Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

NRG petitioned for review of FERC's order approving a settlement between PJM, NYISO, ConEd, PSE&G, and others regarding transmission service agreements. NRG objected to the settlement, which gave ConEd transmission rights not available to other market participants. The court concluded that FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving an agreement that did not conform to PJM's open-access transmission tariff and that FERC's justifications for approving the agreement were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "NRG Power Marketing, LLC, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in two underlying lawsuits (the Briley Lawsuit and the McSpadden Lawsuit). These underlying lawsuits sought damages arising out of Doe Run's operation of a five-hundred-acre waste pile (Leadwood Pile). The court concluded that the pollution exclusions in the CGL policies precluded a duty to defend Doe Run in the Briley Lawsuit. The court concluded, however, that the McSpadden Lawsuit included allegations and claims that were not unambiguously barred from coverage by the pollution exclusions in the policies. The McSpadden Lawsuit alleged that the distribution of toxic materials harmed plaintiffs, without specifying how that harm occurred. The McSpadden complaint also alleged that Doe Run caused bodily injury or property damage when it left the Leadwood Pile open and available for use by the public without posting warning signs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Doe Run commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking to enforce Lexington's contractual duty to defend Doe Run per its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies in an underlying lawsuit. The underlying lawsuit alleged environmental property damage resulting from Doe Run's mine and mill operations. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Lexington had no duty to defend because the policies' absolute pollution exclusions unambiguously barred coverage of all claims asserted in the underlying lawsuit. View "Doe Run Resources Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Cumberland petitioned for review of the Commission's determination that Cumberland's failure to maintain adequate emergency lifelines in its mine's escapeways was a significant and substantial violation of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 814(d)(1). The court denied the petition for review, concluding that the Commission applied the correct significant and substantial standard and that substantial evidence supported its findings. View "Cumberland Coal Resources, LP v. MSHR, et al." on Justia Law

Control of most of the U.S. electrical grid is divided among Regional Transmission Organizations, voluntary associations of utilities that own interconnected transmission lines. Power plants and other electrical companies involved with the regional grid can also be RTO members. An RTO sought approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to impose a tariff on its members to pay for construction of new high-voltage power lines that will primarily transmit electricity generated by remote wind farms. Every state in the region, except Kentucky, encourages or mandates that utilities obtain a percentage of their electricity supply from renewable sources. The cost of the project is to be shared by utilities drawing power from the grid according to each utility’s share of the region’s total wholesale consumption of electricity. The RTO previously allocated the cost of expanding or upgrading the grid to utilities nearest a proposed transmission line, on the theory that they would get the most benefit. FERC approved the rate design and pilot projects. The RTO negotiated a rate with another RTO to share the costs of some upgrades with mutual benefits. Members of the RTO challenged the approval and the agreement and some announced their departure from the RTO. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the orders, but dismissed as premature the claims of departing members concerning their liability and remanded with respect to export pricing in connection with the agreement. View "Am. Mun. Power, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case involved two common methods employed to blend ethanol with conventional gasoline: inline blending and splash blending. Plaintiffs, API and AFPMA, brought federal preemption-based challenges in the district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of North Carolina's Ethanol Blending Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-90. Although the court agreed with the district court insofar as it rejected plaintiffs' Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2801-2841, and federal renewable fuel program preemption challenges, the court held that genuine issues of material fact remained unresolved as to plaintiffs' Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1113, preemption challenge to the Blending Statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Petroleum Institute v. Cooper, III" on Justia Law

Westmoreland challenged an ALJ's decision, affirmed by the Benefits Review Board, to award black lung benefits to one of Westmoreland's former employees. The ALJ found that the evidence failed to establish that the employee suffered from clinical pneumoconiosis but did establish that the employee suffered from legal pneumoconiosis. Regarding this legal pneumoconiosis finding, the ALJ chose to credit one medical opinion over others. The ALJ also found that the employee was totally disabled as a result of his pneumoconiosis and thus awarded him benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901 et seq. The court concluded that the ALJ's decision and order to award benefits was supported by substantial evidence, rational, and consistent with applicable law. Therefore, the Board did not err in affirming the ALJ's decision and order, and the court accordingly denied Westmoreland's petition for review. View "Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Cochran" on Justia Law

In 2003, after more than a decade of litigation, the IRS assessed penalties under now-repealed I.R.C. 6621(c), which penalizes “substantial” underpayments of tax “attributable to tax motivated transactions” against the 19 partners of the Dillon Oil Technology Partnership in tax years 1983 and 1984. The partners paid the tax and penalties in 2004, and, in 2006, initiated a refund suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1 I.R.C.7422(h), which provides that individual partners may not bring tax challenges relating to subject matter “attributable to a partnership item.” Such claims must be brought in a partnership-level suit by the partnership representative or Tax Matters Partner. The Federal Circuit affirmed, calling the claim an impermissible collateral attack. View "Bush v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the owners and lessors of royalty rights to natural gas produced in Trumbull and Mahoning Counties in Ohio, filed a putative class-action lawsuit, alleging that three interrelated energy companies that entered into oil and gas leases with plaintiffs deliberately and fraudulently underpaid gas royalties over more than a decade. Plaintiffs asserted breach of contract and five additional tort and quasi-contract claims and sought compensatory and punitive damages. The district court dismissed, holding that the contract claim was time-barred by Ohio’s four-year statute of limitations and that none of the tort and quasi-contract claims were separate and distinct from the underlying contract action because they did not allege any obligations apart from those imposed by the leases. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that the district court failed to consider plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment argument and that allegations regarding due diligence were sufficient to require further analysis. View "Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's revised emissions standards for secondary lead smelting facilities. In 2012, acting pursuant to sections 112(d)(6) and 112(f)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(d)(6), (f)(2), EPA revised the 1995 emissions standards for secondary lead smelting facilities, reducing allowable emissions by 90% and requiring smelters to totally enclose certain "fugitive" emission sources. Industry petitioners first argued that the Secondary Lead Rule impermissibly regulated elemental lead as hazardous air pollutants (HAP). The court concluded, inter alia, that industry petitioners' first contention was time-barred and the second contention also failed because the Rule set HAP emissions standards at levels designed to attain the primary lead national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), not the converse. In regards to environmental petitioners' challenges, the court concluded that environmental petitioners have shown that their members would have standing under Article III to sue in their own right. However, environmental petitioners' challenge failed on the merits. Their primary argument that, when EPA revised emissions standards under section 112(d)(6), it must recalculate the maximum achievable control technology in accordance with sections 112(d)(2) and (d)(3), was barred by NRDC v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part the petitions for review. View "Assoc. of Battery Recyclers v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law