Justia Energy, Oil & Gas Law Opinion Summaries

Confronting a statewide budget crisis, the Nevada Legislature undertook several revenue-adjustment and cost cutting measures in an effort to balance the State's budget. Those measures were codified in Assembly Bill 6 (AB 6). In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked whether parts of AB 6 violated the Nevada Constitution. The disputed section of the bill applied only to Appellant Clean Water Coalition (CWC), and converted money collected as user fees into a tax. The CWC used moneys it collected from households and businesses to implement the Systems Conveyance and Operations Program (SCOP) which involved the planning, design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of a regional system to convey effluent from existing and future wastewater treatment facilities to its outfall in the Colorado River system. The CWC collected fees from 2002 until 2010. SCOP was tabled, and the funds collected for the wastewater facilities were transferred to the State's General Fund. M Resort and other businesses that had paid the fees sued the State, challenging the conversion of the CWC fees into what they argued was essentially a special tax. "Special taxes" are prohibited by the state constitution. The Supreme Court held that because AB 6 "burdens only the CWC in its efforts to raise revenue for the state, it is an impermissible local and special tax" under the state constitution. The Court found AB 6 unconstitutional.

The Idaho Department of Water Resources (Department) appealed an order of the district court that required it to strike a term from a hydropower water right license issued to the Idaho Power Company. In 1984, an agreement was entered into between Idaho Power, the State, the governor, and the attorney general, in an effort to resolve a controversy associated with the company's water rights at the Swan Falls Dam. As part of the Swan Falls agreement, the parties agreed to support legislation for the commencement of an adjudication of water rights in the Snake River Basin. One key piece of the legislation that was passed pursuant to the Swan Falls Agreement gave the Department specific authority to subordinate hydropower rights in a permit or license to the rights of subsequent upstream depletionary users. The Department was also authorized to limit a permit or license involving hydropower to a term of years. The Department issued a final order that articulated the legal basis for including the "term of years" condition in the license to Idaho Power. The Company sought judicial review of the Department's final order, arguing that the Department did not have statutory authority to include a term condition in its license. The court indeed concluded that the Department did not have the authority to limit the license. The Department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Department had the statutory authority to include a term condition in Idaho Power's license. The Court reversed the district court's decision.

Three questions of law were certified to the Supreme Court from the federal district court. The certified questions arose from a complaint from Petitioner Hempstead County Hunting Club, Inc. (Hempstead). Hempstead contended that Respondent Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) violated multiple public utilities statutes in the construction of its "Turk Plant." The first question from the federal court involved whether Hempstead was required to bring its claims before the state Public Service Commission (PSC) before suing in federal court. The Supreme Court concluded that under Arkansas law, Hempstead was first required to bring its claims before the Arkansas PSC. A court review of its claims should be precluded until Hempstead exhausted its administrative remedies. As a result, the Supreme Court did not address the remaining two certified questions.

In October 2008, the Idaho Power Company (Company) filed an application with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) seeking to modify its âline extensionâ tariff that applied to requests for electrical service that required the installation, alteration, relocation, removal or attachment of company-owned distribution facilities. As homes are constructed in a subdivision, the homeowner requests to be connected to power, and the Company installs wiring from a transformer to the house at no cost to the homeowner. The cost of constructing new distribution facilities had been paid partially from up-front capital contributions from developers, and partially from electric rates charged to all customers. Under the old tariff, the Company gave developers a âline installation allowanceâ to offset a portion of the developersâ costs in having the Company construct distribution facilities. The allowance was equal to the Companyâs cost of providing and installing transformers within the subdivision. Per-lot refunds were refunded to the developer when a permanent residence connected to electrical service and occupied a lot within five years. The per-lot refunds could be as much as $800 each. In this proceeding, the Company sought to change line installation allowances to fixed sums. It also wanted to eliminate the per-lot refunds. The Building Contractors Association of Southwestern Idaho filed a petition to intervene in the proceeding. The Contractors sought to increase per-lot refunds. The IPUC granted the Companyâs request to change the line extension allowance to a fixed sum. The Contractors asked the IPUC to reconsider tariff change, but the IPUC denied the request. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Contractors challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the Power Company to support the tariff change. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the IPUCâs decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the IPUCâs decision to change the power companyâs tariff.

In October 2008, the Idaho Power Company filed an application with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) to modify its tariff. Some of the proposed amendments applied to the relocation of utilities facilities within public rights-of-way. The City of Nampa and the Association of Canyon County Highway Districts intervened in the proceedings, and each objected to the Companyâs proposed amendments to the tariff. The IPUC approved the amendments, and Ada County Highway District (ACHD) filed a petition or reconsideration and clarification. Specifically, ACHD argued that the IPUC exceeded its authority in approving the amendments and that portions of the amended tariff were âan unlawful attempt to amend or abrogate the common law rule requiring a utility to relocate its facilities placed in a public right-of-way at its expense.â Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the IPUC exceeded its authority in determining utilities relocation within public rights-of-way. The Court set aside the amended tariff.

The Ohio Public Utilities Commission approved a âprogram portfolio planâ proposed by Appellee American Electric Power (SEP). The plan contained a variety of programs designed to increase energy efficiency and reduce peak demands on AEPâs system. Appellant Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) challenged the PUCâs approval of the plan to the district court, arguing that the plan was too costly, was not energy-efficient, and did not meet the requirements imposed under the applicable state laws. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that IEUâs challenges âall lack merit.â The Court affirmed the lower courtâs and PUCâs decisions approving the plan.

The Ohio Public Utilities Commission (PUC) approved âreasonable arrangementsâ between American Electric Power Company (AEP) and two manufacturing firms, Ormet Primary Aluminum (Ormet) and Eramet Marietta, Inc. (Eramet). The arrangements gave substantial price discounts on electric service. The PUC approved the arrangements and allowed AEP to collect from other customers most of the revenue foregone to the discounts. Ormet asked the commission to approve an arrangement linking Ormetâs electric rate to the market price of aluminum; Eramet asked for a fixed discounted rate. The PUC held public hearings to consider the manufacturersâ applications, and numerous parties intervened, including Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU). Disagreements regarding both applications centered on the amount of the discount and who should pay for it. The PUC issued orders permitting discounted rates to the manufacturers, but the PUCâs plan was not exactly what AEP had proposed. AEP appealed the PUCâs decision, arguing that the discounts do not allow the power company to recoup its losses from the plan discounts. The Supreme Court found that state law âaffirmatively gives the commissionânot the utilitiesâfinal say over arrangementsâ like the ones decided for Ormet and Eramet. The Court affirmed the PUCâs decisions regarding the manufacturing companiesâ arrangements.

Appellants challenged a district courtâs discovery order that directed them to disclose what they called privileged information. To achieve this end, the Appellants filed an interlocutory appeal and a petition for writ of mandamus with the Tenth Circuit. The Appellants in this case include motor fuel retailers and the retail motor fuel trade associations to which the retailers belong. The Plaintiffs in this case are consumers and other interested parties. Collectively they filed twelve putative class action cases in seven federal district courts. The Plaintiffs alleged that the retailersâ âvolumetric pricing systemâ for retail motor fuel overcharges customers. When the temperature of the fuel rises, the fuelâs volume expands, but the actual energy content stays the same â customers pay for âmoreâ fuel but half the energy. Plaintiffs allege that the temperature fluctuations and fuel volumes are accounted for in every aspect of the Appellantsâ âvolumetric pricing systemâ except at the retail level, thus overcharging retail customers. The Tenth Circuit held that Appellants devoted a majority of their appellate brief to their contention that a First Amendment privilege should be presumed with respect to the information Plaintiffs sought to discover. However, Appellants made an âunwise strategic decisionâ by seeking a presumption when they failed to prove the information was indeed privileged. The Court dismissed Appellantsâ interlocutory appeal and denied their application for writ of mandamus.

Pursuant to an oil and gas lease with Appellee Trees Oil Company (Trees), Appellant Arthur Hockett had a 1/8-royalty interest in the production from a Haskell County well that produced natural gas. Trees operated the well, and sold the gas produced to âfirst purchasers.â Before paying Trees for production, the first purchasers deduct taxes and fees imposed by the state. Trees then pays Appellant 1/8 of the net sales proceeds. In 2009, Appellant filed a complaint against Trees, seeking recovery of the amount in tax deducted from the sales proceeds from the first purchasers. Trees moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that it could not be held liable for complying with state law by paying the sales taxes. The district court held that the taxes and fees were to be imposed on all owners in the venture, including royalty owners. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court found that state law does not require royalty owners pay the oil and gas taxes and fees if they do not operate the well. The fees withheld by the first purchaser are an expense attributable to the oil company as the well operator. In computing Appellantâs royalties, Trees was not permitted to deduct the amount of its fees expenses from the gross sale price under contract with the first purchaser. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court erred in ruling in favor of Trees. The Court remanded the remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 1953, Standard Oil Company owned a refinery in Mandan, and the Northern Pacific Railway Company owned land between the refinery and the Heart River. Northern Pacific executed a written permit granting Standard Oil permission to construct a pipeline along Northern Pacificâs right-of-way from the refinery to the river. The permit provided that Standard Oil could not transfer or assign the permit without Northern Pacificâs permission. In 1998, Northern Pacificâs successor-in-interest sold the portion of land that contained Standard Oilâs pipeline. In 2001, Standard Oilâs successor-in-interest, sold the refinery. In 2004, Tesoro, the new owner of the refinery, filed a âNotice of Permitâ along with the 1953 permit, with the Recorderâs Office. Later that year, the property was sold to Riverwood Commercial Park. Disputes arose between Riverwood and Tesoro over Riverwoodâs planned development of the property. The dispute bounced between the district and Supreme Court for various theories of recovery. Riverwoodâs theories centered on the characterization of the 1953 âpermitâ: all of Riverwoodâs claims would fail as a matter of law if the 1953 permit was not a license but an easement. After thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the 1953 permit was indeed an easement, and affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Tesoro and Standard Oil.