Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, which operated a nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire, applied to renew its operating license. NextEra submitted a required environmental report that concluded that offshore wind electric generation was not a reasonable alternative to the extended licensing of Seabrook. Several environmental groups (collectively, Petitioners) questioned and sought a hearing on NextEra's environmental report. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board admitted the contention, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) denied the admission of the contention, which resulted in Petitioners not being entitled to have a hearing on the merits about their contention that generation of electricity from offshore wind was a reasonable alternative source of baseload energy to the relicensing of Seabrook. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding (1) the NRC did not misapply case law interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act in formulating its contention-admissibility standard; and (2) NRC's conclusion that the contention was inadmissible was not arbitrary or capricious, and there was no basis in law to set it aside. View "Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Black Beauty petitioned for review of an order of the Federal MSHRC adopting the findings of the ALJ. The court held that the ALJ's conclusion that Black Beauty violated 30 C.F.R. 75.400 was supported by substantial evidence; Black Beauty's violation of section 75.400 constituted an unwarrantable failure; and the ALJ's high negligence finding was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Black Beauty Coal Co. v. MSHR, et al" on Justia Law

Ida-Therm, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, which held that a reservation of "all the oil, gas, and minerals, in, on, or under the surface of [deeded] lands," in a 1946 warranty deed included the geothermal resources underlying the property. The district court determined that the Deed's mineral reservation severed the mineral estate from the surface estate, and that geothermal resources were included in the scope of the mineral estate. Because the Supreme Court found that the term "mineral" was ambiguous with respect to the deed in question, and because ambiguous grants in deeds are construed against the grantor, the Court construed the grant in favor of Ida-Therm and reversed the district court. View "Ida-Therm v. Bedrock Geothermal" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of California generators, including Calpine, petitioned for review of FERC's orders under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824. On appeal, the court considered FERC's authority to regulate public-utility charges to independent generators for the latter's use of "station power" - the electricity necessary to operate a generator's requirements for light, heat, air conditioning, etc. The court concluded that FERC's jurisdictional determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The generators were on notice that they could be assessed retail charges for station power depending on the outcome of this litigation. The generators have alternative means of alleviating any potential grievances stemming from retroactive charges. Accordingly, Calpine's petition for review was denied and FERC's orders on remand were affirmed. View "Calpine Corp., et al v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Farrell, Trustee of the David Farrell Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment for defendants Vermont Electric Power Company and Vermont Transco (together, VELCO), the holders of an easement for the construction and operation of electrical transmission lines on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff claimed that VELCO's easement was limited to the installation and operation of transmission lines necessary for the "Queen City Tap Project." He argued that VELCO exceeded the scope of its easement by installing a second transmission line on plaintiff's property in connection with an unrelated transmission-line project. The trial court held that the easement's express terms authorized VELCO to install transmission lines unrelated to the Queen City Tap Project, and that any increased impact on plaintiff's property caused by the new line did not amount to overburdening. "VELCO's easement, by its express terms, authorized its installation of the NRP line on the Property. Such use is also consistent with the easement's purpose - the transmission of electricity - and does not impose an additional burden on the Property requiring further compensation." Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for VELCO was affirmed. View "Farrell v. Vermont Electric Power Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns three tracts, zoned agricultural, and challenged a 2009 amendment to the Winnebago County zoning ordinance that makes it easier to obtain permission to build a wind farm. She claimed that a wind farm on adjacent land would deprive the property “of the full extent of the kinetic energy of the wind and air as it enters the property, subjecting it to shadow flicker and reduction of light, severe noise, possible ice throw and blade throws, interference with radar, cell phone, GPS, television, and other wireless communications, increased likelihood of lightening damage and stray voltage. increased electromagnetic radiation, prevention of crop dusting, drying out her land, and killing raptors. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as simply that a wind farm adjacent to plaintiff’s property would be a nuisance. There is no merit to the claim that the amendment violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. It is a “modest legislative encouragement of wind farming,” within the constitutional authority, state as well as federal, of a local government.View "Muscarello v. Winnebago Cnty. Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the district court or the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim by a putative class of utility ratepayers in the City of Opelousas against Cleco Corporation and Cleco Power, LLC (Cleco). The ratepayers sought reimbursement for alleged overcharges for electricity for a period of nearly twenty years, based on a franchise agreement Cleco signed with the City of Opelousas in 1991. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and sustained Cleco's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction because this is primarily a rate case that must be decided, in the first instance, by the LPSC. Furthermore, the Court found that LA. CONST. art. IV, section 21 (C) was inapplicable, which excludes from the LPSC's exclusive authority a public utility owned, operated, or regulated by a political subdivision, as this case did not involve a municipally-owned public utility company. Accordingly, the rulings of the lower courts were vacated and the ratepayers' claims were dismissed. View "Opelousas Trust Authority v. Cleco Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of an asserted class, brought this action in state court against MFA, Casey's General Stores, and Quicktrip Corporation (the operators) under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.020, alleging that defendants misrepresented the grade of gas pumped at their stations. Casey's General Stores removed the case to the federal district court asserting that plaintiff's claim was completely preempted by the Petroleum Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2801 et seq., or alternatively, that there was diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1711 et seq. The court concluded that the absence of a federal cause of action in Subchapter II meant that plaintiff's claim was not completely preempted and that there was no federal jurisdiction over that claim. Since the question of whether there was jurisdiction under CAFA would benefit from full development and adversarial briefing, the court remanded those issues in order for the district court to consider whether there was federal jurisdiction over this case under CAFA. Accordingly, the court reversed the ruling that plaintiff's state claim was completely preempted and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. MFA Petroleum Co., et al" on Justia Law

Liberty Mutual insured PPI and PPI was retained by several third parties to assist in planning well-drilling operations. After a well was drilled in the wrong area, PPI was sued by the third parties, PPI then sought defense and indemnification from Liberty Mutual but Liberty Mutual refused. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of PPI's breach of contract claim because it had no duty to defend. Both parties acknowledged that the duty-to-indemnify issue was now moot. Because the court affirmed the breach of contract claim's dismissal, the court affirmed the breach of the Texas Insurance Code claim and breach of the good faith and fair dealing claims. View "PPI Technology Services, L.P. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico where an explosion killed 11 workers, caused the drilling platform to sink, and resulted in a major uncontrolled release of oil. At Presidential direction, those events prompted the Department of the Interior to prohibit all new and existing oil and gas drilling operations on the Outer Continental Shelf for six months. The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the moratorium. At issue on appeal was whether the Interior's subsequent actions violated a specific provision of the court's injunction, justifying a finding of civil contempt. The court held that even though the Interior immediately took steps to avoid the effect of the injunction, the court concluded that none of those actions violated the court's order. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Hornbeck Offshore Services, et al v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law