Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

The Automotive United Trades Organization (AUTO) and Tower Energy Group (Tower) brought an as-applied state constitutional challenge to a tax based on the possession of petroleum as a hazardous substance. AUTO and Tower claimed that the hazardous substances tax (HST) violated article II, section 40 of the state constitution because the revenue from motor vehicle fuel was not being "placed in a special fund to be used exclusively for highway purposes." The trial court held on summary judgment that AUTO's claim was barred because it was not filed within a reasonable time under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and that the HST does not violate article II, section 40. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court reversed the trial court in barring AUTO and Tower from bringing their constitutional challenge because to do so would deprive the Supreme Court of its vested power to determine the constitutionality of specific legislation. The Court affirmed the trial court, however, in granting summary judgment to the State because article II, section 40 provides that "this section shall not be construed to include revenue from general or special taxes or excises not levied primarily for highway purposes." View "Auto. United Trades Org. v. Washington" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the recent energy crisis. Appellants alleged that Respondents, in violation of Nevada antitrust laws, conspired with the now-defunct Enron Corporation to drive up the price of natural gas in the Southern Nevada and Southeastern California markets. Appellants asserted (1) Respondents engaged in rapid bursts of purchasing natural gas followed by rapid bursts of selling the same gas, which resulted in considerable profits for Respondents and significantly higher prices for natural gas consumers; and (2) Respondents' plan for manipulating the markets worked because of a secret agreement with Enron that left Respondents with greater profits from the sale of gas as well as ensured that Respondents would always have a sufficient supply of natural gas. The district court ultimately dismissed the case, holding that the claims were barred by principles of federal preemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants' claims were barred by federal field preemption. View "State v. Reliant Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Kivalina appealed the district court's dismissal of their action for damages against Energy Producers. Kivalina alleged that massive greenhouse gas emissions emitted by the Energy Producers have resulted in global warming, which, in turn, has severely eroded the land where the City of Kivalina sits and threatens it with imminent destruction. Kivalina sought damages under a federal common law claim of public nuisance. At issue was whether the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., and the EPA action that the Act authorized, displaced Kivalina's claims. The court concluded that the Supreme Court has held that federal common law addressing domestic greenhouse gas emissions has been displaced by Congressional action. That determination displaced federal common law public nuisance actions seeking damages, as well as those actions seeking injunctive relief. The civil conspiracy claim fell within the substantive claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Native Village of Kivalina, et al v. Exxonmobile Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Tim DeChristopher entered a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oil and gas lease auction in Salt Lake City, Utah, by representing he was a bidder. His purpose was to disrupt the auction and call attention to the potential environmental harms of drilling on the leases. He proceeded to drive up the auction prices and ultimately won almost $1.8 million in bids, for which he was unable to pay. A jury convicted Defendant of interfering with the provisions of Chapter 3A of the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act, and making a false statement or representation. He appealed, raising eight separate issues related to his conviction. Upon review of each, the Tenth Circuit determined they had no merit and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. DeChristopher" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the order of the circuit court dismissing their claims and quieting title to mineral interests, including oil and gas rights, in appellee Upland Industrial Development Company, Inc. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) interpreting the Strohacker doctrine and applying the doctrine to the facts of this case; (2) placing the burden of proof on Appellants; and (3) finding that this was an actino to quiet title and, thus, finding no constitutional right to a jury trial was present. In addition, the Court concluded that Appellant's had no standing to raise on appeal the argument that the circuit court erred in granting Appellee SEECO, Inc.'s motion for attorneys' fees because Appellants were not aggrieved by the court's order. View "Nicholson v. Upland Indus. Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Chesapeake Exploration entered into an agreement to purchase deep rights held by Peak Energy in certain oil and gas leases in the Haynesville Shale formation at a certain price. Peak Energy filed a complaint against Chesapeake Exploration after Chesapeake Exploration refused to honor its commitment when the price of natural gas plummeted several months after the agreement. Chesapeake Exploration argued that the agreement was unenforceable under the Texas statute of frauds, fatally indefinite, and that Peak Energy had failed to tender performance. The court held that the district court did not err in its instructions to its expert, or in holding that the agreement was enforceable under the statute of frauds; in finding that Peak Energy was willing and able to tender performance of the agreement; and in calculating damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Coe, et al v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a related case currently pending in a United Kingdom Litigation, which arose from contractual disputes related to the exploration, development, and operation of oil blocks in Kurdistan, Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by granting a motion to quash certain discovery subpoenas before plaintiff had an opportunity to respond in opposition and by not providing any reasons on the record for its decision. The court vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions to allow plaintiff a reasonable period to respond to the motion and, thereafter, to provide written or oral reasons for the basis of its ruling. Otherwise, the district court was fully empowered to resolve these discovery disputes in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion. View "Texas Keystone, Inc. v. Prime Natural Resources, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case involved the duties and standard of care of an oil and gas operator under an exculpatory clause in a joint operating agreement (JOA). Based on language in the exculpatory clause in the JOA, the trial court instructed the jury to find that to find a breach of the JOA the operator's conduct must have risen to the level of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The jury found the operator, Petitioner, breached his duties under the JOA to the working interest owners. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the gross negligence and willful misconduct instruction should not have been included in the charge because the case centered around a breach of contract; but (2) there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that Petitioner breached his duty as operator when measured against the elements of breach of contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the exculpatory clause in the JOA established the standard for the claims against Petitioner; and (2) there was legally insufficient evidence that Petitioner was grossly negligent or acted with willful misconduct. View "Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

Joe Waldock appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to 25 percent of the mineral interests under a tract of land in Mountrail County in the successors in interest of the Estate of William C. Edwardson. Waldock argued the district court erred in deciding a 1954 administrator's deed from Edwardson's Estate to Waldock's predecessor in interest, Clark Van Horn, was equivalent to a quitclaim deed and in deciding the rule for interpreting mineral conveyances from "Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Co.," (144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940)), was not applicable to the administrator's deed. ThUpon review, the Supreme Court concluded the legal effect of the plain language of the administrator's deed conveyed 25 percent of the mineral interests to Waldock's predecessor in interest and reserved 25 percent of the mineral interests to Edwardson's Estate. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corporation" on Justia Law

The successors to the interests of eight siblings of John Q. Nichols ("Goughnour defendants") appealed the grant of summary judgment in a quiet title action by the successors to the interests of John Q. Nichols ("Nichols plaintiffs") to determine ownership of 1/2 of the mineral interests in a parcel of land in Mountrail County. The Goughnour defendants claimed they collectively owned 1/4 of the mineral interests in the land and the Nichols plaintiffs owned 1/4 of the mineral interests. The district court decided the Goughnour defendants collectively owned 1/9 of the mineral interests in the land and the Nichols plaintiffs owned 7/18 of the mineral interests. After review of the district court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nichols v. Goughnor" on Justia Law