Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Grand Valley Citizens' Alliance filed a complaint alleging that it was entitled to a hearing on an application for permit to drill pursuant to section 34-60-108(7), C.R.S. (2011), of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that under subsection 108(7), Grand Valley Citizens were entitled to a hearing because it had a filed a petition on a matter within the jurisdiction of the Commission. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals judgment, holding that section 34-60-108(7) requires a hearing only for rules, regulations, and orders. Permits are governed by section 34-60-106(1)(f), which grants the Oil and Gas Commission broad authority to promulgate rules governing the permitting process, including the authority to determine who may request a hearing. View "Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

With the approval of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC), in 2005 the Public Service Company of Colorado (Xcel) began constructing a coal-fired electric power unit known as "Comanche 3." When Xcel sought to recover a portion of its construction costs nearly four years later in a rate proceeding, Petitioner Leslie Glustrom intervened. Petitioner sought to introduce testimony that Xcel acted improperly and, consequently, should not recover its costs. The PUC excluded most of her testimony, a ruling that Petitioner challenged. Petitioner separately challenged the depreciation rate and the possibility that Comanche 3 might not be "used and useful" at the time rates went into effect. The PUC denied her challenges, and the district court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the PUC did not abuse its discretion when it struck substantial portions of Petitioner's testimony pursuant to the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Further, the depreciation rate approved by the PUC was established pursuant to law and in accordance with the evidence. Lastly, the PUC was free to exercise its discretion in departing from a strict application of the "used and useful" principle. Petitioner failed to meet her burden in showing why such a departure here would result in a rate that is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. View "Glustrom v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit concerned a challenge to an exploratory drilling plan under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OSCLA). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) approved the Shell Exploration Plan S-7444 (Shell EP) to conduct drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. The Plan covered ten exploratory wells on offshore Alabama leases in the central Gulf. This case was a consolidated appeal in which Petitioners the Defenders of Wildlife, the Gulf Restoration Network and others filed comments on the Shell EP, participated in the ancillary administrative proceedings, and then filed a petition with the Court for review. The only issues for the Court's review were whether the Shell EP violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). After review of the parties' briefs and the record below, the Court denied the petition for review, finding the BOEM's decision to approve the Shell EP was not arbitrary or capricious and instead, "reflected the agency's balance of environmental concerns with the expeditious and orderly exploration of resources in the Gulf of Mexico." View "Defenders of Wildlife, et al v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Managem, et al" on Justia Law

RSM Production Corporation brought a complaint against a law firm and two of its partners ("Freshfields"), alleging that Freshfields, through its representation of the nation of Grenada in international arbitration, conspired to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in an effort to prevent RSM from obtaining an exclusive license for offshore oil and gas exploration and development in Grenada. The district court ruled that RSM's lawsuit was barred under the doctrine of res judicata because of its prior lawsuit in the Southern District of New York regarding the same licensing effort. On appeal, RSM contended that Freshfields was not in privity with the New York defendants and that RSM was not required to add Freshfields as a party to that litigation on pain of res judicata. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the alternative ground that RSM's complaint failed to state a claim of RICO conspiracy against Freshfields. View "RSM Prod. Corp. v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer U.S. LLP" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation's (MBOGC) issuance of twenty-three gas well permits to Fidelity Exploration and Production Company in the area known as the Cedar Creek Anticline (CCA). The Montana Wildlife Federation and National Wildlife Federation (collectively, Federations) challenged the issuance of the permits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, MBOGC, Fidelity, and Montana Petroleum Association, holding that the Federations failed to rebut the presumption of validity in the MBOGC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) conducting its review under Mont. Code Ann. 82-11-144 and in considering evidence outside the administrative record; (2) determining that the environmental assessments prepared by MBOGC for gas development in the CCA were adequate under the Montana Environmental Policy Act; and (3) ruling that MBOGC did not have to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement for oil and gas development in the CCA. View "Mont. Wildlife Fed'n v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation" on Justia Law

This case arose when the owner of a gas-fired electric power generating plant sued the owner of the pipeline that supplied fuel to the plant for negligence in allowing interruptions in service and in delivering gas below contractual quality standards. The court held that Wolf Hollow could not assert its delivery and quality claims against Enterprise in an action for negligence, and though it could assert its quality claim against Enterprise through an assignment from El Paso, the damages it sought would be barred by the consequential damages waivers. Those waivers also precluded Wolf Hollow's recovery of plant damages from El Paso, but El Paso had not established that they precluded recovery of replacement-power damages. Because Wolf Hollow's replacement-power claim survived, the trial court's declaratory judgment was not moot. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "El Paso Marketing L.P., et al. v. Wolf Hollow I, L.P." on Justia Law

Ohio individuals and businesses sued Duke Energy, alleging violation of the Robinson-Patman Act , 15 U.S.C. 13, Ohio's Pattern of Corrupt Activity Act, a civil RICO claim, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), and common-law claims of fraud and civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs alleged that Duke, through subsidiaries and an affiliated company, paid unlawful and substantial rebates to certain large customers, including General Motors, in exchange for the withdrawal by said customers of objections to a rate-stabilization plan that Duke was attempting to have approved by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio as part of a transition to market-based pricing under Ohio Rev. Code 4928.05, enacted in 1999. The district court dismissed, finding that it was deprived of federal question jurisdiction by the filed-rate doctrine, requiring that common carriers and their customers adhere to tariffs filed and approved by the appropriate regulatory agencies, and that PUCO had exclusive jurisdiction over state-law claims, depriving the court of diversity jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the filed-rate doctrine applies only in challenges to the underlying reasonableness or setting of filed rates and that plaintiffs adequately stated claims. View "Williams v. Duke Energy Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff alleged that defendant owed it mineral royalty payments pursuant to an area-of-interest provision contained in a 1979 agreement. The court certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court: (1) Under Nevada law, does the Rule Against Perpetuities apply to an area-of-interest provision in a commercial agreement? and (2) If the Rule Against Perpetuities did apply, is reformation available under Nevada Revised Statute 111.1039(2)? All further proceedings in the case were stayed pending receipt of the answer from the Nevada Supreme Court. View "Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1983, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101-10270, authorized the Department of Energy to contract with nuclear facilities for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. The Standard Contract provided that rights and duties may be assignable with transfer of SNF title. Plaintiff entered into the Standard Contract in 1983 and sold its operation and SNF to ENVY in 2002, including assignment of the Standard Contract, except one payment obligation. Plaintiff transferred claims related to DOE defaults. As a result of DOE’s breach, ENVY built on-site dry-storage facilities. The Claims Court consolidated ENVY’s suit with plaintiff’s suit. The government admitted breach; the Claims Court awarded ENVY $34,895,467 (undisputed damages) and certain disputed damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Plaintiff validly assigned pre-existing claims; while partial assignment of rights and duties under the contract was not valid, the government waived objection. The assignment encompassed claims against the government. Legal and lobbying fees to secure Vermont approval for mitigation were foreseeable, but other expenses were not recoverable. ENVY failed to prove costs of disposing of contaminated material discovered due to the breach and its characterization of spent fuel moved to dry storage. ENVY is not entitled to recover cost of capital for funding mitigation, or Resource Code 19 payroll loader overhead costs, but may recover capital suspense loader overhead costs,.View "VT Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Ruling on a joint petition for declaratory order filed by Monongahela Power Company and Potomac Edison Company ("The Utilities"), The Public Service Commission of West Virginia held that the alternative and renewable energy resource credits attributable to energy purchases by the Utilities from Morgantown Energy Associates (MEA) and the City of New Martinsville ("the Generators"), were owned by the Utilities during the terms of electric energy purchase agreements between the entities. On appeal, the Generators contended that the Commission erred in its ruling and that the energy resource credits were owned by them. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err in finding the credits at issue were owned by the Utilities; and (2) the Commission did not err in holding that it would deem MEA's Morgantown project as a certified facility under the Alternative and Renewable Energy Portfolio Act upon the submission of sufficient evidence by the Utilities. View "City of New Martinsville v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n " on Justia Law