Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a negligence action brought by Plaintiff-Appellant Isabel Enriquez against Defendant-Respondent Idaho Power Company (Idaho Power). Plaintiff received severe electrical burns when he encountered an aluminum sprinkler pipe that had become energized by a high-voltage power line. He claimed that after the power line broke and electrified the pipe, Idaho Power's safety equipment did not shut off the current to the downed line, allowing him to be shocked when he approached the pipe to move it. The case went to trial, and Plaintiff argued that Idaho Power was negligent under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. At the close of Plaintiff's case in chief, Idaho Power moved for a directed verdict. The district court determined that res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the facts of this case and granted the motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in holding that res ipsa loquitur did not apply and the directed verdict was therefore improper. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted a directed verdict in favor of the power company. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co." on Justia Law

On GE’s complaint, the International Trade Commission conducted an investigation and, rejecting the findings of an ALJ determined that GE's 039 patent was not invalid by reason of obviousness or written description, that variable speed wind turbines imported by Mitsubishi do not infringe any of GE's patents, and that the domestic industry requirement is not met as to any of the patents. The Commission concluded that the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. 1337, was not violated. The 039 patent subsequently expired. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the 221 patent is not infringed, but reversed the determination of no domestic industry as to the 985 patent, and remanded. View "Gen. Elec. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case concerned three rivers which flow through Montana and then beyond its borders. At issue was whether discrete, identifiable segments of these rivers in Montana were nonnavigable, as federal law defined that concept for purposes of determining whether the State acquired title to the riverbeds underlying those segments, when the State entered the Union in 1989. Montana contended that the rivers must be found navigable at the disputed locations. The Court held that the Montana Supreme Court's ruling that Montana owned and could charge for use of the riverbeds at issue was based on an infirm legal understanding of the Court's rules of navigability for title under the equal-footing doctrine. The Montana Supreme Court erred in its treatment of the question of river segments and portage and erred as a matter of law in relying on evidence of present-day primarily recreational use of the Madison River. Because this analysis was sufficient to require reversal, the Court declined to decide whether the State Supreme Court also erred as to the burden of proof regarding navigability. Montana's suggestion that denying the State title to the disputed riverbeds would undermine the public trust doctrine underscored its misapprehension of the equal-footing and public trust doctrines. Finally, the reliance by petitioner and its predecessors in title on the State's long failure to assert title to the riverbeds was some evidence supporting the conclusion that the river segments over those beds were nonnavigable for purposes of the equal-footing doctrine. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed. View "PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana" on Justia Law

In 2008 the district court calculated damages for the government's partial breach of the Standard Contract for disposal of spent nuclear fuel using the 1991 Annual Capacity Report and the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit, having set the 1987 ACR as the appropriate acceptance rate for a causation analysis under the Standard Contract, remanded. On remand, the district court set the amount of damages at $89,004,415. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the new judgment accounts for the proper causation times and principle. View "Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Industrial Commission and Slawson Exploration Company appealed a district court judgment that reversed the Commission's assessment of a risk penalty against Gadeco, LLC. The issue in this case arose from a challenge to the validity of an invitation to participate in the cost of drilling a well which resulted in the Commission's assessment of a 200 percent risk penalty. Because the Supreme Court was unable to discern the basis for the Commission's decision, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the Commission for the preparation of findings that explain the reasons for its decision. View "Gadeco v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition with the court, purporting to challenge the NRC's decision to reinstate the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) construction permits for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant. Petitioner stated that it was not challenging the NRC order, but rather, petitioner asserted that its petitions for review challenged only a compilation of "Response Sheets" filed by individual Commissioners in December 2008 and January 2009. Petitioner contended that this compilation of Commissioners' views resulted in a final order on January 27, 2009. Under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2342(4), the court had jurisdiction to review only "final orders" of the NRC. The court held that the petitions at issue did not seek review of final NRC orders and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed. View "Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League v. NRC, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TBS. The appeal concerned the construction and application of the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (LOWLA), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:4861, et seq., on an issue of first impression. The court concluded that the district court authored a thorough and well-reasoned opinion concerning the substantive issues presented and affirmed the judgment. The district court had concluded that by providing survey and positioning services in Vermilion Block 313 in order to help remove a platform following well depletion, TBS performed "operations" under LOWLA. The work that TBS did was both "on a well site" and involved "abandoning a well" within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, the lien that TBS had asserted was valid and enforceable. View "Cutting Underwater Tech USA v. Eni U.S. Operating Co., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, Whitney Holding Corporation, challenged a decision of the district court quieting title in a certain mineral estate in favor of Appellees, Clarence and Peggy Terry. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the parties intended, and the limited warranty deed conveying the property from Whitney to the Terrys reflected, that Whitney did not reserve a mineral interest in the property; (2) the district court properly determined that the deed was ambiguous and did not err in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret the deed; and (3) the Terrys' quiet title action was not barred by the statute of limitations. View "Whitney Holding Corp. v. Terry" on Justia Law

BP appealed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Charles V. Stanley, Jr., and his business (defendants), in BP's action seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant in a deed. BP also appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs. The court held that the district court erred in finding the Petroleum Restriction (PR), in the Special Warranty Deed that was attached to the Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) at issue, was overbroad and unenforceable where the PR did not prohibit Stanley from operating a non-BP-branded vehicle repair business on his property so long as the business did not also sell non-BP-branded gasoline. The court also concluded that the PR's prohibition of the sale of certain enumerated items was too inconsequential to invalidate the entire PR. Therefore, the PR on the whole "afford[s] a fair protection" to BP's interest without being "so large as to interfere with the interests of the public." Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, vacated the fee and cost award, remanding for further proceedings. View "BP Products North America, Inc. v. Stanley, Jr." on Justia Law

This case arose out of plaintiffs' second challenge to the sufficiency of the DOE's Environmental Assessment (EA) of a prospective "biosafety level-3" (BSL-3) facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). On appeal, plaintiffs petitioned the court to require the DOE to prepare an Environment Impact Statement (EIS), or in the alternative, to revise its EA, in light of the allegations set forth in its original complaint, to determine whether an EIS was required. The court held that the DOE took the requisite "hard look" at the environmental impact of an intentional terrorist attack in the manner required by the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq., and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Tri-Valley Cares, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, et al." on Justia Law