Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

FM was awarded damages stemming from an industrial accident that destroyed a waste treatment plant at an oil refinery plant owned by Alon. On appeal, Alon challenged the damage determination. The court affirmed the damage determination, concluding that the district court was clearly presented with two permissible views of the evidence; few records were available to estimate the cost of rebuilding the plant at issue, which counseled in favor of using a multiplier; and the 2.25 multiplier used by the district court was well within the range recommended by the witnesses and was consistent with past experiences. View "Factory Mutual Ins., Co. v. Alon USA, L.P., et al" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between a natural gas clearinghouse, Dynegy, and two separate entities that managed refinery plants, Ergon Refining and Ergon-WV. Dynegy and Ergon Refining appealed the district court's holding that Dynegy had no contractual duty to Ergon Refining to attempt to secure replacement gas after declaring force majeure in response to hurricane damage, but did have such a duty to Ergon-WV under a separate contract. Although the district court mistakenly concluded that the Ergon Refining contract was ambiguous, it nevertheless correctly used extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' understanding of the contract's "reasonable dispatch" clause. The district court erred, however, in concluding that the Ergon-WV contract unambiguously required Dynegy to attempt to secure replacement gas. Therefore, the court held that neither contract required Dynegy to attempt to secure replacement gas during the force majeure period and affirmed the district court's ruling on the Ergon Refining contract and reversed with respect to the Ergon-WV contract. View "Ergon-West Virginia, Inc. v. Dynegy Marketing & Trade" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the multi-district litigation involving the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig oil spill. Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of its action brought under the citizen-suit provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9659(a), and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. 11046(a). The court concluded, with one exception, that the district court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's claims as moot because the Macondo well had been capped and sealed; on the present state of the record, plaintiff had standing to assert its claim for relief based on defendants' alleged failure to comply with the reporting requirements of EPCRA; and the EPCRA claim was not moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

Several environmental groups challenged decisions made by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) regarding the legality of thirty-nine oil and gas leases in Southern Utah, owned by Kirkwood Oil and Gas, LLC and William C. Kirkwood. In the 1980s, Kirkwood applied to have its oil and gas leases converted to combined hydrocarbon leases, which would allow Kirkwood to extract oil from tar sands. At the time, BLM never accepted or rejected Kirkwood's applications. Between 2006 and 2008, BLM and IBLA issued several decisions declaring that the underlying oil and gas leases were "suspended" pending review of the conversion applications. The groups alleged that the BLM and IBLA violated the Mineral Leasing Act and other federal laws by retroactively deeming the leases to be suspended, avoiding expiration of the leases according to their terms. The district court held the groups did not have standing to bring its claims and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the district court misapplied the law in important respects with regard to standing, the Tenth Circuit ultimately held that this case was not ripe for review. View "S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Palma" on Justia Law

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, which operated a nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire, applied to renew its operating license. NextEra submitted a required environmental report that concluded that offshore wind electric generation was not a reasonable alternative to the extended licensing of Seabrook. Several environmental groups (collectively, Petitioners) questioned and sought a hearing on NextEra's environmental report. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board admitted the contention, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) denied the admission of the contention, which resulted in Petitioners not being entitled to have a hearing on the merits about their contention that generation of electricity from offshore wind was a reasonable alternative source of baseload energy to the relicensing of Seabrook. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding (1) the NRC did not misapply case law interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act in formulating its contention-admissibility standard; and (2) NRC's conclusion that the contention was inadmissible was not arbitrary or capricious, and there was no basis in law to set it aside. View "Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Black Beauty petitioned for review of an order of the Federal MSHRC adopting the findings of the ALJ. The court held that the ALJ's conclusion that Black Beauty violated 30 C.F.R. 75.400 was supported by substantial evidence; Black Beauty's violation of section 75.400 constituted an unwarrantable failure; and the ALJ's high negligence finding was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Black Beauty Coal Co. v. MSHR, et al" on Justia Law

Ida-Therm, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, which held that a reservation of "all the oil, gas, and minerals, in, on, or under the surface of [deeded] lands," in a 1946 warranty deed included the geothermal resources underlying the property. The district court determined that the Deed's mineral reservation severed the mineral estate from the surface estate, and that geothermal resources were included in the scope of the mineral estate. Because the Supreme Court found that the term "mineral" was ambiguous with respect to the deed in question, and because ambiguous grants in deeds are construed against the grantor, the Court construed the grant in favor of Ida-Therm and reversed the district court. View "Ida-Therm v. Bedrock Geothermal" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of California generators, including Calpine, petitioned for review of FERC's orders under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824. On appeal, the court considered FERC's authority to regulate public-utility charges to independent generators for the latter's use of "station power" - the electricity necessary to operate a generator's requirements for light, heat, air conditioning, etc. The court concluded that FERC's jurisdictional determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The generators were on notice that they could be assessed retail charges for station power depending on the outcome of this litigation. The generators have alternative means of alleviating any potential grievances stemming from retroactive charges. Accordingly, Calpine's petition for review was denied and FERC's orders on remand were affirmed. View "Calpine Corp., et al v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Farrell, Trustee of the David Farrell Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment for defendants Vermont Electric Power Company and Vermont Transco (together, VELCO), the holders of an easement for the construction and operation of electrical transmission lines on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff claimed that VELCO's easement was limited to the installation and operation of transmission lines necessary for the "Queen City Tap Project." He argued that VELCO exceeded the scope of its easement by installing a second transmission line on plaintiff's property in connection with an unrelated transmission-line project. The trial court held that the easement's express terms authorized VELCO to install transmission lines unrelated to the Queen City Tap Project, and that any increased impact on plaintiff's property caused by the new line did not amount to overburdening. "VELCO's easement, by its express terms, authorized its installation of the NRP line on the Property. Such use is also consistent with the easement's purpose - the transmission of electricity - and does not impose an additional burden on the Property requiring further compensation." Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment for VELCO was affirmed. View "Farrell v. Vermont Electric Power Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns three tracts, zoned agricultural, and challenged a 2009 amendment to the Winnebago County zoning ordinance that makes it easier to obtain permission to build a wind farm. She claimed that a wind farm on adjacent land would deprive the property “of the full extent of the kinetic energy of the wind and air as it enters the property, subjecting it to shadow flicker and reduction of light, severe noise, possible ice throw and blade throws, interference with radar, cell phone, GPS, television, and other wireless communications, increased likelihood of lightening damage and stray voltage. increased electromagnetic radiation, prevention of crop dusting, drying out her land, and killing raptors. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as simply that a wind farm adjacent to plaintiff’s property would be a nuisance. There is no merit to the claim that the amendment violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. It is a “modest legislative encouragement of wind farming,” within the constitutional authority, state as well as federal, of a local government.View "Muscarello v. Winnebago Cnty. Bd." on Justia Law