Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Ballard, successor in interest to Kilroy, sued Devon, successor in interest to Wise Oil, for breach of a provision in an American Association of Petroleum Land Men (AAPL) Model Form Operating Agreement (Operating Agreement) that was an exhibit to and incorporated by reference in a May 1971 Farmout Agreement (collectively, Joint Operating Agreement or JOA) between Kilroy and Wise Oil. Ballard's lawsuit turned on the interpretation of one sentence in the multi-paragraph "Area of Mutual Interest" (AMI) provision of the Operating Agreement. The court held that, because the entire AMI provision - including its acquisition provisions and its surrender provisions - expired before the claims asserted by Ballard arose, Devon had not breached its contract with Ballard, and the district court's summary judgment was proper. View "Ballard v. Devon Louisiana Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant John Madden appealed the Public Service Board's order granting a certificate of public good for Appellee Cross Pollination, Inc.'s planned construction of a solar energy farm in the Town of New Haven. Appellant claimed that the Board erred in applying 30 V.S.A. 248, which regulates the construction of electric generation facilities, and should not have issued the certificate because the solar farm will have an "undue adverse effect" on the aesthetics of the natural landscape as defined by 30 V.S.A. 248(b)(5). Appellant's issue on appeal was the Board's use of the "Quechee test" so named from the Supreme Court's decision in "In re Quechee Lakes Corp.," 580 A.2d 957 (1990)): that the Board erred in applying the Quechee test and should have concluded that under 30 V.S.A. 248(b)(5) the project would have an "undue adverse effect" on the aesthetics of the land, and as a result, no certificate of public good should have issued. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's findings in this case, and held that its decision was based on a correct reading of the law and is supported by its findings. View "In re Petition of Cross Pollination for a Certificate of Public Good" on Justia Law

MoGas Pipeline operated an interstate natural gas pipeline delivering natural gas to customers in Missouri. MoGas submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) two proposals for approval. In both instances, the Missouri Public Service Commission (PSC) intervened as a party in the related FERC proceedings and to protest MoGas' proposals. MoGas subsequently filed a petition with the PSC alleging that the PSC did not have authority to intervene in matters before the FERC and requesting that the PSC terminate its intervention in FERC cases concerning MoGas' operations. The PSC denied MoGas' petition. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the PSC's order was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the PSC has no authority to intervene in matters pending before the FERC, and accordingly, the PSC erred in denying MoGas' request that it terminate its intervention in FERC proceedings. View "State ex rel. MoGas Pipeline, LLC v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Mobil petitioned for review of the Commission's denial of Mobil's application for permission to charge market-based rates on Pegasus, in light of the competitiveness of the Western Canadian crude oil market and Pegasus's minor role in it. The court concluded that the Commission's decision was unreasonable in light of the record evidence where the record showed that producers and shippers of Western Canadian crude oil have numerous competitive alternatives to Pegasus for transporting and selling their crude oil; Pegasus did not possess market power; and therefore, the court granted Mobil's petition for review, vacated FERC's order, and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101-10270, authorizing the Department of Energy to enter into contracts with nuclear facilities for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). Congress mandated that, under the Standard Contract, DOE dispose of SNF and HLW beginning not later than January 31, 1998. In 1983, DOE entered into a Standard Contract with Consolidated Edison under which DOE agreed to accept SNF stored at the Indian Point facility. Following DOE’s breach, the Claims Court awarded two categories of damages: wet storage costs for continued operation of its Unit 1 spent fuel pool and regulatory fees paid to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Federal Circuit reversed the awards, affirmed denial of damages for the cost of financing mitigation activities, but reversed denial of damages for indirect overhead costs associated with mitigation. The company had chosen to prioritize removal of Unit 2 SNF and Unit 1 material would not have been removed by the time at issue; the company did not establish that the breach caused an increase in fees to the NRC. View "Consol. Edison Co. of NY, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Kenny and Shelia Staggs brought suit in circuit court seeking quiet title to the oil and gas rights on certain real property of which they claimed ownership of the surface and subsurface rights. The Staggses asserted that while Union Pacific Railroad Company claimed ownership of the oil and gas rights in the property and leased those rights to Heartland Exploration, it did so erroneously based on a 1934 deed. In the deed, Union Pacific's predecessor in title conveyed property to two individuals but reserved for itself "all the minterals" in or under the land. The Staggses contended that the oil and gas rights did not pass to Union Pacific but instead passed through the chain of title to them. Union Pacific, Heartland, and XTO Energy (collectively, Defendants) moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding that the general reservation of minerals in the 1934 deed included oil and gas as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on case law, the 1934 reservation at issue included any rights to oil and gas. View "Staggs v. Union Pac. R.R." on Justia Law

The Pascagoula School District (which contains a Chevron crude oil refinery and a Gulf liquified natural gas terminal) brought suit, seeking a declaration that a new law that mandated that revenue the District collected from ad valorem taxes levied on liquified natural gas terminals and crude oil refineries be distributed to all school districts in the county where the terminals and refineries were located was unconstitutional and requesting injunctive relief. All parties filed for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial judge ruled that the law was constitutional, and the plaintiffs appealed that decision. Because the Supreme Court found the contested statute violated the constitutional mandate that a school district's taxes be used to maintain "its schools," it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pascagoula School District v. Tucker" on Justia Law

John and Minerva Sutherland entered into a mining lease granting Meridian Granite Company the right to conduct mining operations on the Sutherlands' property. A dispute developed between the Sutherlands and Meridian regarding the Sutherlands' obligation to pay taxes relating to the mineral production. The dispute led to litigation. The district court granted Meridian's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Sutherlands were obligated to pay the disputed taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in allowing Meridian to deduct ad valorem and severance taxes from payments to the Sutherlands when such tax payments were not required by the State, as the Sutherlands and Meridian agreed in the mining lease that the Sutherlands would pay the taxes. View "Sutherland v. Meridian Granite Co." on Justia Law

Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. sought to recover over $30 million for the costs of restoring its system following the destruction caused by Hurricane Ike. The Public Utilities Commission allowed Duke to recover roughly half that amount, finding that several of Duke's requests lacked adequate supporting evidence. Duke appealed, raising five propositions of law, all variations on the theme that the Commission's order lacked record support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's finding reducing the amount that Duke could recover because it found substantial problems with the supporting evidence was confirmed by the record; and (2) each of Duke's arguments lacked merit. View "In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

The Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC) approved the issuance of a permit to TransCanada Maine Wind Development, Inc. to construct a wind energy facility. Friends of the Boundary Mountains (FBM) appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LURC (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying FMB's request to reopen a public hearing on TransCanada's original application or to conduct a new hearing on the amended application; (2) did not violate its own procedural rules; (3) properly handled consideration of several issues raised by FMB during the administrative proceedings; and (4) did not err in finding that TransCanada's wind energy project would provide significant "tangible benefits" under 12 Me. Rev. Stat. 685-B(4-B)(D). View "Friends of the Boundary Mtns. v. Land Use Reg. Comm'n" on Justia Law