Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Following about 30 years of oil extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Ecuadorians brought a variety of claims against the company and obtained judgment in Ecuador. Chevron, a potential judgment-debtor, brought action under New York’s Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301-5309, which allows judgment-creditors to enforce foreign judgments in New York courts, seeking a global anti-enforcement injunction against the Ecuadorians and their attorney to prohibit attempts to enforce the allegedly-fraudulent judgment entered by the Ecuadorian court. The district court granted the injunction. The Second Circuit reversed, vacating the injunction. The Recognition Act does not grant putative judgment-debtors a cause of action to challenge foreign judgments before enforcement of those judgments is sought. Judgment-debtors can challenge a foreign judgment’s validity under the Act only defensively, in response to an attempted enforcement.View "Chevron Corp. v. Donziger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Shell for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud, based on claims that Shell underpaid royalty due under a mineral lease to plaintiff's grandmother. At issue was whether limitations barred a royalty owner's claims against the operator of the field. The court held that the fraudulent concealment doctrine did not apply to extend limitations as a matter of law when the royalty underpayments could have been discovered from readily accessible and publicly available information before the limitations period expired. When, as in this case, the information was publicly available and readily accessible to the royalty owner during the applicable time period, a royalty owner who failed to take action did not use reasonable diligence as a matter of law. Accordingly, because the parties did not dispute that the pertinent information was readily accessible and publicly available, plaintiff's claims were time-barred as a matter of law. View "Shell Oil Co., et al. v. Ross" on Justia Law

Independence County and the City of Clarksville entered into a power purchase and sale agreement that included an arbitration provision. After the City informed the County that it was going to terminate the agreement, the County filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, ruling that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because (1) the City validly exercised its right to terminate the agreement, and without the revocation of the entire agreement, the City was released from the obligation to arbitrate; and (2) the arbitration agreement lacked mutuality of obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to the absence of mutuality of obligation, and the arbitration agreement was void on that basis. View "Independence County v. City of Clarksville" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270, to provide for government collection and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The NWPA authorized the Department of Energy to contract for disposal. In return for payment of fees into the Nuclear Waste Fund, the Standard Contract provided that the DOE would begin to dispose of SNF and HLW not later than January 31, 1998. Because collection and disposal did not begin, courts held that the DOE had breached the Standard Contract with the nuclear energy industry. The trial court found breach of plaintiff's contract, but granted summary judgment in favor of the government regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and set damages for the breach at $10,014,114 plus the cost of borrowed funds for financing construction of a dry fuel storage project. On reconsideration, the trial court reduced damages to $9,735,634 and denied the cost of borrowed funds. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to borrowed fund, but and reversed denial of overhead costs. View "System Fuels, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Respondent, widow of an employee of Pacific Operators Offshore, sought benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq., pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333(b), which extended LHWCA coverage to injuries "occurring as the result of operations conducted on the [OCS]" for the purpose of extracting natural resources from the shelf. The ALJ dismissed her claim, reasoning that section 1333(b) did not cover the employee's fatal injury because his accident occurred on land, not on the OCS. The Labor Department's Benefits Review Board affirmed, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit's "substantial-nexus" test was more faithful to the text of section 1333(b). The Court understood the Ninth Circuit's test to require the injured employee to establish a significant causal link between the injury that he suffered and his employer's on-OCS operations conducted for the purpose of extracting natural resources from the OCS. View "Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid" on Justia Law

El Paso operated an interstate pipeline that transported natural gas to California and other western states, and Freeport shipped gas on El Paso's pipeline to power its various mining, smelting, and refining facilities. El Paso and Freeport separately challenged several orders of the Commission issued in connection with El Paso's 2005 rate filing and subsequent settlement. The court denied the petition for review and held that the Commission's reasoning was sound when it found that the CAP Orders had neither changed the bargain underlying the 1996 Settlement nor abrogated Article 11.2 of the Settlement. The court also held that the Commission reasonably determined the converted FR contracts were "amended" within the meaning of that term in Article 11.2; Article 11.2 applied to turnback capacity; the applicable rate cap for turnback capacity was determined by the shipper's delivery point; Article 11.2 did not apply to capacity created by the Line 2000 project; and where the Commission adopted the presumption that the capacity of El Paso's system on December 31, 1995 was 4000 MMcf/d. The court further found that the Commission's approval of the Settlement appropriate under the so-called Trailblazer Pipeline Co. approach. Accordingly, the Commission's orders were not arbitrary or capricious and the petitions for review were denied. View "Freeport-McMoran Corp. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The petition for review before the court arose from a dispute between the IURC and PJM, which, subject to the Commission's oversight, operated the market for wholesale electricity in the District of Columbia and all or parts of 13 states, including Indiana. The IURC petitioned for review of an order of the Commission approving the tariff of PJM. The court dismissed the petition insofar as it challenged the order on grounds that the IURC did not raise with sufficient specificity in its request for rehearing by the Commission pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 825l(b). In all other respects, the court denied the petition because the IURC had not shown the Commission acted unreasonably. View "Indiana Utility Regulatory Comm. v. FERC" on Justia Law

In this action, the trial court granted summary judgment against a locality, holding it liable to landowners under the State Water Control Law, Va. Code Ann. 62.1-44.2 through -44.34:28, in particular Code 62.1-44.34:18(C) of the Oil Discharge Law, for the contamination of groundwater by leachate and landfill gas. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the landowners and finding the locality liable under the Oil Discharge Law, as the Oil Discharge Law does not apply to the passive, gradual seepage of leachate and landfill gas into groundwater. View "Campbell County v. Royal" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the court of appeals erred in (1) reversing a circuit court's judgment and applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to the State Water Control Board's decision to reissue a Virginia pollutant discharge elimination system permit to Virginia Electric and Power Company for its nuclear power station; and (2) reversing the circuit court and affirming the Board's determination that the discharge of heated water from the station into a waste heat treatment facility, classified as a "waste treatment facility" under state and federal regulations, did not require a separate discharge permit. For the reasons stated in Commonwealth v. Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Inc., the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Blue Ridge Envtl. Defense League v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Taxpayers were the owners of all or a portion of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on, and under each of their real property located in the counties party to this lawsuit. Taxpayers filed a complaint against the Counties, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that an ad valorem property tax was an illegal exaction. The circuit court concluded that Taxpayers had failed to make a proper illegal-exaction challenge and dismissed their lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the Taxpayers' complaint where (1) the crux of Taxpayers' argument was that the tax assessed against them was illegal because the assessment was flawed; and (2) the Taxpayers' avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with each county's equalization board. View "May v. Akers-Lang" on Justia Law