88 percent was higher quality. The Office of Surface Mining denied a requested refund. The Claims Court first rejected claims not arising within six years of the filing date, then denied relief, holding that the fee is on coal as extracted. Because the BTU value of the blend was higher than 8300 BTUs per pound, Wyodak was not entitled to a refund for any lignite in the mix. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that Wyodak had the burden of proving entitlement to and the amount of any refund. View "Wyodak Res. Dev. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Entergy filed suit against Vermont seeking a declaratory judgment that Vermont's Electrical Energy Generating Tax was unconstitutional. On appeal, Entergy challenged the district court's grant of Vermont's motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. At issue was whether the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, denied the federal courts jurisdiction to review Entergy's challenges to the Generating Tax. The Act prohibits federal courts from interfering with state taxation schemes so long as the state courts offer an adequate forum to litigate the validity of the tax. The court concluded that the Act applied to the Generating Tax and that Vermont provided a plain, speedy, and efficient mechanism for raising Entergy's objections to the validity of the tax. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Entergy Nuclear v. Shumlin" on Justia Law

Since the early 1990s, Chevron and its predecessor Texaco, Inc., have defended litigation concerning Texaco's operations in Ecuador and the environmental contamination it allegedly produced. This litigation started in the Southern District of New York but eventually found its way to Ecuadorian courts. In 2011, the court in Lago Agrio entered an $18.2 billion judgment against Chevron, which Chevron appealed. In this case, Chevron appealed the United States district court's order granting a motion to compel production of documents pursuant to subpoenas issued under 28 U.S.C. 1782. Chevron sought relief from that judgment pursuant to investment treaty arbitration under United Nations' rules. Finding no error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "The Republic of Ecuador, et al v. Bjorkman" on Justia Law

Sasafrasnet, an authorized distributor of BP products, provided Joseph with notice of its intent to terminate his franchise based on three occasions when Sasafrasnet attempted to debit Joseph’s bank account to pay for fuel deliveries but payment was denied for insufficient funds. The district court denied Joseph a preliminary injunction, finding that Joseph failed to meet his burden for a preliminary injunction under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 15 U.S.C. 2805(b)(2)(A)(ii). After a remand, the district court found that two of Joseph’s NSFs should count as “failures” under the PMPA justifying termination, at least for purposes of showing that he was not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Joseph’s bank account was not adequately funded for the debit on two occasions because Joseph had decided to change banks, circumstances entirely within Joseph’s control. Given Joseph’s history of making late payments in substantial amounts because of insufficient funds (each was more than $22,000), the delinquent payments were not “technical” or “unimportant.” View "Joseph v. Sasafrasnet, LLC" on Justia Law

APAC petitioned for review of a settlement agreement between the BPA and a large number of its customers. The settlement set terms for refunding customers who were previously over-charged, as well as setting terms for the next seventeen years. APAC alleged that the settlement violated several provisions of the Pacific Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act (NWPA), 16 U.S.C. 839c(c), 839e(b); the Bonneville Project Act, 16 U.S.C. 832d(a); regulations of the Federal Energy Commission, 18 C.F.R. 300.1(b)(6), 300.21(e)(1); and the court's decision in Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. BPA and Golden NW. Aluminum, Inc. v. BPA. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that APAC had standing to challenge the settlement because of the "pass-through" contracts under which its members pay rates that directly reflect the rates BPA charged its direct customers. On the merits, the court concluded that the settlement complied with the relevant statutory requirements and with the court's prior decisions. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "APAC v. BPA" on Justia Law

This matter arose from efforts by Wasatch Wind Intermountain, LLC to establish two wind energy projects. These efforts drew the ire of the Northern Laramie Range Alliance, which objected to Wasatch’s certification to sell the energy. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected the objections, and the Alliance appealed FERC’s decision. The threshold issue for the Tenth Circuit was whether the Alliance has established standing, which requires traceability and redressability. For both, the Alliance relied on increases in electricity rates. But the wind projects had not been completed, Wasatch had not found a buyer for the anticipated wind power, and it was unknown whether sales of wind energy would increase or decrease Northern Laramie's costs. With the uncertainties surrounding the effect of Wasatch’s certification or decertification on electricity rates, the Court concluded the Alliance did not show either traceability or redressability. The Court therefore dismissed the petition for lack of standing. View "N. Laramie Range Alliance v. FERC" on Justia Law

Under a Power Sales Agreement, the Authorities granted Entergy the right to oversee the generation of power and to purchase the generated power. Plaintiffs filed suit against Entergy after their properties were flooded and eroded after the Authorities and Entergy opened spillway gates during certain times. Because the state law property damages claims at issue here infringed on FERC's operational control, the court held that they were conflict preempted. Accordingly, the court held that the district court properly concluded that the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791-828c, preempted plaintiffs' claim for negligence. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "Simmons, et al. v. Sabine River Authority, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform oil spill. On appeal, BP challenged the district court's decision upholding the Claims Administrator's interpretation of the settlement agreement between it and the class of parties injured in the oil spill and the district court's dismissal of its action for breach of contract against the Administrator and denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the balance of equities favored a tailored stay where those who experienced actual injury traceable to loss from the Deepwater Horizon accident continued to receive recovery but those who did not receive their payments until this case was fully heard and decided through the judicial process weighed in favor of BP. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction and instructed the district court to expeditiously craft a narrowly-tailored injunction that allowed the time necessary for deliberate reconsideration of significant issues on remand. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of BP's suit against the Claim Administrator. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that Amaranth, a hedge fund, had manipulated the price of natural gas futures in violation of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq. Plaintiffs also alleged that J.P. Morgan had aided and abetted Amaranth's manipulation of natural gas futures through J.P. Futures' services as Amaranth's futures commission merchant and clearing broker. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the district court did not apply the correct standard in evaluating the sufficiency of their amended complaint and likewise failed to recognize the amended complaint's well-pleaded allegations that J.P. Futures aided and abetted Amaranth's manipulation within the meaning of Section 22 of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 25(a). The court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiffs' amended complaint failed to state a claim against J.P. Futures. Because the court concluded that this was so even under the pleading standards that plaintiffs argued should apply, the court did not decide whether the district court's application of a more stringent standard was error. View "In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig." on Justia Law

G&M filed suit against BP, asserting that it was a co-owner of both the pumping station and the land on which it sits and seeking an accounting for all revenue and profit that BP made from the pumping station. The district court granted summary judgment for BP where BP contended that the St. Julien Doctrine prescribed G&M's claim and contested G&M's assertion of co-ownership. The court concluded that the St. Julien Doctrine did not apply in this case where the bare existence of the pumping station did not demonstrate G&M's consent or acquiescence to a servitude. Nor could G&M's inaction in the expropriation action serve as the basis for finding this final element of the St. Julien Doctrine. Because G&M never acquired an ownership interest in the pumping station, the resolution of this issue turned on whether those profits were the "civil fruits" of the co-owned Tract. The district court reversed and remanded to the district court to further consider whether the profits were civil fruits of the Tract and, if so, whether G&M was therefore entitled to an accounting. View "Gulf and Miss. River Transp. Co., Ltd. v. BP Oil Pipeline Co." on Justia Law