Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

TRCP filed for declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court, arguing that the Bureau of Land Management's 2008 Record of Decision regarding the Pinedale Anticline Project Area (PAPA) violated the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; that the accompanying environmental impact statement (EIS) violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.; and the 2000 Record of Decision violated both acts. The district court granted summary judgment for the Bureau and TRCP appealed. The court held that the Bureau considered a reasonable range of alternatives in the EIS addressing the proposal to expand natural gas development in the PAPA. That EIS sufficiently addressed the proposed action's impact on hunting in the PAPA. The record supported the Bureau's determination that the 2008 Record of Decision would prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the PAPA. Finally, TRCP's claims based on the Bureau's alleged non-enforcement of the 2000 Record of Decision were moot. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Clarkson and Company owned and leased land on which Continental Resources conducted oil and gas exploration activities. Continental agreed to pay Clarkson for use of and damage to Clarkson's property. Clarkson sued Continental, seeking declaratory relief to clarify the terms of the payment agreement Continental and Clarkson made. The trial court granted judgment to Clarkson for $164,102. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) Clarkson's claim was not barred by laches; (2) the agreement called for annual escalation of road use payments; (3) roads on land that Clarkson leased in 1981 and subsequently purchased were subject to the road use payment provision of the agreement; and (4) Clarkson was not entitled to a road use payment for a portion of existing road that Continental used to construct a new road. View "Clarkson & Co. v. Continental Res., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellees, record owners of surface property, brought an equitable action pursuant to Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes, claiming the property's severed mineral interests had been abandoned pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 57-229 and seeking an order vesting title to all several mineral rights in them. The district court entered an order finding Appellants, the owners of the severed mineral rights, had abandoned the mineral interests under section 57-229 because for more than twenty-three years preceding the filing of the complaint, Appellants had not publicly exercised rights of ownership. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Nebraska's dormant mineral statutes were not applied retroactively to Appellants and the district court did not err in determining that those interests had been abandoned under the provisions of section 57-229. View "Peterson v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Fitchburg appealed from a ruling of the department requiring it to reimburse its customers over $4.6 million in gas supply costs incurred during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 purchasing seasons. The court concluded that the department's determination that Fitchburg's purchasing plans required preapproval was erroneous, as the plans incorporated only traditional risk management techniques that had previously never been subject to the department's preapproval. Penalizing Fitchburg for failing to seek preapproval, when such preapproval was never required, exceeded the department's authority and amounted to an error of law. With respect to the allegedly imprudent purchases, the court agreed with the department that one of the purchases at issue was unreasonable and imprudent, but held that the department's findings of imprudence with regard to the balance of the purchases in 2007 and 2008 were not supported by substantial evidence. View "Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities" on Justia Law

NorthWestern Energy proposed constructing an electric transmission line from Montana to Idaho and submitted its application for a certificate from the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). While preparing a draft of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), Jefferson County informed DEQ that it expected DEQ to consult with the County in determining the route. Jefferson County subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus and injunction relief against DEQ, (1) seeking an order requiring DEQ to comply with the Montana Environmental Policy Act and other environmental legislation, and (2) requesting DEQ be enjoined from releasing a draft EIS. NorthWestern subsequently intervened. The district court ruled in favor of Jefferson County after determining that DEQ had not satisfied its duty to consult with Jefferson County under Mont. Code Ann. 75-1-201(1)(c) and enjoined DEP from releasing the Draft EIS until it had done so. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) at this stage in the process, DEQ had not violated a clear legal duty to consult with the County prior to issuing its draft EIS; and (2) because the County had adequate legal remedies once DEQ rendered a final agency action, the County was not entitled to mandamus or injunctive relief. View "Jefferson County v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

This case arose from an award by Golden Valley Electric Association (GVEA) of two competitively bid construction contracts on its Northern Intertie Project. In November 2001 GVEA awarded Global Power & Communications, LLC (Global) a $39.4 million contract (Contract NI-8) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River flats section. Later GVEA awarded Global an approximately $5.3 million contract (Contract NI-9) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River crossing and Fairbanks sections. Subsequently, after Global had been awarded NI-9 and before it had completed work on NI-8, Global presented GVEA with requests for additional compensation (RFIs) totaling approximately $2.4 million in connection with NI-8. GVEA responded that it found "no legitimate basis" to justify Global’s RFIs and rejected Global’s request for additional payment. Global also notified GVEA that Global would submit more RFIs, arising out of both NI-8 and NI-9. In all, Global sought additional compensation totaling $5.7 million under the two contracts. GVEA responded to Global denying most of the RFIs but indicated that it would approve a few and consider partial payment for a few others. Global sued, and a trial court ultimately held in GVEA's favor, awarding it costs under both the contract and the applicable state law. Global appealed, arguing among other things, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling in favor of GVEA. Upon review of the lengthy record from the trial court, the applicable legal authority and legislative history, and the two contracts in question, the Supreme Court partly affirmed and partly vacated the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for: (1) a fee determination regarding GVEA’s "UTPA" claim against Global and (2) a new trial on causation and damages relating to GVEA’s breach of NI-9. View "ASRC Energy Services Power v. Golden Valley Electric" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of a decision of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, an agency within the United States Department of Labor. The issue on appeal was whether a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector was authorized to designate the violation of a safeguard notice issued pursuant to section 314(b) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as "significant and substantial" under section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act, which limited the "significant and substantial" designation to a violation of a "mandatory health or safety standard." The court agreed with the Commission majority that the violation of a safeguard notice issued pursuant to section 314(b) amounted to a violation of section 314(b) and was therefore a violation of a mandatory safety standard which could be designated "significant and substantial." Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Wolf Run Mining Co. v. MSHR" on Justia Law

Renaissance Resources Alaska, LLC (Renaissance) partnered with Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation (Rutter) to develop an oil field. Renaissance and Rutter acquired a lease to the entire working interest and the majority of the net revenue interest of the field. They then formed a limited liability company, Renaissance Umiat, LLC (Umiat), to which they contributed most of the lease rights. But when they formed Umiat, Renaissance and Rutter did not contribute all of their acquired lease rights to the new company: they retained a 3.75% overriding royalty interest (ORRI). Rutter was eventually unable to meet the capital contributions required by Umiat's operating agreement and forfeited its interest under the terms of the agreement. Rutter filed suit against Renaissance seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to half of the retained 3.75% ORRI. Renaissance argued why it deserved the entire 3.75%: (1) Renaissance held legal title to the 3.75% ORRI; and (2) Rutter could only obtain title through an equitable remedy to which Rutter is not entitled. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that Renaissance's characterization was inaccurate and that Rutter was entitled to title to half of the 3.75% ORRI. Furthermore, Renaissance argued that the superior court should have found an implied term that Rutter would forfeit its share of the 3.75% ORRI if Rutter failed to contribute its share of expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that there was not such an implied term in the agreement. View "Renaissance Alaska, LLC, v. Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation" on Justia Law

KAAPA managed a facility that distilled corn into ethanol. KAAPA commenced a diversity action after Affiliated denied KAAPA's claim to recover the cost of extensive repairs and business interruption losses. A jury found that some losses were caused by "collapse" of storage tanks, awarded KAAPA property damage, but denied its claim for business interruption losses. Both sides appealed raising various issues. Applying Nebraska law, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Affiliated's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held, however, that the district court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on the meaning of the term "collapse" and remanded for a new trial. The court did not decide the loss-mitigation and other post-trial issues raised in KAAPA's cross-appeal. View "KAAPA Ethanol, LLC v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that Defendant BP America Production Company (BP) improperly deducted postproduction costs from royalty payments due between January 1986 and December 1997. To toll the applicable six-year statute of limitations, Plaintiffs claimed that BP fraudulently concealed material facts which gave rise to their claims. The trial court certified the class, and the appellate court affirmed. BP then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) proof of fraudulent concealment was inherently individualized, and not amenable to resolution on a class basis; and, (2) the class time period was overly broad and as a result, includes members who had no costs deducted under the "netback" methodology. BP thus argued that the trial court erred in certifying the class. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with either of BP's arguments, and affirmed the trial court's certification of the class. View "BP America Prod. Co. v. Patterson" on Justia Law