Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

In this action, the trial court granted summary judgment against a locality, holding it liable to landowners under the State Water Control Law, Va. Code Ann. 62.1-44.2 through -44.34:28, in particular Code 62.1-44.34:18(C) of the Oil Discharge Law, for the contamination of groundwater by leachate and landfill gas. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the landowners and finding the locality liable under the Oil Discharge Law, as the Oil Discharge Law does not apply to the passive, gradual seepage of leachate and landfill gas into groundwater. View "Campbell County v. Royal" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the court of appeals erred in (1) reversing a circuit court's judgment and applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to the State Water Control Board's decision to reissue a Virginia pollutant discharge elimination system permit to Virginia Electric and Power Company for its nuclear power station; and (2) reversing the circuit court and affirming the Board's determination that the discharge of heated water from the station into a waste heat treatment facility, classified as a "waste treatment facility" under state and federal regulations, did not require a separate discharge permit. For the reasons stated in Commonwealth v. Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Inc., the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Blue Ridge Envtl. Defense League v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Taxpayers were the owners of all or a portion of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on, and under each of their real property located in the counties party to this lawsuit. Taxpayers filed a complaint against the Counties, seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that an ad valorem property tax was an illegal exaction. The circuit court concluded that Taxpayers had failed to make a proper illegal-exaction challenge and dismissed their lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the Taxpayers' complaint where (1) the crux of Taxpayers' argument was that the tax assessed against them was illegal because the assessment was flawed; and (2) the Taxpayers' avenue of relief for its assessment grievance lay with each county's equalization board. View "May v. Akers-Lang" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the deduction in RCW 82.04.433(1) applies to reduce Business and Occupation (B&O) taxes for manufacturing activities. Plaintiff Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company owns and operates a refinery in Washington state from which it processes crude oil from Alaska, Canada and other sources. The legislature created a tax deduction for the amount of tax "derived from the sales of fuel for consumption outside the territorial waters of the United States." On its monthly tax returns from 1999-2007, Tesoro reported its fuel sales on both the "Manufacturing" B&O tax line and the "Wholesaling and Retailing" B&O tax line. After completing an audit of the refinery, Tesoro requested a partial tax refund claiming the deduction against amounts paid in B&O tax on manufacturing from 1999 through 2004. The request was denied by the Department of Revenue's (DOR) appeals division on the ground that the deduction applied only to taxes paid under the "wholesaler and retailer" B&O tax line. Tesoro appealed to the superior court; the Court of Appeals held that the company could deduct the amount of its "offshore" bunker fuel sales from its B&O taxes. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the DOR: "the plain language of RCW 82.04.433(1) … indicates that the B&O deduction applies only to ... taxes on wholesale and retail sales, not on manufacturing." View "Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Tribes share an interest in a Wyoming Reservation. Consolidated suits, filed in 1979, claimed that the government breached fiduciary and statutory duties by mismanaging the Reservation's natural resources and income derived from exploitation of those resources. The Court of Federal Claims divided the suit into phases. One addressed sand and gravel and has been settled. The other two phases were devoted to oil and gas issues. An issue concerning the Government's failure to collect royalties after October, 1973 has been resolved. The final phase concerned pre-1973 oil and gas royalty collection and a series of discrete oil-and-gas issues. In 2007, the court granted the government judgment on the pleadings, finding that the claim was not filed within six years of the date on which it first accrued. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the claim asserted a continuing trespass, so that the Tribes can seek damages for trespasses which occurred within six years of the filing of this suit and all trespasses that occurred after the filing of this suit. The Tribes must establish that the government had a duty to eject trespassers from the parcels. View "Shoshone Indian Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

This case arose when Southern Power terminated its service agreement with Georgia Power, represented by Local 84, and Alabama Power, represented by Local 801-1, taking over four electricity generating plants' operations. Local 84 and Local 801-1 requested recognition, contending that Southern Power qualified as a successor employer to Georgia Power and Alabama Power. After a hearing, an ALJ found that Southern Power violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., ordering it to recognize and bargain with the unions. The ALJ also found that the three-plant bargaining unit represented by Local 84 was inappropriate. On March 20, 2009, the Board, acting with only two sitting members, issued an order affirming the ALJ's findings but found, however, that the Georgia Power three-plant bargaining unit was proper given the unit's bargaining history. Southern Power petitioned for review and the court remanded in light of New Process Steel, which required at least three members to exercise the Board's authority. On November 30, 2010, a three-member panel of the Board affirmed the ALJ's decision and adopted the recommended Order. Southern Power subsequently petitioned for review of the Board's November 30 Order. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider two of Southern Power's arguments, another was time-barred, and two others failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court denied the petition and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Southern Power Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, three sets of landowners asserted claims against Arrington for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment relating to Arrington's failure to pay cash bonuses under oil and gas leases. The district court granted summary judgment to the landowners on the breach of contract claims and thereafter dismissed the landowners' other claims with prejudice on the landowners' motions. The court rejected the landowners' assertion that the lease agreements could be construed without considering the language of the bank drafts; the drafts' no-liability clause did not prevent enforcement of the lease agreements; Arrington entered into a binding contract with each respective landowner despite the drafts' no-liability clause; the lease approval language of the drafts was satisfied by Arrington's acceptance of the lease agreements in exchange for the signed bank drafts and as such, did not bar enforcement of the contracts; Arrington's admitted renunciation of the lease agreement for reasons unrelated to title precluded its defense to the enforceability of its contracts; Arrington's admission that it decided to dishonor all lease agreements in Phillips County for unrelated business reasons entitled the landowners to summary judgment; there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Arrington disapproved of the landowner's titles in good faith. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claims. View "Smith, et al. v. David H. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.; Foster, Jr., et al. v. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc.; Hall, et al. v. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Baker Hughes Inteq, Inc. appealed the district court's order that denied its motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff EEC, Inc. and Baker contracted for Baker to provide drilling equipment for use in EEC's horizontal oil and natural gas well in Oklahoma. The equipment was lost in the well. EEC filed suit in Oklahoma state court alleging that Baker’s negligence damaged its well. Baker removed the case to federal court, invoked diversity jurisdiction, and filed counterclaims for the value of its equipment. Baker also sought to compel arbitration. Baker prepared and EEC signed numerous documents containing arbitration clauses which were ultimately ruled as unenforceable by the district court. The court also denied Baker’s motion to reconsider. Further, the court enjoined Baker from proceeding with arbitration, and stayed further district court proceedings pending appeal of its orders. Upon review of the arbitration clauses at issue in this case, the Tenth Circuit found disagreed that because there were differences in the multiple clauses they were rendered unenforceable. The Court reversed the district court's judgment denying Baker's motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case with directions to order the parties to pursue arbitration. View "EEC, Inc. v. Baker Hughes Oilfield" on Justia Law

This matter came before the court on a reservation and report by a single justice of the court of a decision and final order of the department approving a power purchase agreement (PPA) that National Grid entered into with Cape Wind. The four parties that brought the appeal were all interveners in the department's proceeding. They claim that the PPA violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution; the department improperly found that the PPA was cost effective and in the public interest; the contract should have been solicited through competitive bidding and subject to a cap on its size; and the department erroneously both approved a method for recovering costs from all distribution customers and required that the contract facilitate financing of a renewable energy generation source. The interveners sought reversal of the department's decision and order, and a remand to the department for further proceedings. The court reviewed the department's decision under G.L.c. 25, section 5, and gave deference to the department's expertise and experience, remanding to the county court where the single justice will affirm the department's decision. View "Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 1)" on Justia Law

The court addressed a procedural question that related to Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 1). At issue was whether the department committed error in denying the third motion filed by the Alliance to reopen the administrative record in the proceeding that the court reviewed in Alliance III. The court applied the more deferential standard of review that generally applied to procedural decisions by agencies on whether to reopen an administrative record and held that the department did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen a closed record in a completed proceeding in order to accept more information on the same points. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court where the decision of the department denying the motion to reopen the record was to be affirmed. View "Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 2)" on Justia Law