Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Covanta Maine, LLC (Covanta), a subsidiary of Covanta Energy, appealed from orders of the Public Utilities Commission denying Covanta's requests for certification of two of its facilities as Class I new renewable resources. Covanta argued that the Commission erred by basing its conclusion that the facilities were not refurbished on the ratio of Covanta's expenditures in the facilities to the value of those facilities, and it therefore asserted that the Commission improperly denied certification of its two facilities. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Commission, holding that the Commission erred by establishing a requirement that the expenditures meet some minimum level that equals an unspecified percentage of the total value of the facility. Remanded. View "Covanta Maine, LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 1957 the Commonwealth constructed the Quehanna Wild Area Nuclear Site. Part of the site was donated to Pennsylvania State University. Until 1967 Penn State leased to a Lockheed predecessor, conducting work under Atomic Energy Commission contracts, involving Strontium-90, a radioactive isotope. The predecessor partially decontaminated. According to Lockheed, the Commonwealth was aware that Strontium-90 remained and could not be removed without dismantling the facility. In the 1990s, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ordered the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, and the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources to decommission the facility. This cost more than $20 million. PADEP sued Lockheed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a). Lockheed defended that the Commonwealth should recover less than its demand based on its own conduct and liability and the doctrines of unclean hands, estoppel, waiver, and laches. Lockheed also alleged that PADEP was liable under CERCLA as an owner-operator and as having arranged for or transported hazardous substances. The district court dismissed Lockheed’s third-party complaint, concluding that the Commonwealth and DCNR retained Eleventh Amendment immunity when PADEP filed a federal suit. The Third Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss the third party complaint as moot, based on the sufficiency of Lockheed’s affirmative defenses. View "Commonwealth of PA Dep' of Envtl. Prot. v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

This case concerned the mechanics of NSTAR's, an electric distribution company, attempt to shift the recovery of one of it supply-related costs, supply-related bad debt costs, from its distribution rates to its supply rates. NSTAR filed a petition, through which it sought to begin recovery of its supply-related bad debt costs through its supply rates rather than, as before, through its distribution rates. Not withstanding that contention, the department conditioned its approval of NSTAR's petition on a corresponding reduction in NSTAR's distribution rates. The court concluded that the department had failed to provide an adequate statement of its reasons for imposing the condition. Specifically, the court was unable to determine whether this aspect of the department's order rested on a determination that NSTAR did not follow the correct procedural path in removing supply-related bad debt costs from its distribution rates, or rather on a determination that NSTAR did not in fact remove such costs from its distribution rates at all. The court concluded further that certain of the department's factual determinations were not adequately supported by subsidiary findings and that an aspect of the department's analysis was legally erroneous. Accordingly, the department's order was to be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "NSTAR Electric Co. vs. Dept. of Public Utilities" on Justia Law

Petitioners, nuclear power plant owners and operators, sought review of a November 2010 determination by the Secretary of Energy finding that there was no basis for suspending, or otherwise adjusting, annual fees collected from them totaling some $750 million a year. The court concluded that the Secretary had failed to perform a valid evaluation, as he was obliged to do under the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., but the court did not think it appropriate to order the suspension of the fee at this time. Instead, the court remanded to the Secretary with directions to comply with the statute within six months. View "Nat'l Assoc. of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

Petitioners, non-profit environmental protection organizations, filed petitions for judicial review challenging sixteen Department of the Interior (DOI) plan approvals, issued between March 29 and May 20, 2010, under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356a. The court concluded that: (1) petitioners' OCSLA-based challenges were justiciable, except for four, which have become moot; (2) the DOI's approval of the exploratory and development plans were subject to judicial review by the court under OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1349(c)(2); (3) petitioners' failure to participate in the administrative proceedings related to the DOI's approval of the plans as required by section 1349(c)(3) did not oust the court's jurisdiction because that participation requirement was a non-jurisdictional administrative exhaustion rule; but, (4) petitioners have not shown sufficient justification for excusing them from that exhaustion requirement in this case. Accordingly, except for four of petitioners' petitions for judicial review that were dismissed as moot, petitioners' petitions for judicial review were dismissed because of their failure to participate in the administrative proceedings. View "Gulf Restoration Network, Inc., et al. v. Salazar, et al.; Ctr for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

In expedited petitions for review, the court considered the allegations of petitioners that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) failed to discharge obligations under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) in approving Shell's plan for exploratory oil drilling in the Beaufort Sea. The court concluded that BOEM's decision that Shell's exploration plan complied with OCSLA's requirements was entitled to deference and was supported by the record as a whole. Accordingly, the court denied the expedited petitions. View "Native Village of Point Hope, et al. v. Salazar, et al.; Inupiat Community v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Seabrook appealed an order of the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) which granted Respondent NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra), several tax exemptions under RSA 72:12-a (Supp. 2011). Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the record supported DES' decisions except for one: the Court found no evidence in the record to support an increase in a percentage allocation allowed under the statute. Accordingly, the Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the DES' decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Town of Seabrook " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 38-5-105 C.R.S. (2011) granted condemnation authority to a company for the construction of a petroleum pipeline. Upon review, the Court concluded that the General Assembly did not grant expressly or implication, the power of eminent domain to companies for the construction of pipelines conveying petroleum. Therefore, section 38-5-105 did not grant that authority to Respondent Sinclair Transportation Company for its proposed pipeline project. The Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion that upheld the trial court's order granting Sinclair immediate possession of the property belonging to Petitioners Ivar and Donna Larson and Lauren and Kay Sandberg. View "Larson v. Sinclair Transp. Co." on Justia Law

Respondents-Appellants Darlene Hankison, Michael Flick, Steven Flick, David Flick, landowners in Wells County, and Weckerly F.L.P., a landowner in Sheridan County, appealed a Wells County district court judgment and a Sheridan County district court order that denied their motions to dismiss and granted Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc.'s petitions to enter their property to conduct testing and surveys. The Wells County district court held that for purposes of a petition to enter land for surveying and testing, Minnkota only needed to show it was in charge of a public use or it was in the category of persons entitled to seek eminent domain. The court determined Minnkota was in charge of a public use and also was entitled to seek eminent domain. The Sheridan County court held, under N.D.C.C. § 10-15-52, a foreign cooperative is entitled to all rights, exemptions, and privileges of a cooperative organized for the same purposes under the laws of this state when it is issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state. Minnkota was issued a certificate of authority from the secretary of state, and it is organized to provide power to its members. Because North Dakota electric cooperatives have authority to use eminent domain, the court determined Minnkota also has the power to use eminent domain. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district courts did not err in concluding that Minnkota was entitled to seek the power of eminent domain under North Dakota law. View "Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their conviction of and sentencing for false reporting of natural gas trades in violation of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), 49 U.S.C. 1491, and the federal wire fraud statute. The government alleged that defendants violated the CEA and the wire fraud statute by sending false information about natural gas prices to trade magazines that reported natural gas prices in indexes, in an effort to affect and manipulate those indexes, which, in turn, would affect the market for natural gas futures and benefit the company's financial positions. The court held that defendants failed to show clear error in the district court's factual findings, and under those facts, the court found that denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment was proper; the CEA covered no constitutionally protected speech; beyond the issue of whether the means rea applied to the final element of the false reporting offense - which the court was confident was harmless if it was erroneous - the court found no errors in the jury instructions and held that the cumulative error doctrine did not require reversal; defendants' argument that the district court erred by denying their motion for acquittal because they were convicted for answering fundamentally ambiguous questions was rejected; in regards to defendants' claims of evidentiary error, the district court did not err; and because the court found defendants' arguments unavailing, the court affirmed the sentences. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law