Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Jefferson Block submitted a claim under the London OPA Insurance Policy for Offshore Facilities (OPA Policy) for indemnification of the removal costs it incurred in responding to a pipeline leak. Underwriters denied the claim and Jefferson filed suit against Underwriters in district court, alleging that Underwriters wrongfully refused to indemnify it for oil pollution removal costs. The court held that the district court erred when it refused to apply the contra-insurer rule where the OPA Policy was ambiguous with respect to the issue of coverage for Jefferson Block's 16-inch pipeline and extrinsic evidence in the record did not conclusively resolve this ambiguity. Therefore, the court held that, since Jefferson Block offered a reasonable interpretation of the policy and did not completely draft the ambiguous provisions of the OPA Policy, the contra-insurer rule should apply and the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the insured, Jefferson Block. View "Jefferson Block 24 Oil & Gas, v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd., et al." on Justia Law

The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) approved an application by BHP Navajo Coal Company (BNCC) to revise the mining plan at its Navajo Mine. Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment and San Juan Citizens Alliance (collectively Citizens) sought the Tenth’s Circuit’s review of the application under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Navajo Mine is a large open pit coal mine on tribal reservation lands in northwestern New Mexico. BNCC operates the mine under a long-standing lease with the Navajo Nation and a surface coal mining permit issued by OSM. In October 2005, after performing an Environmental Analysis (2005 EA) and making a finding of no significant impact (FONSI), OSM approved the application. In July 2007, Citizens filed this case. BNCC intervened. The district court concluded OSM’s approval of BNCC’s application was the type of action which normally requires preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA rather than the less comprehensive Environmental Assessment. The court then turned to the 2005 EA and concluded it was deficient in several respects. It remanded the matter to OSM to correct the deficiencies and reassess its FONSI. OSM and BNCC appealed the court’s decision. OSM later dismissed its appeal, but BNCC attacked the district court’s decision on all fronts. Citizens claimed there was no final, appealable, order under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the district court remanded the case to OSM for further proceedings. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that there was no appealable order issued by the district court and dismissed the OSM’s and BNCC’s appeals. View "Dine Citizens Against Ruining the Environment v. Klein" on Justia Law

This case consolidated appeals that challenged the Public Regulation Commission's (PRC) effort to comply with the Efficient Use of Energy Act (EUEA).  The EUEA was amended by the Legislature, requiring the PRC to identify and remove regulatory disincentives to a public utility's implementation of energy efficiency programs.  To comply with this legislative mandate, the PRC issued a Final Order amending its Energy Efficiency Rules.  The Attorney General (AG) and the New Mexico Industrial Energy Consumers (NMIEC) separately appealed the PRC's Final Order, challenging the Final Order on several grounds.  The Supreme Court consolidated both appeals, and after reviewing the record, annulled and vacated the PRC's Final Order. View "New Mexico Att'y General v. Public Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Five companies entered into special contracts with the Toledo Edison Company for the sale of electricity. The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) established February 2008 as the termination date for the contracts, basing its finding on the language of the special contracts and its orders in earlier electric-deregulation cases. Appellants challenged the decision, contending (1) Toledo Edison agreed in 2001 that the contracts would not terminate until Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges from its customers, and (2) December 31, 2008 was the date when Toledo Edison stopped collecting regulatory-transition charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PUCO ignored the plain language of the 2001 amendments to Appellants' special contracts, and accordingly, the PUCO unlawfully and unreasonably allowed Toledo Edison to terminate the special contracts in February 2008. View "Martin Marietta Magnesia Specialties, L.L.C. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n " on Justia Law

American Electric Power operating companies (AEP) had been providing service to a pair of manufacturing customers at discounted rates. AEP had been keeping track of its delta revenue, the difference between what AEP would have collected under its tariffs and what it actually collected with the discount, and intended to collect it through a rider. In the case below, AEP filed an application seeking permission to collect its delta revenue through the rider. Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) opposed both requests. The Public Utilities Commission rejected IEU's arguments and allowed the American Electric Power operating companies (AEP) to recover the costs arising from the discounted-rate arrangements. IEU appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) IEU did not show that the Commission erred in modifying the phase-in of AEP's rates, and (2) IEU did not show that the Commission erred in calculating AEP's carrying charges. View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

Original defendants wanted to build a power plant in southern Illinois. In the first appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that defendants' Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) permit (42 U.S.C. 7475(a)), had expired. After the ruling, the district court assessed a penalty of $100,000 on all defendants, jointly and severally, and awarded attorneys' fees to Sierra Club. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that defendant waived constitutional arguments by not raising them before the district court. The court acted within its discretion; it considered all of the relevant statutory factors and did not make any clearly erroneous findings of fact in assessing a penalty and awarding fees. View "Sierra Club v. Khanjee Holding (US) Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, Summer Night Oil Company, and Appellees, individuals and oil companies, resolved a dispute over the operation of two oil wells through a settlement agreement. Appellant filed a motion to compel performance of the agreement after the parties failed to perform timely their obligations under the agreement. Specifically, Appellant asked the district court to compel Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents under the agreement. Appellees responded with a request to compel Appellant to pay a fine due to the EPA and a payment owed to Appellees under the agreement. Both parties sought attorney fees. The district court enforced what it determined to be the plain meaning of the agreement's terms, and (1) ordered Appellant to pay the fine owed to the EPA, (2) ordered Appellant to pay Appellee the amount owed it under the agreement, (3) ordered Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents to an escrow agent, and (4) declined to award attorney fees to either party. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion to compel performance of the agreement according to Appellant's terms, and (2) the district court correctly denied Appellant's motion to alter or amend its judgment. View "Summer Night Oil Co. v. Munoz " on Justia Law

Appellants, Marion Energy and the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, leased and owned oil and gas deposits lying underneath property owned by the KFJ Ranch Partnership. In order to build a road to access those deposits, Appellants sought to condemn a portion of KFJ's land by relying upon a statute that permits the exercise of eminent domain for the construction of roads to facilitate the working of mineral deposits. The district court dismissed Appellants' condemnation action, concluding that the statute did not provide the authority to take land for roads to access oil and gas deposits. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the phrase "mineral deposits" in the statute was ambiguous, and because all ambiguities in a statute purporting to grant the power of eminent domain are strictly construed against the condemning party, Appellants were not authorized by the statute to condemn KFJ's land. View "Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship" on Justia Law

In 1983, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, authorizing contracts with nuclear plant utilities, generators of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HWL) under which the gVovernment would accept and dispose of nuclear waste in return for the generators paying into a Nuclear Waste Fund, 42 U.S.C. 10131. In 1983, the Department of Energy entered into the standard contract with plaintiff to accept SNF and HLW. In 1987, Congress amended the NWPA to specify that the repository would be in Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The government has yet to accept spent fuel. The current estimate is that the government will not begin accepting waste until 2020, if at all. In 2001, plaintiff began constructing dry storage facilities to provide on-site storage for SNF rather than to continue using an outside company (ISFSI project). The Court of Federal Claims awarded $142,394,294 for expenses due to DOE’s breach; 23,657,791 was attributable to indirect overhead costs associated with the ISFSI project. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Breach of the standard contract caused plaintiff to build, staff, and maintain an entirely new facility; the ISFSI facilities had not existed prior to the breach and were necessitated by the breach. View "So. CA Edison Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant Alabama Power Company filed a petition for the writ of mandamus to ask the Supreme Court to direct the trial court to dismiss Plaintiff Capitol Container, Inc.'s claims against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Alabama Power argued the Alabama Public Service Commission (APSC) had exclusive jurisdiction over those claims Capitol filed, and Capitol failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its action. Upon review of the record below, the Supreme Court found that Capitol indeed failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its suit against the power company. The Court issued the writ. View "Capitol Container, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co." on Justia Law