Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, the Lowell Mountains Group, Inc. (LMG), and the Towns of Albany and Craftsbury, challenged several Public Service Board orders related to the construction of a wind-electric-generation facility and associated facilities on Lowell Mountain in Lowell, Vermont. In May 2010, petitioners Green Mountain Power Corporation (GMP), Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc. (VEC), and Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc. and Vermont Transco LLC (VELCO) requested a certificate of public good (CPG) to construct a wind-electric-generation facility on Lowell Mountain. On May 31, 2011, following testimony, site visits, a public hearing, and hearings, the Board issued a final order granting a CPG subject to forty-five conditions. Appellants and several other parties moved for reconsideration. On July 12, 2011, the Board modified its final order in certain respects. The Towns and LMG appealed that final order with modifications. The parties also raised compliance issues with the final order that the Board ultimately overruled. Upon review of the Board's orders, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, and deferred to the Board's decisions with regard to the final order. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Board. View "In re Green Mountain Power Corp." on Justia Law

In consolidated interlocutory appeals, Defendants-Appellants, natural gas producers with wells in south central Kansas, challenged a preliminary injunction enjoining them from further gas production from those wells. The district court entered the preliminary injunction after concluding there was a substantial likelihood that Plaintiff-Appellee Northern Natural Gas Co. would prevail on its state-law claim alleging that Defendants' natural gas production from these wells was an actionable nuisance because it was disrupting Northern's nearby underground storage of natural gas. The parties agreed that, to prevail on its nuisance claim, Northern needed to establish four things: 1) Defendants acted with the intent to interfere with Northern's use and enjoyment of the storage field; 2) there was some interference with the use and enjoyment of the Field of the kind Defendants intended; 3) that interference was substantial; and 4) the interference was of a such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the Field. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was a substantial likelihood that Northern could prove all four of those elements of its nuisance claim. View "Northern Natural Gas Company v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

These consolidated petitions for review challenged a contract between the BPA and one of its long-time customers, Alcoa. BPA's preference customers and others filed this petition for review, requesting that the court hold that the contract was unlawful because it was inconsistent with the agency's statutory mandate to act in accordance with sound business principles. Petitioners claimed, among other things, that instead of entering into a contract to sell power to Alcoa at the statutorily required Industrial Firm power (IP) rate, BPA should sell to other buyers at the market rate. The court denied the petitions for review insofar as they pertained to the Initial Period. Because the potential for BPA and Alcoa to enter into the Second Period of the contract was no longer before the court, the court dismissed those portions of the petitions. Finally, the court held that because BPA relied on a categorical exclusion to the National Environmental Policy Act's (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, requirements, declining to complete an Environmental Impact Statement was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's NEPA claim. View "Alcoa Inc. v. BPA, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a trespass action for damages to their land caused by Defendant's seismic exploration activities. Plaintiffs originally filed their action in Oklahoma state court, but Defendant removed it to federal district court based on diversity of citizenship. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had permission to enter the property and conduct seismic testing from owners of the mineral rights and/or oil and gas leasehold rights, which lie under the surface estate of Plaintiffs' properties. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for Defendant. Defendant then sought an award of attorney's fees pursuant to title 12, section 940(A) of the Oklahoma Code. The district court awarded Defendant $71,560 in attorney's fees as the prevailing party. Plaintiffs appealed both the summary judgment and the award of attorney's fees. Upon review, and "in the face of […] clear Oklahoma precedent," the Tenth Circuit concluded there was no merit to Plaintiffs' challenge to the grant of summary judgment, or their argument that section 940(A) did not apply to the facts of the case. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in arriving at the final amount of the fees. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Kimzey, et al v. Flamingo Seismic" on Justia Law

In 1996, CP sued the United States, claiming that CP owned minerals underlying Louisiana property (Groups A, B, and C mineral servitudes), and that between 1943 and 1978, the government imposed a drilling and operations moratorium while the surface was used for bombing and artillery practice. It alleged that starting in 1992, the government, claiming ownership, has granted oil and gas leases covering the property. The district court granted the government summary judgment with regard to Groups A and B because the prescription period was not suspended by the moratoriums. Concerning Group C, the court granted CP summary judgment, finding that servitude imprescriptible. The Fifth Circuit affirmed; certiorari was denied. In1998, CP filed another complaint in the Claims Court, alleging taking without just compensation, as an alternative to its district court action. In 2004, the Claims Court dismissed the Groups A and B claims and limited the C claim to post-1992 action. The court found that the government’s issuance of leases after 1997 constituted a compensable temporary taking, but subsequently dismissed, finding that the facts alleged in the district court complaint were nearly identical. The complaints were “for or in respect to” the same claim and 28 U.S.C. 1500 precluded jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Cent. Pines Land Co., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

A quasi-independent governmental agency manages a program designed to improve power generation in small Alaska villages that are located off the electrical grid. One such village believed that the agency did not respect the wishes of village leaders in securing a contract to improve that village's power-generation facility. The village, joined by a company that produces a key component used in improving power generation in village areas, sued the agency. The plaintiffs alleged that the agency erroneously awarded contracts for power generation and that agency employees improperly disclosed the company's trade secrets to its competitor. The superior court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims on motions for summary judgment. Because the Supreme Court agreed there were no disputed issues of material fact and the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court in all respects. View "Powercorp Alaska v. Alaska Energy Authority" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively "Tellus") alleged that they owned the "shallow gas" rights in a tract of land known as the Bilbo A Lease. While ownership of the shallow gas was disputed, all parties agreed that the defendants (collectively "TPIC") owned the gas rights below 8,000 feet and the oil rights in both the shallow and deep zones. In 2004, Tellus sued TPIC, alleging that it had produced Tellus's shallow gas through one if its wells known as the A-1 well. After much pretrial litigation and a two-month jury trial, the trial judge declared that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners and submitted the plaintiffs' conversion and negligence claims to a jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, and both sides appealed. Finding no reason to reverse, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and the trial court's declaratory judgment. View "Tellus Operating Group, LLC, v. Texas Petroleum Investment Co." on Justia Law

The Automotive United Trades Organization (AUTO) and Tower Energy Group (Tower) brought an as-applied state constitutional challenge to a tax based on the possession of petroleum as a hazardous substance. AUTO and Tower claimed that the hazardous substances tax (HST) violated article II, section 40 of the state constitution because the revenue from motor vehicle fuel was not being "placed in a special fund to be used exclusively for highway purposes." The trial court held on summary judgment that AUTO's claim was barred because it was not filed within a reasonable time under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and that the HST does not violate article II, section 40. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court reversed the trial court in barring AUTO and Tower from bringing their constitutional challenge because to do so would deprive the Supreme Court of its vested power to determine the constitutionality of specific legislation. The Court affirmed the trial court, however, in granting summary judgment to the State because article II, section 40 provides that "this section shall not be construed to include revenue from general or special taxes or excises not levied primarily for highway purposes." View "Auto. United Trades Org. v. Washington" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the recent energy crisis. Appellants alleged that Respondents, in violation of Nevada antitrust laws, conspired with the now-defunct Enron Corporation to drive up the price of natural gas in the Southern Nevada and Southeastern California markets. Appellants asserted (1) Respondents engaged in rapid bursts of purchasing natural gas followed by rapid bursts of selling the same gas, which resulted in considerable profits for Respondents and significantly higher prices for natural gas consumers; and (2) Respondents' plan for manipulating the markets worked because of a secret agreement with Enron that left Respondents with greater profits from the sale of gas as well as ensured that Respondents would always have a sufficient supply of natural gas. The district court ultimately dismissed the case, holding that the claims were barred by principles of federal preemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants' claims were barred by federal field preemption. View "State v. Reliant Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Kivalina appealed the district court's dismissal of their action for damages against Energy Producers. Kivalina alleged that massive greenhouse gas emissions emitted by the Energy Producers have resulted in global warming, which, in turn, has severely eroded the land where the City of Kivalina sits and threatens it with imminent destruction. Kivalina sought damages under a federal common law claim of public nuisance. At issue was whether the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., and the EPA action that the Act authorized, displaced Kivalina's claims. The court concluded that the Supreme Court has held that federal common law addressing domestic greenhouse gas emissions has been displaced by Congressional action. That determination displaced federal common law public nuisance actions seeking damages, as well as those actions seeking injunctive relief. The civil conspiracy claim fell within the substantive claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Native Village of Kivalina, et al v. Exxonmobile Corp., et al" on Justia Law