Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Columbia Gas disagrees with the Singhs over the scope of an existing pipeline right-of-way. Columbia suit in federal court to enjoin the Singhs and their tenant from engaging in activity that Columbia believed could lead to violations of Columbia’s duties under federal laws regulating natural gas service and pipeline safety. Although the cause of action appeared to be an Ohio interference-with-easement claim, Columbia’s complaint referred to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717–717w, as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Without explicitly addressing jurisdiction, the district court held a status conference at which the parties reached a settlement. When the Singhs refused to comply with Columbia’s understanding of the settlement, the district court granted Columbia’s motion to enforce the settlement. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction over this property dispute between nondiverse parties. Columbia’s complaint neither asserted a federal cause of action nor showed that a substantial federal interest was implicated by its state-law claim. View "Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Singh" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Congress's amendment of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), to establish a renewable fuel standard (RFS) program. API objected to the EPA's 2012 projection for cellulosic biofuel and to its refusal to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. The court rejected API's argument that the EPA failed to justify its determination not to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. However, because the EPA's methodology for making its cellulosic biofuel projection did not take neutral aim at accuracy, the court held that it was an unreasonable exercise of agency discretion. Accordingly, the court vacated the 2012 RFS rule and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

FM was awarded damages stemming from an industrial accident that destroyed a waste treatment plant at an oil refinery plant owned by Alon. On appeal, Alon challenged the damage determination. The court affirmed the damage determination, concluding that the district court was clearly presented with two permissible views of the evidence; few records were available to estimate the cost of rebuilding the plant at issue, which counseled in favor of using a multiplier; and the 2.25 multiplier used by the district court was well within the range recommended by the witnesses and was consistent with past experiences. View "Factory Mutual Ins., Co. v. Alon USA, L.P., et al" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between a natural gas clearinghouse, Dynegy, and two separate entities that managed refinery plants, Ergon Refining and Ergon-WV. Dynegy and Ergon Refining appealed the district court's holding that Dynegy had no contractual duty to Ergon Refining to attempt to secure replacement gas after declaring force majeure in response to hurricane damage, but did have such a duty to Ergon-WV under a separate contract. Although the district court mistakenly concluded that the Ergon Refining contract was ambiguous, it nevertheless correctly used extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' understanding of the contract's "reasonable dispatch" clause. The district court erred, however, in concluding that the Ergon-WV contract unambiguously required Dynegy to attempt to secure replacement gas. Therefore, the court held that neither contract required Dynegy to attempt to secure replacement gas during the force majeure period and affirmed the district court's ruling on the Ergon Refining contract and reversed with respect to the Ergon-WV contract. View "Ergon-West Virginia, Inc. v. Dynegy Marketing & Trade" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the multi-district litigation involving the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig oil spill. Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of its action brought under the citizen-suit provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9659(a), and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. 11046(a). The court concluded, with one exception, that the district court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's claims as moot because the Macondo well had been capped and sealed; on the present state of the record, plaintiff had standing to assert its claim for relief based on defendants' alleged failure to comply with the reporting requirements of EPCRA; and the EPCRA claim was not moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

Several environmental groups challenged decisions made by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) regarding the legality of thirty-nine oil and gas leases in Southern Utah, owned by Kirkwood Oil and Gas, LLC and William C. Kirkwood. In the 1980s, Kirkwood applied to have its oil and gas leases converted to combined hydrocarbon leases, which would allow Kirkwood to extract oil from tar sands. At the time, BLM never accepted or rejected Kirkwood's applications. Between 2006 and 2008, BLM and IBLA issued several decisions declaring that the underlying oil and gas leases were "suspended" pending review of the conversion applications. The groups alleged that the BLM and IBLA violated the Mineral Leasing Act and other federal laws by retroactively deeming the leases to be suspended, avoiding expiration of the leases according to their terms. The district court held the groups did not have standing to bring its claims and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the district court misapplied the law in important respects with regard to standing, the Tenth Circuit ultimately held that this case was not ripe for review. View "S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Palma" on Justia Law

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, which operated a nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire, applied to renew its operating license. NextEra submitted a required environmental report that concluded that offshore wind electric generation was not a reasonable alternative to the extended licensing of Seabrook. Several environmental groups (collectively, Petitioners) questioned and sought a hearing on NextEra's environmental report. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board admitted the contention, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) denied the admission of the contention, which resulted in Petitioners not being entitled to have a hearing on the merits about their contention that generation of electricity from offshore wind was a reasonable alternative source of baseload energy to the relicensing of Seabrook. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding (1) the NRC did not misapply case law interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act in formulating its contention-admissibility standard; and (2) NRC's conclusion that the contention was inadmissible was not arbitrary or capricious, and there was no basis in law to set it aside. View "Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Black Beauty petitioned for review of an order of the Federal MSHRC adopting the findings of the ALJ. The court held that the ALJ's conclusion that Black Beauty violated 30 C.F.R. 75.400 was supported by substantial evidence; Black Beauty's violation of section 75.400 constituted an unwarrantable failure; and the ALJ's high negligence finding was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Black Beauty Coal Co. v. MSHR, et al" on Justia Law

Ida-Therm, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, which held that a reservation of "all the oil, gas, and minerals, in, on, or under the surface of [deeded] lands," in a 1946 warranty deed included the geothermal resources underlying the property. The district court determined that the Deed's mineral reservation severed the mineral estate from the surface estate, and that geothermal resources were included in the scope of the mineral estate. Because the Supreme Court found that the term "mineral" was ambiguous with respect to the deed in question, and because ambiguous grants in deeds are construed against the grantor, the Court construed the grant in favor of Ida-Therm and reversed the district court. View "Ida-Therm v. Bedrock Geothermal" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of California generators, including Calpine, petitioned for review of FERC's orders under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824. On appeal, the court considered FERC's authority to regulate public-utility charges to independent generators for the latter's use of "station power" - the electricity necessary to operate a generator's requirements for light, heat, air conditioning, etc. The court concluded that FERC's jurisdictional determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The generators were on notice that they could be assessed retail charges for station power depending on the outcome of this litigation. The generators have alternative means of alleviating any potential grievances stemming from retroactive charges. Accordingly, Calpine's petition for review was denied and FERC's orders on remand were affirmed. View "Calpine Corp., et al v. FERC" on Justia Law